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/// *THE POLISH PEASANT* FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A CENTURY

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INTRODUCTION

Today, a hundred years or so after the original publication of the five volumes of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918–1920), the work is considered to be the very first masterpiece of qualitative sociology and the very first sociological analysis of migration. The hundredth anniversary of the book's publication has occasioned a number of publications and conferences commemorating the outstanding work and its authors. William Thomas's and Florian Znaniecki's fascinating biographies and intellectual trajectories crossed in 1913, when Thomas visited Warsaw in order to find help in the realization of a grand research project concerning the migration of Eastern Europeans to the United States.

Thomas's empirical inquisitiveness, combined with the depth of Znaniecki's systematical thought, resulted in a very broad and theoretically creative contribution to the sociological canon. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* pioneered or significantly enriched empirical research in such areas as the structure of ethnic identity, values and attitudes, organisation, disorganisation and reconstruction, pathologies of social consciousness, subcultures, urban influences, interaction between old and new worlds, Americanisation, deviance, relationships between individual attitudes, and control and social constraints. In general, it opened the way to empirically based analyses of modernity, especially studies that took modernity's dark sides into account.

The Polish Peasant is widely recognised to be a milestone of the Chicago school of sociology, but its influence is much broader, even if its theoretical programme and empirical material were not fully satisfactory even for Thomas and Znaniecki. As far as theoretical issues are concerned, the authors were both attracted by, and distanced from, the most influential social theories of their times. The parallels between their thoughts and pragmatism are unquestionable but still not fully analysed. Elżbieta Hałas

is probably the author who has gone furthest in demonstrating Znaniecki's originality in the context of pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. On the other side of the ocean, Norbert Wiley interpreted Thomas and Znaniecki's ideas as an important contribution to the emergence of the "semiotic self," without, however, reducing Thomas and Znaniecki's work to pragmatism and by emphasising Kantian elements in Znaniecki's philosophy.

A comprehensive study of *The Polish Peasant*, as well as of Thomas's and Znaniecki's other works, still needs to be written. The present issue does not claim to outline such a project but hopes to call attention to several questions that have either been overlooked or did not play a central role in previous interpretations of *The Polish Peasant*. We open the issue with an English translation of Florian Znaniecki's article, "Elements of Practical Reality," from which it can be seen that the idea of biographical studies followed from Znaniecki's early philosophy and not solely from Thomas's anthropological approach. As Znaniecki clearly stated in the paper, "a social value must be considered in its emergence. […] all 'pictures' of social life at a certain moment, which are so numerous especially in the history of literature, the history of art, etc., have absolutely no scientific significance" (38–39). Znaniecki's text also clearly shows that in 1912 his thought was already evolving towards sociological questions and concepts.

In the first contemporary text of the issue, Łukasz Dominiak focuses on Znaniecki's biography and raises doubts as to whether Znaniecki's work should be interpreted primarily through the lens of pragmatist influences. Instead, Dominiak argues that Bergsonian and Durkheimian inspirations played a much more significant role in Znaniecki's philosophical arguments, as well as in the main themes of *The Polish Peasant*.

Michał Kaczmarczyk, whose article may be read as a commentary on "Elements of Practical Reality," elucidates the advantages of Znaniecki's approach to the idea of values and compares it to other major theories of values in sociological theory. He argues that Znaniecki's collaboration with Thomas, which was interesting in itself, was also an opportunity for the Polish philosopher to apply his early ideas in sociological research.

In contrast to Kaczmarczyk, Łukasz Remisiewicz is concerned with Thomas's evolution from having a relatively simple quasi-behaviouristic approach to a much more balanced explanatory model in which nature and culture constitute a complex unity of interconnected empirical phenomena.

Remisiewicz places Thomas's intellectual trajectory in the context of major shifts in the relationship between biology and the social sciences.

Bogna Dowgiałło ties *The Polish Peasant* to the contemporary sociology of emotions by reconstructing Thomas and Znaniecki's theoretical models: in particular, their overcoming of the dualism of the individual and society. In Dowgiałło's interpretation, the focus on migration and the disorganisation of family life in the long term allowed the authors to identify several mechanisms of affective adaptation.

Sylwia Urbańska identifies gender biases and patriarchal schemes in Thomas and Znaniecki's work in order to reconstruct their "morally healthy" model of a national and patriarchal rural community of families untouched by individualisation and women's emancipation. As Urbańska writes, "[i]n *The Polish Peasant* we can find both a nostalgia – which was typical of its era – for a 'pre-modern,' rural, conservative civilisation, and worry about the moral health of women in the urban world. However, it is an ambivalent nostalgia, accompanied by a conviction of the inevitability of social change" (138).

The review section is opened by Marta Bucholc's essay "*Ubi Caritas*…," in which she criticises the diagnosis of Polish religiosity in Mirosława Grabowska's book *Bóg a sprawa polska* [God and the Polish cause], and consequently delivers a bitter appraisal of the condition of the Polish Church. Grabowska responds at length, defending the historical role of the Church and emphasising the broader context, which is necessary, according to her, for a just evaluation of the role of religion in Polish public life. Marta Kołodziejska's book *Online Catholic Communities*, which is reviewed by Antoni Głowacki, is an empirical analysis of the online Catholic community. Next, Justyna Weber presents Katarzyna Leszczyńska's work *Płeć w instytucje uwikłana* [Gender entangled in institutions], in which the author studies research on stereotypes of masculinity and femininity among lay people working in the Polish Church. From the nature of the subject, all these works concerning Polish religiosity also always concern the essence of Polish society.

Dominika Michalak reviews Krzysztof Jaskułowski's book *The Everyday Politics of Migration Crisis in Poland*, which is the first qualitative analysis of Polish attitudes to the migration crisis after 2015. Tomasz Rakowski's book, *Przepływy, współdziałania, kręgi możliwego* [Inflows, cooperation, the realm of the possible], which Aleksandra Bilewicz reviews, changes the geographical context to Mongolia but remains within the thematics of this

issue as it concerns models of socio-economic transformation. Lastly, in reviewing Karolina Wigura's book *Wynalazek nowoczesnego serca* [Discovery of a modern heart], Agata Łukomska discusses how the work of this historian of ideas sheds light on contemporary social and political emotions.

Michał R. Kaczmarczyk

IN MEMORIAM:
ARKADIUSZ PEISERT


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IN MEMORY OF ARKADIUSZ PEISERT

Arkadiusz Peisert, assistant professor at the Institute of Sociology of the University of Gdańsk, died on 13 November 2019 in Gdańsk. He was a valued researcher on cooperatives and civil society, a solid scholar, and a colleague with a great sense of humour. He was a graduate of interdepartmental individual humanist studies at the University of Warsaw and defended his doctorate in sociology at the UW Institute of Applied Social Sciences. He then moved to the University of Gdańsk, where he worked in the Department of General Sociology and next in the Department of Sociological Theory and Social Science Methodology.

He was an outstanding sociologist of law and of civil participation. His significant body of scholarly work contains publications of a quite varied nature, from in-depth empirical studies such as "Spółdzielnie mieszkaniowe: pomiędzy wspólnotą obywatelską a alienacją" [The housing cooperative: Between the civil community and alienation] to theoretical essays such as "Społeczeństwo obywateli? Obywatelskość w procesie cywilizowania" [A civil society? Citizenship in the civilising process], inspired by Norbert Elias's book. The latter essay contains many valuable pointers on how organisational mechanisms can further the resolution of difficult social conflicts and the healing of deep divisions. It is thus particularly worth recommending to contemporary politicians, managers, and local government officials.

Arkadiusz Peisert was the author of numerous articles and expert reports and was engaged in the academic life of many institutions, associations, and discussion clubs. He was active in the Gdańsk branch of the Polish Sociological Society and in the European Sociological Association, where he was a member of the board for the Research Network "Sociology of Transformations: East and West." Among his many other activities, his work as a member of the editorial board of *Stan Rzeczy* should be men-

tioned. He was one of the group that established the journal. He passed away before he could bring many of his creative ideas and scholarly projects to completion. He was always a helpful, sociable, and trustworthy person. It is very hard for his friends, colleagues, and students to come to terms with his death.

ARTICLES

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ELEMENTS OF PRACTICAL REALITY[1]

Florian Znaniecki

Every phenomenon that could be considered a single element of a certain multiplicity, we call an element; the collection of all phenomena constituting the material of activity we call practical reality. We include here thus all phenomena that are usually defined as motives, aims, means, and the results of acting, regardless of whether they relate solely to the individual or whether they have a social nature. Thus both sensory phenomena and cultural phenomena, that is, those which appear in sensory form yet have significance that is not exhausted by their sensory content, are included here. For the time being, though, we understand activity solely as a process of conscious transformation: the changing of phenomena, in either their sensory form or their cultural significance. Therefore, it is obvious that our entire experience, without exception, can be viewed as practical reality, because there are no phenomena that cannot be changed and that have not been changed by humans in conscious life. Even phenomena that are apparently in their nature entirely independent of our activity (for instance, astronomical phenomena) change their significance in accord with the development of thought about them, or, in other words, they are not only natural phenomena, they are also cultural phenomena. The designation of practical reality and its elements cannot thus be accomplished with the help of a simple indication and the separation of a certain group of phenomena from other groups, but only by discovering those general characteristics

[1] Originally published as "Elementy rzeczywistości praktycznej" in *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, vol. 15 (1912), pp. 161–187. The translation is based on a reprint of the paper featured in the first volume of Znaniecki's collected works (*"Myśl i rzeczywistość" i inne pisma filozoficzne*, ed. J. Wocial, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe (1987)).

thanks to which any phenomenon becomes an element of practical reality, a link and material of activity.

The above definition is thus solely temporary in the sense that it is not at all the result of theoretical reflection on an element of practical reality but is a departure point for such reflections. Our task will be to designate elements of practical reality, that is, to reveal the traits thanks to which a phenomenon is a link in activity. Our task, however, is not theoretical reflection on activity; we will content ourselves with indicating the processes labelled by the term, which are known to everyone. In actuality, we are compelled to designate elements of practical reality on the basis of their relation to activity; yet to this end, defining activity as the process of a conscious change in phenomena is entirely adequate.

I

According to a theory that is today very widespread,[2] science is the continuation of practical thought: activity defines the general outlines of that reality known to the science of nature; the process of those thought functions featured and elaborated in full in the process of scientific research has its beginning in activity.

This theory is correct in every regard. Above all, it takes into consideration the significant historical order of succession of types of thinking: knowledge developed later than practical activity. It also emphasises, entirely correctly, the importance of practice as a basic factor in the genesis of cognition. But the very process of that genesis gives it a false significance. It is not true that activity itself found its further course in cognition so that the form which today we find or produce in scientific study of the natural world should be merely the perfection of that form which the world assumed for practical life. This last form exists till this day as something fundamentally different from the type of the theoretically studied world. Activity created – and has been creating to this point – only certain thought sequences, which in developing produce cognition, but each of which, taken as a whole, constitute *the sole* link of the practical process within whose boundaries it arose. The first and last element of this sequence, that is, the initial situation, which theoretical reflection is to resolve, and the result of reflection, constituting the departure point for further activity,

[2] Cf. H. Bergson, *Evolution créatrice*, chapter III, E. Le Roy, "Science et philosophie," *Revuede Métaphisique* 7; H. Poincaré, *Science et hypothèse*; Wilbois, *La Méthode des sciences physiques*. The pragmatic part contains this statement. Cf. also E. Mach, *Erkenntnis und Irrtum*.

are undeniably conditioned by the entire practical process in the course of which they appear, but the passage from the first element to the last, the choice of intermediary elements and their mutual relation – in a word, what is properly cognitive in resolving a practical situation – distinguishes itself as something fundamentally different from the whole process of activity. The longer the path between the elements at the extremes – the situation and its resolution – the richer, the more varied, and the more independent will be the internal relations of that theoretical sequence and the more independence the study will acquire. So in the course of the development of conscious life ever longer, richer, more theoretically complex theoretical sequences are created. In the end, the division of social work causes such a theoretical sequence to fill a large part of the life of certain human individuals. Then a given theory can still be considered as one element of practical life, in so far as we take it in connection with the whole of social life: it most often arose on the basis of a social-practical situation and will render a social-practical service. But for the individuum creating it, it will be solely a theory, without connection to practical life. The first and last member, the practical situation and its resolution, will be entirely forgotten. The relation between knowledge and activity is reversed: for a given individuum (or even a given group – a scientific body) it is no longer practical activity that will define the departure point and task of theoretical thinking, but on the contrary, the theoretical situation will designate the basic elements for that separate type of activity that is cognitive thinking. In a word, what happens is that the choice and relation of phenomena in the theoretical sequence will be entirely independent of practical substance.

This is the level of evolution on which natural science finds itself. Obviously, the type of reality it studies can have nothing in common with the type of reality with which activity in itself deals – that activity which produces a theoretical sequence as one of its own links. It is also obvious that cognitive thinking, considered solely in terms of its object – the association of phenomena in theoretical sequences – will be something fundamentally different from a practical thought. Even then, when we note that the very creation of scientific theories is a certain kind of activity, we must be aware that that activity – to the degree that it is already adapted to the requirements of the theoretical situation – acquires traits that are entirely its own: from an activity it becomes cognitive thought. In fact, this self-adaptation never appears at once but is rather achieved gradually; even in individual scientific thinking the association of phenomena or theoretical views is from the beginning practical to a lesser or greater degree and only by way

of eliminating practical factors and introducing ever more new theoretical relations does it come closer to having a purely theoretical character. But only then, when the given association of phenomena or views achieves that nature, is the theory ready and its elaboration will be something fundamentally different than the process that brought it to the level of theory. In the evolution of knowledge, the life process of accepting new theories and rejecting old ones will be practical, but never the thought process, which as a logical function associates elements of theory with each other, extends the theory to new experiences, or combines more specific theories in a more general system. In short, knowledge, on account of its historical connection with other areas of individual and social life, is a phenomenon of a practical nature on account of its relation to the material it elaborates – theoretical thinking.

Scientific creativity can be placed in an even row with other types of creativity: moral, aesthetic, and religious. All these types of creativity gradually came to be differentiated within practical activity and have the same general basic traits, but to these are added specific new ones, differentiating those types of creativity from one another and separating them from their common practical base. The development of these specific traits goes in tandem with the creation of combinations of phenomena, which are independent on the inside from the general practical process; in associating the phenomena, inside every combination, thought processes occur in which those specific traits differentiating them from activity in general have dominant significance. On the exterior, however, each of these relations, considered as a whole, is a link in practical life, and a distinct cognitive, aesthetic, moral, or religious thought may at any moment enter the composition of its practical base.

A moment comes, however, when theoretical creation turns back from nature, which was its proper subject, and chooses as its subject that activity from which it proceeded. The same can happen in regard to aesthetic, moral, or religious production. Here is not the place to speak of this. Let us also omit the fact that in the historical process, theoretical creation began from self-reflection, avoiding for the moment its source. It is sufficient that through itself it led to activity. The circle was closed. Theoretical situations, which were previously imposed only by the natural world, are finally imposed by activity itself. It is understood, however, that that activity here appears as if from the exterior, not in the very process, in which at one time cognitive thought imposed its own issues. Cognitive thought creates issues

from activity, as its material. Confusing the departure point with the arrival point is impossible.

Then, however, it emerges that – as we said – practical reality can have nothing in common with natural reality. We are more completely convinced *a posteriori* of that which *a priori* is obvious.

The basic difference, which jumps to the eye at once, is that natural reality is a world of *being*, while practical reality is a world of *values*. Let us, however, give closer consideration to the significance of this distinction.

Without exception, everywhere where philosophy has introduced the distinction, it has been based on that trait of practical reality which reality possesses originally, before it becomes the object of cognitive, scientific thought. What is of value for philosophy is whether a thing is positive or negative, and in accordance with which the subject occupies a position, accepts or rejects a thing, and so forth. It is less concerned with whether the subject is creating an absolute value, always occupying the same position, as, for instance, in Kantism and Fichteanism, or is a subject creating a relative value, changing its position, as in various ethical, aesthetic, or religious types of empiricism.

And yet, such a definition of practical phenomena is not fully suited for the theory of such phenomena, since it takes the practical world as it appears before theoretical thought begins to study it; it takes it then when it is still a departure point and not an arrival point in that circle we mentioned above. From the world of values, positively or negatively appraised, knowledge, morality, art, and religion emerged. In this form, practical life cannot be grasped in any theoretical system, because in this form it creates its own theoretical systems, including moral, aesthetic, and religious ones. The combination of values based on their appraisal, on the position of the subject in relation to them, expanding and harmonising, leads to cognitive theories, to positive morality, to works and streams of art, to historical religions, in a word, to all those series of phenomena which – each considered separately as a whole and all together as historical facts – constitute what we could call "higher-order values." That same relation of value conceived by theoretical thought cannot lead to a theory of value, because it is approaching value here from the opposite side; we close the circumference of the circle in which theoretical thought distanced itself from activity in the direction of independent study of natural phenomena and returns to the same activity as to its object.

They say to us: but there are countless theories which arose on the basis of the laws of that pre-reflective activity. That is so. But each of those

theories betrays, by its behaviour, that that basis is not appropriate for it. Various ethical views are typical here. Each of them, in that which is apparently a theory of moral facts, does nothing more but raise to consciousness that practical life system of morality that was formed independently of it in a given era and in a given society.[3] In addition, it tries theoretically to justify that system and this never works: no moral conclusion ensues from a theoretical statement of some fact or law in itself. What is worse, however, is that it always turns out that life morality does not correspond to ethical requirements. The system of positive morality in every era and society is, for cognitive thought, illogical and incomplete; the norms contradict each other; human acts contradict the norms, and they are unrelated to one another.

Thus there is that strange idea of *normativity*. Life creates moral systems; an ethics arrives, and being unable at once to produce those systems on the established bases, it creates a new system and demands that life adapt. A science that waits until reality, in its development, makes its statements real.

The same concerns aesthetics, philosophy, religion, and even to a certain degree, logic, although in the latter, reflective thinking is a little closer to original thinking. In defining a value as something in regard to which a positive or negative position is adopted, of necessity such a theory of value must be reduced to the assertion that value opposes existence, as that which *must* or *should be* opposes that *which is*. Life itself, after all, in producing cognitive, aesthetic, moral, and religious creations, builds relevant systems on the basis of a choice of appraisals. Every confirmation of values or their relation contains *implicite* what James calls a "claim" to be recognised as absolute; justifying that demand consists in likening it to other demands of the same order stated by the same individual or others. This is the way moral,[4] artistic, religious, and finally, ever more objective scientific systems are built. Reflective thinking sets this system its own task, depending on the era, environment, and individual; being unable to wait until life systems make it real, it presents a value as that which *should be*, expressing here equally the expectation of life values, in order for their absoluteness to be recognised, as well as its own expectation that that recognition of the absoluteness of life values be in accord with its requirements.

[3] Cf. L. Lévy-Bruhl, *La morale et la science des moeurs*, Paris-Alcan.

[4] The work by Frédéric Rauh, *L'expérience morale*, is an interesting and important attempt to create a critical method for the construction of moral systems. This method, *mutatis mutandis*, could be applied to esthetic and religious life; W. James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* contains numerous ideas that could be used in this regard.

Let us understand now that knowledge, of which values themselves are supposed to be the object, must absolutely eliminate the understanding of values as something positive or negative and their definition as that which should be. Such a science must first of all be aware that it approaches activity not from inside but from outside, and that through the very fact of its own existence it is dealing not with activity as a primary source of systems but with activity as a material of the system.

In this regard then, in order to avoid confusion in terminology, we propose the use of the term "a good" for a value as an object of appraisal or as that which "should be." A "value" and a "good" would signify the same phenomenon but viewed from different viewpoints: a "good" would be a value in its purely practical, life relation to other values; a "value" would be a good considered theoretically in its relation to other goods as a research subject. In the circle that consciousness delineates – rising from practical life to the study of the natural world and returning from there to the study of practical life – a "good" would indicate an element of practical reality as a point of departure, a "value" an element of practical reality as a point of entry.

On this ground, the question of designating elements of practical reality would be expressed in the following manner: what are the traits of a phenomenon thanks to which it is a value, that is, the link of activity understood as a subject of scientific study.

As these traits are, obviously, common to all values, thus the concept of value will be the most general of all the concepts applied to elements of practical reality; its content will be the most general form that those elements adopt for cognition and will become the basis for all more specific forms, all definitions that the science of values will give to practical phenomena. In a word, the concept of values will be a *thought category* for elements of practical reality and simultaneously a *category* of those same *elements* as objects of cognition.

II

In order to establish the significance of the concept of value, we have the path indicated by our previous reflections. Cognitive thought, in liberating itself, constructs knowledge of nature and only from that point turns to activity. It is easy thus to imagine that it transfers to practical reality those forms that it used for natural reality, and even those cognitive generalities that it acquired in studying nature. It should thus be considered whether

such a transfer is possible and if not to contrast the practical phenomenon with the natural one, describing value in the proper manner.

The form constituting the logical basis in studying the natural world is the category of *things*, that is, *substance*. All other categories[5] are logically connected with it inextricably. The thing (substance) is a subject of thought which remains basically the same when it is being thought and however many times it is thought. Now natural cognition applies this thought postulate to reality. The thing (substance) is *supposed to be* objectively unchangeable. But it changes and in various moments appears variously. Thought can accept this only on the condition that that variety is the supplement of unchangeable properties to an unchangeable substance: that A could be A_1, A_2, A_3, only then, when $A_1 = A + x$, $A_2 = A + y$, $A_3 = A + z$. Where does this addition of properties itself come from, though? In certain cases, thought ascribes the fault to itself: the property adhered to the subject earlier but was not cognitively distinguished. A was actually $A + x + y + z$: an error occurred. In other cases, however, it has to be accepted that the property did not exist and now it does – if only then when it appeared in the course of studying things – and cannot be viewed as a discovery. Then the property *is a state*; it is something real added to the substance. Since the substance itself cannot change, then by reason of this state the property must lie outside of it, in its *relation* to another substance.

Of course, as it deepens, further evolution is necessary here: the gradual distribution of the substance and simultaneously giving a material – that is, a logically inalterable character – to the changes themselves; the development and expansion of the idea of function proceeds from there.[6] But the original categories give the direction of that evolution: the mathematical-natural function is an association and distribution of material elements. It defines itself always by divisible static moments;[7] only by way of a logical leap does it arrive at continuity,[8] there where natural reality is not an obstacle, that is, in pure mathematics. Even though we have recognised that precisely there it has liberated itself from dependence on former geometric and arithmetic forms with their static and divisible nature, nevertheless its application to natural changes remains, and must remain, forever conditioned by the logic of the substance. Those changes are defined and differentiated in relation to the given natural order, and that order is entirely

[5] We here make use of Wundt's division of the category.

[6] See E. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem* and *Substranzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*.

[7] H. Poincaré, *Nature du raisonnment mathématique* (*La Science et le'hypothèse*).

[8] H. Bergson, *Evolution créatrice*, passim: *Wstęp do metafizyki*, passim.

based on substantiality. Mechanical, chemical, and biological changes are changes to a body. Even when certain phenomena, at today's level of the development of knowledge, are at once considered to be pure processes, yet those processes occur within the substantial world; they are processes in relation to the things that surround them. Even if the logical ideal of natural knowledge – the complete transformation of substance into function, the disassembly of things into relations – were ever to be achieved, the scientific system would always remain an expression of the world of things, its literal translation, the breakdown of bodies, properties, and states through the prism of functionality. It would always be an explanation – or description – of the given world in the material form and its final task would always be to order that precise world.

Let us consider now whether a value, an element of practical reality, appears in experience and can be conceived of in the same way as a thing, that is, does it possess a substantial nature?

First of all, it must be stipulated that *expressing* a thought concerning a value must occur in the same way that expressing a thought about things, as speech was shaped – for reasons that we cannot study here – in accord with the type of natural thinking. A value will always be an object of judgement and as such it will bear the external form of a thing. But cognitive thought is freeing itself in the course of its development ever more from the rule of grammatical forms, and not necessarily by way of artificial symbolism but simply with the aid of such grammatical associations that allow for replacing the relation of expressions – with the relations of phenomena themselves. The relation of subjects in cognitive thought frees itself from the relation of the symbol. Thus we can entirely *think* of a value other than in the category of a thing, to the degree that we only think of it as something real. Thus the conclusion follows that without the aid provided by speech, a value as a category of thought can only be described by the traits of the value as elements of experience.

Now while an element of nature, the subject of disinterested thought, can possess the trait of substantiality – can be conceived of as a thing that is unalterably the same – this cannot be said of a value. An element of nature after all is assumed to be independent from the thought of it; the premise is that theoretical thinking itself will not change it, though objective changes within certain bounds could be overlooked. At the same time, a value, when it becomes the subject of theoretical thinking, is already an element of practical reality, a link of activity. *It is entirely marked by its property, by that belonging to a practical process; its entire reality consists in precisely this; in ex-*

perience it appears only as the link in an act. In no other regard can it appear, in no other character does it possess reality, either as an element of a natural-causative relation or as a human "presentation," or as a creative work of the imagination, or as an object of faith. All these points of view emerge only together with the development of science, art, morality, and religion; here, while we are indeed considering a value in cognitive reflection, it is as an element of practical reality, thus avoiding all that that reality transforms in its various elaborations. For us, a value is *only a link in activity*, nothing more.

Thus given that alterability does not come to value from outside, it is obvious that it is not something added to it, to a lesser or greater degree, outside of thought. In so far as an object is a link in an act, it is fundamentally different from moment to moment, as the act is the very change of the object. A *value*, appearing only as a part of activity, as the subject of practical thought, *is thus changeable in its very essence*. This changeability does not allow it to be compared with any changeability of natural phenomena; it is neither a change of property nor a change of state. The fundamental error of the theory of the act, which we encounter in Bergson and certain pragmatists, consists in viewing it as a mechanical transformation of objects. Thereby, they give themselves first the natural world and then they place activity in that world – meanwhile, the natural world is, according to their own theory, the product of activity. The object, transformed by an act, does not appear as a material part of the natural world but only as a value; only theoretical reflection on the object of the act and the act begins to grasp the first as a material thing, and the second as a mechanical transformation of a material thing.

How then to understand that changeability of the value, if it is not either a change of property or a change of state? A glance at practical life allows us to answer the question. Change requires time. Thus an act is accomplished in time, or rather *the time of practical reality is its form and work*. The act is always present; it is produced in the present moment. The concrete present, in which we act, is not a moment detached from natural time sequenced in one line of an infinite quantity of past and future moments, and equal to them. It is an exceptional moment, privileged, and incomparable to any other. But it does not constitute, as Bergson believes, a blade of the past cutting into the future. On the contrary, the past and present begin from it; the past is its disappearance, the future, its emergence. It is at once the present and the act, or rather something from which the present and the abstract act were just separated. *The concept of actuality expresses precisely this unity of the present moment and acting.* Actuality creates the past, because it

extracts values from the sphere of the present activity; it creates the future because it introduces values in that sphere. Values, appearing as an element of the act, appear in full in actuality. Activity moves them through the present moment by changing them, and it changes them by moving them through the present moment. The changeability of values can then be defined as an approach to or distancing from actuality, constituting a certain summit of their real existence; a value is real precisely in the measure that it is close to actuality. Finally, thus, it can be said that *the changeability of values is simply their emergence and disappearance*, with emergence and disappearance being understood as the process of acquiring or losing reality.

But that concrete and living actuality of the present act must not be confused with the detached and schematic actuality of psychology. Thus, it does not ensue from a value being most real when it is actual that outside of actuality it is not at all real. Wundt's principle, "as much reality as actuality" in the sense that reality is limited to the moment of consciousness,[9] is applied only to psychology. Conducting it is possible only thanks to the division of scientific work, which arose because the world, in the natural view, was projected as independent of actuality, on the screen of substance; as constructing experience entirely with the aid of a combination of two substances – material and spiritual – turned out to be impossible, it was necessary to supplement the "objective" consequence of a phenomenon and contrast it with pure actuality itself: whence psychological "experiences." The proof that that path of recreating life actuality is not possible, however, is the unsolvable problem of psychic "temperaments."

In essence, practical actuality not only does not oppose the existence of phenomena outside the psychological "consciousness," but on the contrary, it requires it. Activity occurs in the present, but it looks to the future and extends into the past. It gives values duration in time by its existence itself. It knows that reality surpasses actuality in the past, because it leaves it changed and changing in its path, along the thread it is itself spinning. It knows that that reality surpasses actuality in the future because it sees how it approaches it and leads it by its own efforts. But that past and future of reality is not being: it is *emerging, approaching actuality or retreating from it*, nothing else. The *existence of values* is dynamic; it is a *process*, both outside of actuality and in actuality itself, through which a value passes, without stopping.

Finally, in the world of values, the understanding that schematically classifies phenomena into absolute past and absolute future phenomena, that counts as the past everything that passed through the present, and

[9] Cf. W. Wundt, *Logik* III[3], p. 249 et seq., p. 260 et. seq.

to the present what has not yet been accomplished, must be rejected. Our thinking still revolves here within a framework of the division between nature and psychological consciousness. In nature and in consciousness, what has happened cannot return, and what will be has never happened, because change, like substance, is logically ineluctable, through being part of the world of nature it is set in an unchangeable relation with other changes; in the psychic world – because the productions of psychological consciousness are based on the consequences of actual contents. In practical life, however, there is no absolute and permanent division between past and future facts; facts are past or future only in relation to actuality. Thus what was may return and what will be, can be; actuality divides phenomena into past and future differently. If something that we already know appears in actuality, that means that it was something future in relation to that actuality; sometime, however, it passed through consciousness, thus it belonged to the past. In other words, it moved from the past to the future in order again to sink into the past. They tell us that from the natural viewpoint these must be two separate natural phenomena; from the psychological viewpoint they mean two different experiences. Common sense will consider one of these phenomena to be reality and the other as a memory or foresight of the former. But if I remove all those explanations that arise on the ground of a cognitive contrast between the "thing in itself" and the "idea in itself," if I limit myself to that which is presented by a given phenomenon as an element of activity, I have to say that in cases of a return I am dealing with the same phenomenon, in so far as it has the same content, that is, in so far as we can consider its practical content to be the same. Foreseeing or remembering is a real element of activity, similar to a "perceived" phenomenon, which can be joined to the composition of the natural world. It is the same value, which only in other conditions appears in actuality, and another relation connects it with the rest of the values. But the question of its relation is another question; at this moment we are considering it as an *element* of practical reality.

We cannot thus say of any phenomenon that it is absolutely past or absolutely future. For as long as it may return, or still move from the past to the future, since it was foreseen, that means that it moved from the future into the past. What is absolutely past is only that which can no longer appear in actuality; absolutely future is that which cannot at all be foreseen. *For practical life then, both absolute past and absolute future are nullities.*

What then does that relativity of the past and future mean? It means that they are only directions of an emerging value: a future value is only

that which is approaching actuality, a past value is one receding from it. A value can change its direction of becoming; it can successively approach and recede from actuality.

If now we want to define a value more specifically, let us say that it is an *element of practical reality, practically considered in the entire process of its becoming, from the moment of its first emergence to the moment that it forever ceases to return to actuality. This means that a value, in contrast to substance, emerges and disappears; in contrast to experience, it endures through many "awarenesses."* However, as a value is the more real the closer it is to actuality, we can say – in accord, after all, with common observation – that in the entire process of its becoming a value gradually moves from minimal reality to the highest reality and later again gradually approaches nothingness. At the beginning, it is rarely actual, later it appears in actuality increasingly often, until finally again its actualisation becomes rarer and then entirely ceases to occur. It is understood that these three periods – acquiring reality, the highest reality, and the loss of reality – can have varying lengths. There are values that only once cross consciousness, to disappear forever: these include, for instance, the countless minor phenomena in the daily life of individuals. There are those that are long in preparation for their peak period and disappear shortly after achieving it, as, for instance, numerous of the so-called aims of individual strivings. There are others, which are also slow in preparation and disappear only with the death of the individuum – these are, for instance, the elevated ideals that give direction to a person's entire life. Some appear suddenly, at once achieve their peak period, and then long and slowly disappear: these are all the unexpected phenomena that shake the entire consciousness. Of course, all this diversity must be subject to a certain regularity, if indeed practical reality is not chaos but one world of values.

Let us emphasise thus that fundamental schema: *the existence of values is a becoming, describing a fairly complicated wavy line, whose highest point – often in the middle, more rarely on either side, signifies moments of actuality.* Of course, this is the simplest schema; numerous values have several peak periods.

If now we want finally to make a formulation of the contrast between a value and a thing (substance), we must remind ourselves that a value, considered in the individual moment of its actualisation, is a psychological experience. Every experience, given the continual changeability of values, obviously contains only a certain part – or certain side – of the entire content that a value possesses in the entire course of its duration. An experience contrasts with a thing through its incomplete, partial nature: a thing is that which appears in all experiences having a certain common content; only

later, depending on various further factors, which we cannot here consider, sometimes more, sometimes fewer "properties" are excluded from the idea of the essence of the given thing as "subjective." The relation of a thing to experience is always such that in constructing the content of a thing we entirely overlook psychological time; we do not at all take into consideration in what successive order the experience of that thing occurred; even when we acknowledge the object to be objectively "changeable," the succession of experiences of that change has no significance for us, as experiences lose, in regard to things, their own individuality.

At the same time, for defining values, the *order of the succession of moments of actuality is something quite significant, because those moments do not have significance in themselves but only as links in the process of a value's becoming*; they cannot be detached from what in the language of earlier psychology we would have called their "unconscious substrate." Thought detaches them in order to shape "things," but also from the viewpoint of practical experience, the "thing" is an abstraction. That abstraction also corresponds to abstract actuality, expressed in the concepts of an "ideal object," "reason," etc. – absolute actuality, timeless, and not influencing the nature of phenomena.

If we were now to want to label the difference between a value and a thing, not from the viewpoint of practical experience but from the viewpoint of the rationalism of the thing, that difference is expressed in an unusually simple manner. A thing, a substance, constituting the unity of all the moments of the actualisation of a value, will be the logical boundary that a value approaches but is unable to reach in its successive and increasingly frequent actualisations. The second boundary set by values we will call nothingness, considering from the practical viewpoint that a value loses reality when it can no longer appear in actuality or is still entirely unforeseen. But that practical nullity is similarly not nonbeing, from the viewpoint of the logic of things, just as that highest reality that a value achieves in individual actuality during its period of most frequent actualisation is not a substantial being. From the factual standpoint, for nonexistence to be predicated of something, there must be a sufficient reason for the existence of something else; the world of values, in not achieving absolute being, cannot provide sufficient reason for absolute nonbeing. A value, for the logic of things, will thus not be something that *has being*, but something that is only *becoming*, that *from nonbeing approaches substantial being, and contrarily, without ever reaching these two boundaries*. Thus saying that the world of values "exists" is to express an apparently contradictory proposition. The contradiction, however, can be resolved. If a value does not achieve being

it is because substantial being rests on the postulate of absolute actuality, in which the entire essence of a value could be real at once. At the same time, that essence of the value develops in time, and thus it is realised always only in a certain part; it can never be said from a substantial standpoint that a value has been completely realised and that it will not reveal a new side to its essence. But in exchange, it can also never be said that its becoming is finished. Thus the postulate of substantionalism can be answered by another postulate: that that becoming *appears rationally as eternal*, *a value realising itself entirely in the duration of infinity, and thus its complete becoming means as much as being.*

III

Considering a value from the logical-cognitive viewpoint, we were forced *implicite* to place the problem on the ground of individual consciousness. We were forced to do so by the traditional shaping of logical and epistemological questions, which again are in close relation with the all-powerful control of the logic of the thing. A thing is fundamentally independent of a specific thought process; actually thereby the very differentiation of individual and social conscious does not at all enter into play. Thinking in categories of material logic is *de jure* supra-conscious: thought of the absolute object. If it *de facto* occurs in consciousness, then the theoretical-cognitive problem that arises consists basically in studying by what manner a concrete consciousness raises itself to the level of the absolute object and can comprehend things as if they were independent of a specific thought process. It is not strange, since in this study individual consciousness was almost exclusively considered, that the theory of the relation of ideal and real thinking acquired the form of psychologism (with its various shades). What appears to us "from inside" is only individual thought; only in our own thought process do we make real an appraisal of phenomena and relations as cognitively positive or negative, that is, as correct or erroneous; and that appraisal is the basis for the construction of cognitive systems. Social thinking similarly only appears to us when it is our own thinking: the cognitive appraisal of the social group has cognitive significance for us only when we ourselves participate in it – when we think identically with the group. In these cases, obviously there is no need to differentiate social and individual consciousness. For cognitive theory, understood as a theory of correct or erroneous cognitive appraisals and the relations of those appraisals with their subjects, placing problems on the individual ground is

thus entirely sufficient both on account of the ideal significance of material cognition as on account of its real process.

However, the question could appear different in the theory of values. We define a value in relation to the process of active consciousness, recognising actuality as an indicator of its emergence. Then, from a purely formal position, the question of the relation of social consciousness to individual consciousness must be defined. We take then the value "from the outside," not as an object of appraisal, but as a link of activity, and thus for us what is important is not only values, in the appraisal of which the individual consciousness agrees with the social consciousness, but entirely to the same degree those values which are subject to diverging appraisal from the individual and social standpoint. We must then consider whether the form that individual values possess can be extended to social values, and whether it is essentially the form of all elements of practical reality.

The original sin of the social sciences is not at all – as the extreme members of the sociological school claim – approaching the study of social phenomena from the viewpoint of the individual; the individual is not an abstraction in sociology any more than in biology, and although in the cultural individuum various social influences cross, yet the individuum gives itself reality by its own unique ordering of those influences in its own consciousness, and, as we shall see, does not increase nor lessen the difficulties arising in creating individual phenomena from social phenomena and vice versa. The entire cognitive problem of the relation of the individuum to the social arose from the false identification of the cultural human with the natural human, with transferring to the world of values certain ontological concepts that are valid only for the world of things.

The construction of the natural world required, as we mentioned above, supplementation in psychology, taking into account the sequence of phenomena in actuality as experiences. But further, it became necessary to harmonise these two worlds: the psychical and the natural, and activity unavoidably poses that question. For it, natural objects do not have an intangible nature: it enters the world of nature, introduces in it changes, which even from the natural standpoint cannot be denied; on the other hand, while occurring in actuality, they have a psychical nature. In the lack of a concept of a separate practical reality, a natural-psychological theory of the act cannot otherwise take into account that relatedness of the concrete consciousness with the world of nature but by introducing the world of nature into the composition of consciousness or understanding consciousness as part of nature. The first path is obviously, for psychology, impos-

sible: a thing cannot be made into an experience; thus a consciousness, which things would be part of, must be a subconsciousness, an absolute object, or universal spirit. There remains thus only the other option: consciousness is introduced into the world of nature on the basis of its relation with the body understood as a natural organism. A human thus becomes a combination of organism and consciousness, a natural individuum; society is the synthesis of such natural individuals.

Of course, in this regard the problem of the relation of the individuum and society becomes insoluble. Experience, understood as the result of a certain relation of things and of the natural individuum, and being a self-existing phenomenon, is absolutely individual; the psychical life of the individuum – a self-enclosed whole; other individuals are only experiences. One thing, appearing to many people, becomes a multiplicity of separate experiences, which have nothing in common with each other; others' experiences can only be indirectly concluded and recreated in one's own consciousness, where, obviously, they become something entirely different, a new experience and not a recreation of the same one. It is only surprising that with such an understanding of the question attempts have been made to create social life from individual life; clearly either the doctrine was not sufficiently clearly understood or the obviousness of social experience pushed the doctrine to the background, where its inconsistencies could be borne.

These inconsistencies, though, are a bit too striking: thus there have been numerous attempts to eliminate them. It is a simple thing, however, that on the grounds on which the question is placed there was no solution other than defining society – that is, the sum of natural individuals – as a new natural whole, of which every individuum is a part. Thus society was likened to an organism – in various shades, from a complete likening of social life to an organism, as with Schäffle (today, with Novicow), through Spencer's formal but detailed analogy, to seemingly cautious premises which basically contain the seeds of a pure social "biologism."

The misunderstanding on which this theory rests can be indicated without difficulty. The individual organism is the basis of conscious phenomena: if there is to be an analogy between the individuum and society, then society as an organism can be only the social *basis* of conscious life. At the same time, social "biologism" *makes conscious phenomena themselves into an element and organic link in the social system*, that is, the social *system* is a *metaphor* expressing in a name drawn from biology certain relations *occurring in time between social values*. All the phenomena that this sociological school men-

tions in order to show the analogy between society and the organism – complexity of construction, functional differences, division of work, relation to other societies, social imagination, speech as a conveyor analogical to the nervous current, etc., etc. – all these are generalities which in organic life concern material phenomena constituting the equivalent of conscious life; in social life –conscious phenomena no longer have an equivalent. If, however, someone wanted to say that society is an organism precisely on account of the relations of those conscious phenomena that occur in it, that consciousness is such a form of social existence as anatomical build and physiological processes – the form of existence of the individual organism, in a word, that we are moving here to a new level of existence – in essence, we would have no objection, if it were not that the conclusion about the similarity of society and the organism is in that case at least premature. First, study of social life should be advanced sufficiently to claim that social phenomena significantly create relations analogical to the relations of biological phenomena in the organism. Yet when we commence the study of social elements we see at once that they appear entirely other than organic elements; they are values, not things, and thus we must first of all define their traits as the *material* of research; we cannot from the outset impose definitions for them, such claims that *could sometime* be a *research finding*. Of all metaphysics, this one of preceding concrete scientific findings on the basis of *a priori* premises or apparent analogies is the most dangerous.

However, even if we adopted that metaphysics, we would learn that even *in abstracto* it does not resolve the question of the individuum's relation to society. The individuum remains a psycho-physical entity; meanwhile, solely on account of its psychical side it participates in social life. The physical side remains a part of nature independent from society, and as an organism conditioning psychical phenomena brings to the social organism an irrational factor – individuality.

The strongest emphasis should then be put on the fact that the individuum must be absolutely detached from natural relations in order to understand its role as a part of social relations, in order for the question of the relation between individual and social phenomena not to be a "nest of sophisms" or a source of barren mysticism. The question is after all so simple that it is surprising that it needs to be clarified. The individuum is a part of nature only on account of its body; only as a result of the consciousness being attached to a body can we at all arrive at the concept of consciousness itself as something real, as a substance or function on the order of other substances, or a function within nature. A body appears to

us consciously; it is the same content moving through actuality as other sensual or cultural content, in a word – it is a value among other values and not a condition or basis of others. That from a certain viewpoint, in creating a rational picture of the world, we arrive at a theory in which the body becomes the condition of consciousness after having been its part does not at all prove that we should remain at this same viewpoint forever, even though it turns out to be inappropriate for the solution of numerous questions. No less legitimate will be the position that keeps, for a body, the nature of a value – an important one, often the most important, influencing numerous facts in the world of values, but influencing them as an element of this world, as its part, and not as something outside of it. This viewpoint is essential for knowledge about practical reality, because here the body is only one – the most frequently encountered – of the elements of activity, or rather of a group of elements of activity. Practical, individual consciousness does not need a basis, because it is not something detached from practical reality and absolutely different, as psychical consciousness from natural reality; on the contrary, it is a certain process, a certain dynamic phenomenon, taking shape within practical reality and at the same time giving form to that reality.

Dividing in this manner the world of people from the world of nature, even understanding the latter as part of the first – since nature is to a significant degree, if not entirely, a work of knowledge about nature – we encounter two related trends that we must consider: the first we could call social psychologism and the second, ontologism.

Social psychologism, as it appears, for instance, in Wundt, is proof of how difficult it is to get rid of the belief that *only* natural phenomena can be considered as existing in itself, without regard for any – substantial or functional – soul, that would reflect it. Of course, as a value is described as an object of will, the existence of values will be dependent on the hypothetical subjective process that we call "will." The world of social values can thus be comprehended solely as a world of subjects of some "collective will," because value exists here only on account of the will, and will is an actual process, thus in the end the social world becomes the actuality of collective experiences, just as the individual world is the actuality of individual experiences. In other words, social values bear only the trait of collective psychical states, similarly to individual values – the principle of "as much reality as actuality" applies to them as well in the sense that outside of actuality there is no reality at all.

It is easy to understand what consequences ensue therefrom both for the relation of individual phenomena to social phenomena and for research methods. A social value is a collective experience, thus basically when there is no collective experience, there is also no social phenomenon: values exist only in actuality. In this manner every individual experience, which is not shared at a given moment by other individuals, basically not only falls outside the borders of the social world but in general no relation between it and social phenomena can be established. Because the quantity of experiences that are actually common is extremely insignificant, it is necessary to turn to auxiliary means in order to count as social those phenomena of which various individuals at various moments become conscious. Social psychologism cannot use any auxiliary method other than the concept of psychical temperaments: the existence in the individual of a temperament to produce the same phenomenon which other individuals in other moments produce is sufficient to give social traits to that phenomenon. But in this manner we not only transfer the reality of social phenomena into the metaphysical area of will as an entity of the retaining temperament, but at the same time we leave an unresolved question: how can the social unity of the social fact be made to agree with the multiplicity of individual consciousnesses, since every individual experience, arising due to "temperament," will be a separate new fact?

Since, however, we only accept that values do not exist either in social or individual consciousnesses, but on the contrary, consciousness exists in the world of values and is a certain combination of them – the above problem can be resolved at once. *The same value* can enter into the composition of various combinations, either simultaneously or successively, just as the same natural object can be a link in numerous relations of identity and dependency. When the same content is given to many individuals, it does not at all mean that that content repeated itself that many times, was reflected in that many consciousnesses (beings), but simply means that it is a part of that many more or less changeable relations, because each individual connects with values differently. A value can thus be conceived as social entirely independently of whether it appears in many individuals at once or in each of them separately, or appears at all in many individuals. Between the individual and the social existence of values, there is no difference that could not be reduced to an empirical relation of that value with others: social reality and individual reality are *the one sole reality, in which both the individuum and society are formed*. The metaphysical problem of the relation of the individual consciousness to social consciousness will shatter into

a quantity of simple empirical questions, each of which will concern the relation of combinations of one or another value in individual and social experience, or the relation of such or another individual value to such or another social value.

Just as we cannot accept social psychologism, we must also reject Durkheim's ontological school. According to that theory, social phenomena are objective realities, imposed on the individual in a fashion that is similarly independent of the individual, as are natural phenomena. Social ontologism derived from entirely justified strivings to obtain bases for positive sociological research; it is thus an absolute break with all social metaphysics; it cuts the knots that psychological cognitive theory tied; it ceases entirely to bring into play the problem of the relation of the individual psyche to the social psyche in the form of attempts to produce society from individuals. It thus has high methodological significance, shifting the emphasis of sociology from general abstract inquiries to the ground of concrete empirical studies of individual facts. But its methodology is closely connected with epistemology and the latter has not been critically grounded.

Viewing a social phenomenon as independent from the individuum of reality factually leads to repeating, on the basis of the world of values, the identical same division of reality and the individual psyche that produces it as we have on the basis of the world of things. Individual participation in a social phenomenon – the same as with a natural phenomenon – is simply the experience of that phenomenon, without influence on its nature. However, it is in social life that the influence of individual consciousness on phenomena cannot be denied or eliminated, as that influence is brought to the fore in acting, and social reality itself, in contrast to natural reality, is practical. Thus, for instance, when Durkheim excludes individual ideals from the range of moral reality, that abstraction is something entirely artificial because individual ideals gradually transform social norms. The premises of social ontologism lead to a voluntary limitation of the range of influences considered; actually, as well, it can be conducted only there where the Durkheim school predominantly applies it, namely in studying primitive societies, in which individual initiative is either essentially insignificant or cannot be, in our conditions, distinguished. In general, the influence of the individuum on shaping social phenomena is neither – as ontologism claims – nothing, nor is it unlimited, as social atomism claims; it is subject to infinite gradation; it is different in each specific instance, and the definition of social phenomena must be such as to allow for the

consideration of those degrees and diversity. Solely our definition makes this possible.

Social values are for us independent of the individuum to the degree that their combination in collective life departs from the influence of their individual combination: those values that are independent of the individuum will obviously be first those values whose significance (that is, combination with others) is to a predominant degree the same for all individuals constituting the social group; those that are dependent will above all be those whose significance is not yet established and that are just being created, thanks to individual activity. In a word, we can say generally that the more durable the tradition the greater the social reality, and conversely: the individual character of a value will predominate the more production plays a larger role for it.

The general form of the value will, however, be identical with the entire extent of social and individual life. A value is everywhere a content whose existence is a becoming, a passage through actuality. It is thus a further question whether the moments of actualisation of a value will be more or less numerous and whether the value will be actualised for various individuals contemporaneously or successively, and whether the relations linking it with other values will be the same or differing in the experience of various individuals. At any rate, one thing should be emphasised: as the individual value appears completely only in the entirety of its process through all the successive moments of its actuality, so the social value appears only through its entire duration and in all the extension of its social influence through all the successive moments of its actuality in all individuals having the experience. Sociology cannot thus, in distinguishing values, detach them from individual differences in general, because this would mean the impoverishment of the content of the values by virtue of an *a priori* and voluntary criterion. It can take into consideration, from the content of a value, only that which is *important* for collective life, or that which for the studied relation between values has fundamental significance, but obviously what should be set aside and what retained cannot be resolved *a priori*. The criterion of importance is different in each individual case.

Since our definition of an individual value applies equally to a social value, the result is a good indicator for sociological research methods. Thus a social value must be considered in its emergence. It cannot be considered, as the psychological school often does, that any social phenomenon can appear entirely and be analysed at any one moment of its duration; it only reveals its fundamental content in the entire process of its becoming and

disappearing. Thus it follows that all "pictures" of social life at a certain moment, which are so numerous especially in the history of literature, the history of art, etc., have absolutely no scientific significance.

That method (which has become especially widespread in comparative studies) should also be rejected that treats social values as things and takes institutions, beliefs, and law as something unchangeable, something that in the whole course of its duration preserves the same content. A characteristic thing is how many sociologists consider that the task of a comparative analysis is completed when, for instance, in a certain number of a social group the abstract existence of a similar belief, or social provision, legal norm, or institution is found – regardless of where they came from, in what connection, at what moment those phenomena emerged in various societies, how they developed, what occurs or occurred after them and so forth. This treatment of social phenomena as things has one of its main sources in the study of lower societies. In these societies, which we still have before our eyes today, the stagnation of conscious life is striking and even if changes occur, we lack historical evidence, similarly as with primary social groups which no longer exist. It proves, however, simply that lower societies are an inappropriate research subject for beginning sociology, with the exception of cases where the quantity of material already collected allows for the recreation of their evolution. However, we have before us historical humanity and a huge quantity of already partially prepared material. There, this principle – which moreover in this application becomes quite obvious – can be used in full: *the social and individual world is one; it is practical reality, a world of dynamic values in which individuals and societies are formed.*

Transl. Michelle Granas

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THE TRANSATLANTIC MIGRATION OF IDEAS: FLORIAN ZNANIECKI IN AMERICA IN THE YEARS 1914–1919

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The books of the sociological canon are an essential element of sociology's contemporary intellectual tradition. They enable the formation, reproduction, and transformation of disciplinary identities, which in turn integrate the academic community. In sociology, which is divided into various subdisciplines, this communal element – and thus also the history of sociology – is especially important (Carreira da Silva & Brito Vieira 2011). *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* is undoubtedly the kind of book that unites scholarly circles.[1] Its translation into Polish in 1976 contributed to the great growth in popularity of one of its authors in his native country. The accompanying enormous amount of exegetical undertakings (numbering hundreds of publications at the turn of the 1970s to 1980s) is worthy of a separate work.

The task I set myself in the present article is the critical and historical interpretation of the initial value of *The Polish Peasant*, that is, the original, internal sources of its growing popularity. Thus, I will not be considering

[1] *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: Monograph of an Immigrant Group*, Gorham Press, Boston 1918–1920 (1918 – vol. 1 and 2, 1919 – vol. 3, 1920 – vol. 4–5). Polish edition: *Chłop polski w Europie i Ameryce*, Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, Warsaw 1976 (vol. 1–2 – *Organizacja grupy pierwotnej*; vol. 3 – *Pamiętnik imigranta*; vol. 4 – *Dezorganizacja i reorganizacja w Polsce*; vol. 5 – *Organizacja i dezorganizacja w Ameryce*). In the references I give the number of the volume of the Polish edition in Roman numerals. References to the English-language edition concern the publication of 1958, Boston, Gorham Press.

works or events that took place long after 1920, such as the political and scholarly engagement of succeeding generations of scholars (in this case, Florian Znaniecki's students), interest in folk literature in the PPR, or the current hundredth anniversary of the first publication of *The Polish Peasant*. For the most part, these are independent of the context in which the work emerged and the intentions of the authors. I will return to the subject of these external factors of popularity in the conclusion.

An important part of that same discussion is the debate over William I. Thomas's and Florian Znaniecki's share in work on *The Polish Peasant*. The contribution of the former was recently studied very closely and previously unknown sources of the book were discovered, such as English literature, psychiatric life histories, and the medical tradition of didactic casebooks (Abbott & Egloff 2008). Consequently, Znaniecki's supposed role in writing *The Polish Peasant* has been slightly decreased, while his importance as a philosopher and theoretician has been emphasised (Kaczmarczyk 2018).

As I do not wish to join that debate, for the needs of this text I assume that both scholars were simultaneously interested in the same questions and that their individual engagement was similar, although the elder of the two played the deciding role. However, the result of their work, *The Polish Peasant*, requires that Znaniecki's intellectual sources be explained in the same manner as those of Thomas. As Znaniecki's philosophical (Wiley 2007) and theoretical inspirations (Kaczmarczyk 2018) have already been discussed, I will concentrate on his biographical and social background.

The main question is how did it happen that by the time the Polish philosopher returned to Poland, after having left for America at age thirty-two "on the first opportunity, with the intent of becoming the intellectual leader of the American Polish community" (Znaniecki 1978 [1920]: 38), he had written what turned out to be a canonic work of sociology?

In answering, I intend to show that Znaniecki's creativity in writing *The Polish Peasant*, a complex and multi-volume work, consisted in (1) combining many of the diverse motifs of the social sciences of the time, (2) rejecting one of the basic methodological principles of sociology – the explanation of social facts only by other social facts – while simultaneously reconfiguring other current theoretical elements, and (3) making the work eclectic and inconsistent. The mode of proceeding in which a creative individual transforms existing elements by radically changing one of them (Collins 1998: 768) is well known and especially important. In the standard interpretation, Znaniecki's stay in America made him into a sociolo-

gist almost by the very fact of being there. In my opinion, such a view is not justified (see Ciżewska 2013: 12; Szacki 1986: 61ff.).

In order to verify the question, I will attempt a separate, non-canonical interpretation of *The Polish Peasant*. First I will present autobiographical elements that could have influenced Znaniecki's work. Then I will proceed to discuss the dynamics of the intellectual network supporting that work. My main materials will be biographical and autobiographical testimonials and information contained in the work itself.

/// Emigration: The Experience of Absence

In the summer of 1912, thirty-year-old Znaniecki conducted an interview with an inhabitant of Edmonton, Jan Komarnicki, who was visiting Warsaw. During a conversation on the possibility of immigrating to Canada and working there, Znaniecki, the editor of *The Polish Emigrant*, suggested to Komarnicki that "For intellectuals and semi-intellectuals it would seem that the prospects are not favourable, as is the case for emigrants everywhere?" Komarnicki, an optimistic Canadian citizen of Polish descent, responded that "Naturally they can't be as favourable as for farmers or craftsmen, but at any rate they're better than in, for instance, the United States. Not knowing the language is a barrier; the emigrant must count on not being able to find any occupation for some half a year" (Znaniecki 1982: 147).

For Znaniecki, knowledge of the language would not be an obstacle, but he would have to take into account that "Canada has enough local intelligentsia, thus the immigration of intellectuals can only be adventitious." Komarnicki was a Canadian bureaucrat; his reply seemed like a form of advertisement for his country, and Znaniecki, in order to investigate the subject, travelled that year to France and England (Dulczewski 1982: 56). He summarised the information he collected at the time as follows:

> We became convinced that in order to evaluate the sphere of emigration, neither official sources nor the descriptions of travellers, nor even general works – even the most important ones – of a statistical-economical, geographical, or similar nature are sufficient. Only *the numerous personal experiences* of the emigrants themselves, grouped with that general data, can give an exhaustive and universal picture of the conditions awaiting our future emigrants (Znaniecki 1982: 148–149; italics added).

Znaniecki spent twenty-five years as an emigrant, and thus the majority of his adult life. It is hard to believe, in accord with the general assumption, that by voluntarily and deliberately departing for America in the summer of 1914 he was intending to continue or begin a sociologist's career, if only because at the time there was no set formal or even informal career path for sociologists. In addition, America was not at the time known for its sociology. The global rhythm of development in the discipline at the beginning of the twentieth century was still dependent on the academic life of Germany and France (Collins 1998: 618ff.), as Znaniecki, after studies in France and Switzerland, was very well aware. He described the experience of *émigré* alienation in categories of unsuccessful assimilation. Nevertheless, in spite of the indifference and discrimination with which he met, he had no problem in accepting the role of lonely observer (Znaniecki 1978: 42–43). His cosmopolitan attitude had been shaped much earlier. Therefore, it seems right to assume that emigration to the United States was rather a neutral factor both for his career and his productivity.

Whatever weight may be attached to the biographical concurrency of Znaniecki the author and Znaniecki the migrant, the above-mentioned article on immigrant conditions in Canada contains a forecast of Znaniecki's turning to autobiographical studies as a proper method for collecting data for the study of culture, and a clear research subject: Poles migrating to the United States in the decade before 1914. Obviously, the unforced transatlantic migration of people and ideas was nothing unusual at the beginning of the twentieth century and even before the success of the world fair in St. Louis in 1906 migration became quite popular among wealthy Europeans.

It would be very tempting to explain this thread in the history of Polish sociological tradition by the inspiration of American scholarship in the form of contact with Thomas and the milieu of the early Chicago sociological school. Such an interpretation, in my opinion, is as dubious as the theory of "migration determinism." Although the influences of American pragmatism are clear in Znaniecki's work (see Niżnik 1988), recognising this intellectual trend as a major one would require the artificial procedure of separating the author from his context. In other words, we would have to adopt the unlikely proposition that Znaniecki did not have the opportunity to encounter pragmatism earlier: for instance, in the course of meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society in the years 1910–1914 in Warsaw, or during studies in philosophy at the Sorbonne or Jagiellonian University.

It should be added that the Chicago school in the first two decades of the twentieth century had not yet truly taken shape and did not have

a ready-to-use research programme (Topalov 2004). What Znaniecki encountered in Chicago were new methods of research in the newly created department of the social sciences and a mosaic of personalities, from the preacher Charles Henderson (1848–1915) through the Comte-inspired palaeontologist Lester Ward (1841–1913) to the Christian socialist Albion Small (1854–1926) (Lybeck 2019; Smith 1991).

Thomas, a graduate of the Chicago department with the degree of doctor (1896), who had earlier studied *Völkerpsychologie* in Berlin, was also trying to find a place for himself in this milieu. Thomas's idea of sociology involved shifting the discipline's focus in the direction of issues that were of typical concern for philanthropic organisations. One result was that he began his work even before Znaniecki had had the opportunity to prove his potential value as a co-author.

Elsewhere I have discussed the micro-sociological conditioning of the beginnings of Znaniecki's career, pointing to four sources of his productivity: (1) his early poetic work, (2) his declaration of complete devotion to intellectual work, (3) his brief contact with the international *émigré*-academic milieu in Geneva and Zurich, and (4) intensive work in the network of Warsaw philosophical and psychological societies in the years 1910–1914, where he obtained recognition and an audience for the first time (Dominiak 2017). Aside from his literary work (1), these elements had a continuing influence on his productivity in the second decade of the twentieth century. Below I will describe the elements of *The Polish Peasant* that are new and that constitute the exceptionalness of its creation.

/// *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* as Part of the Global Intellectual Network

Znaniecki most probably brought a part of *The Polish Peasant* with him to America, that is, a segment of a report entitled "Seasonal Emigration," which had been discussed by the Central Agricultural Committee and was addressed to the Russian Ministry of Agriculture. The original of this work has been lost and although it was not printed on account of the outbreak of the war, the supposition can be made that Znaniecki had managed to finish it (Dulczewski 1982: 67–70). A significant part of the introduction to the first volume (the subchapter entitled "Economic Life": 142–174) is from this text. It would seem that Znaniecki had access to at least a portion of the notes from the work, which was submitted for printing in 1914, and

that he made use of them in describing the general economic conditions of the Polish countryside.

In other questions – those connected with property, religion, magic, or customs – Znaniecki referred to works by the economist and future prime minister Władysław Grabski (1874–1938), the historian and sociologist Franciszek Bujak (1875–1953), and the ethnologist Oskar Kolberg (1814–1890). I mention the fact not in order to undermine the originality of this part of the work but because before 1914 the question of agricultural reform was an especially important issue in Poland and was frequently discussed by Polish intellectuals (Grabski 1904). Znaniecki's contribution, like that of every successful scholar, involved the effective use of earlier results of research for his own argumentation. Creativity is not connected with "genius" or any other uncontrolled phenomenon but with a successful reconfiguration of already known elements, including mainly ideas, research programmes, and theoretical premises experienced as significant symbols during reading, reflecting, and writing (Collins 1998: 35–36).

A major source of such symbols was undoubtedly Znaniecki's co-author, the originator of the idea behind *The Polish Peasant*, William I. Thomas (1863–1947), with his specific approach combining race psychology with engaged sociology. Equally importantly, Thomas also had a budget for research: a subsidy of $50,000 from Helen Culver's (1832–1925) foundation for a study in the area of race psychology. More significant than the sum itself, though, is that Thomas linked Znaniecki with the very dynamic circles at Hull House, a well-known and valued philanthropic organisation with headquarters in Chicago. Hull House had been founded at the end of the nineteenth century by the future Nobel peace prize laureate, Jane Addams, on the model of similar institutions in Great Britain. Its aim, other than supporting reforms and conducting research, was to work closely with the inhabitants of impoverished quarters of Chicago. Thomas and Znaniecki's work to a large degree reflected the programme of progressivism, which involved concern for educational institutions, support for modernisation through the training of social workers, and the use of scientific methods in the debate over improving society. However, Thomas's circle of acquaintance, which was extensive but not stable, should not be overrated and his social and intellectual vagabondage undoubtedly did not foster the potential for establishing creative connections (Abbott & Egloff 2008).

One idea that was significant for *The Polish Peasant* was Wilhelm Wundt's idea of comparative psychology. Both Thomas, through his German teachers, the philologist Heymann Steinthal (1823–1899) and the philos-

opher Moritz Lazarus (1824–1903), as well as Znaniecki, thanks to the psychologist Gustav Störring (1860–1946), were well acquainted with the achievements of *Völkerpsychologie*, which at that time was a recognised and normal – in the Kuhnian sense – social science. Znaniecki praised Wundt's theory as being the most complete theory of culture, free of naturalistic preconceptions, and considered it a merit that he and Thomas were among its first defenders (Znaniecki 2008 [1934]: 114–120).

In *The Polish Peasant*, Wundt's influence can be seen above all in solutions of a methodological nature. In this monographic generalisation, laws of development for a multi-million-member social class were derived from evidence of the individual behaviours, attitudes, and statements of a proportionally small community, as the empirical material involved fifty families and around one hundred cases of disorganisation. In regard to the analysis of individual questions, the subtle but significant influences of comparative psychology appeared when Znaniecki tried to define attitudes as belonging to characteristic types, called "temperaments," for instance, the *rastaquouère*, or buffoon (II: 344–346), or when he distinguished types of personalities, such as the philistine, the gypsy, or the creative individual (III: 22–28). The use of a typology of characters is a further creative transformation; to it, Znaniecki added Freudianism, another very popular current of the then social sciences. He probably obtained the idea from Alfred Adler, a student of Zygmunt Freud's, or through the intermediary of Władysław Witwicki's concept of cratism.[2] *The Polish Peasant* thus came to contain a fairly idiosyncratic social theory, without a "middle storey," deriving social institutions directly from the sublimation of elementary psychical-physiological properties of human beings, that is, from desires, attitudes, or reactions. Aside from utilising sociographic, historical, ethnographic, and philanthropic motifs, and elements of *Völkerpsychologie*, Znaniecki made a major alteration to one of the most important contemporary sociological traditions, that is, to the methodological premises of the Durkheim school.

The "Methodological Note" which begins *The Polish Peasant* contains the typical struggles of the first sociological traditions to separate positive scientific knowledge – in this case "practical sociology" – from common knowledge, that is, "common-sense sociology." Critique of the latter

[2] Cratism, which was developed by the Polish philosopher Władysław Witwicki (1878–1948), was an idiogenic concept of emotions derived from the psychological premises of Wundt, Spencer, and Nietzsche. Witwicki considered states of emotion to be individual means in the struggle for existence, while cratism, a sense of elevation or humiliation, was the effect of their sublimation through socialisation and creative participation in culture.

allowed Znaniecki to raise sociology above materialistically oriented psychology, the study of morality, comparative sociology, and economic reductionism. Znaniecki's objections to these unscientific forms of sociological reflection were the typical set of objections directed against common wisdom as subjectivism, unjustified comparisons, or the isolation of the research subject from other phenomena. The "Methodological Note" is an ambitious enterprise consisting in the preparation of an epistemological field through the use of distance in regard to traditionally recognised subdisciplines such as ethnography or social history. Znaniecki also pointed out that sociology should not be confused with the professional activities of social practitioners such as teachers or lawyers (I: 46–55).

In place of common-sense sociology, Znaniecki proposed combining social psychology, understood as the study of attitudes rather than simple reactions, with a sociology studying only one kind of value: social norms. Sociology in Znaniecki's view was thus only one of several specialised studies of culture. According to him, it should be a theory of social organisation, a pragmatic support for practitioners rather than an independent science. It is worth observing that in the "Methodological Note" Znaniecki treats sociology only as the "field of interest for various investigations," which involve manifestations of norms in behaviours and thus in actions. As a consequence of such a premise, the rest of the book rests on social psychology, which according to the author is a better theory because it can describe and explain both the objective and subjective side of values and attitudes. In addition, it allows attempts to be made to establish rules for the appearance of specific institutions in various "socio-psychological conditions" (I: 61–65).

In the remaining part of the "Note" Znaniecki refers to the methodology of Durkheim, reversing his rigorous principle of explaining social facts only through other social facts.

> It may be objected that we have neglected to criticize the conception according to which the cause of social phenomenon is to be sought, not in an individual, but exclusively in another social phenomenon (Durkheim). [But a criticism of this conception is implied in the previous discussion of the data of social theory.] As these data are both values and attitudes, a fact must include both and a succession of values alone cannot constitute a fact. Of course much depends also on what we call a "social" phenomenon. An attitude may be treated as a social phenomenon as opposed

> to the "state of consciousness" of individual psychology; but it is individual, even if common to all members of a group, when we oppose it to a value (I: 69; English ed.: 44).

In my opinion, this is a very important part of the work. It leaves the problem of defining a social phenomenon unresolved, which is not an objection, because Znaniecki did not intend to reduce the distance between the individual and society in such a radical manner as Durkheim had done. In Znaniecki's works, a social fact, or other basic element of society, is the missing part between psychological reactions and their collective manifestations in the form of social values and collective activities. This is by no means a demerit. Znaniecki thus avoided the "Charybdis of theorising" and concentrated on analysing higher order entities, that is, cultural systems. The result is acceptance of the premise that a human being may belong to multiple social groups depending on the qualifications of the other participants. On the one hand, this allowed the dynamic between individuals on the micro-scale to be observed, but on the other it entirely prevented the perception of important macro-structural relations (Ossowski 1983: 50).

Consequently, the "Methodological Note" contains a fairly distinctive theoretical mixture, composed mainly of analytical induction, certain nomothetic ambitions on the model of the natural sciences, and Wundtian comparative psychology. In partially rejecting Durkheim's psychology in its canonical form, Znaniecki combined various elements of the social sciences of his times. This led to a certain lack of cohesiveness in *The Polish Peasant*, which according to Znaniecki was the cost of a compromise between Thomas's theory of attitudes and his own concept of values. That the "Note" is in places a bit inconsistent is not necessarily a weakness. A homogenous work would not provoke discussion. Yet Znaniecki and his book continue to provide inspiration, including on account of certain omissions, such as, for example, the observations concerning leadership among migrant groups (Mucha 2019).

The last important element of *The Polish Peasant* is the empirical part, which constitutes more than a third of the work. It is composed of several hundred letters (vol. 1, 2, and 4), the autobiography of Władysław Wiśniewski (vol. 3), court documents, and declarations of Polish immigrant organisations (vol. 5). Placing such a large amount of empirical material in a scholarly work, with only a modest amount of commentary, could be indicative of *The Polish Peasant*'s addressees, who were assumed to be other social workers

and a narrow group of American bureaucrats. The vast amount of data also shifts part of the argumentation to the reader – with the obvious assumption that the reader is already convinced (Smith 1991).

The collected letters were divided into five types: ceremonial, informative, sentimental, literary, and business-related. Even if the contents are commonplace, or unintelligible, they filled the important role of maintaining family ties and replacing direct contact (I: 238–239). Znaniecki's conclusions concerning the role of literacy among the peasantry are interesting and inspiring. Although the contents of the letters are for the most part dull (Gallino 1974), they reveal the growing ability of Polish peasants to communicate and to overcome the isolation of their groups by their own forces. In order to argue that process in accord with the accepted premises of evolutionism, in the second volume a series of letters is arranged in an order showing the intellectual development of peasants, from the primitive forms of writing of the Kanikuł family (II: 37–40) to the complex discursive political arguments on the subject of capitalist oppression of the rural teacher Stanisław Jasiński (II: 392–400). Znaniecki saw in this epistolary material not solely a tool of communication but also the emancipation of the Polish peasants in their literary republic, which arose thanks to emigration.

The Polish Peasant is a work that emerged at the meeting point of numerous intellectual networks of scholars, departments, associations, methods, ideologies, empirical materials, and social circles on both sides of the Atlantic at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century. This unstable but dynamic institutional complex was a point of reference for Znaniecki, who always tried to preserve his independence while operating on the margins of the then centres of ideas. Znaniecki's loose network of connections – ranging from cosmopolitan *émigré* salons in Switzerland, inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche, through Warsaw intelligentsia circles and the Polish Philosophical Society, to the Chicago melting pot of progressive ideas – allowed him to add new elements continually until he finally put them together in the form of the famous five-volume work.

No set of ideas develops in a vacuum, without a social background. The specific path between psychology and philosophy that Znaniecki chose in order to maintain his research independence was doubtless not easy. Autonomy in the social world of intellectuals is often connected with isolation, but fortunately Znaniecki avoided that situation due to the rhythm of events and geopolitical decisions which occurred fairly unexpectedly in the years 1917–1918.

/// Concluding Remarks

In this short study of "early" sociological writing, I have tried to show the historical and source value of *The Polish Peasant*, an undeniably fundamental work, from an angle that differs from the one current in sociological historiography. Although the work has lost its original recipients, after a hundred years it is quite clearly acquiring new meaning through successive interpretations. This is what makes the "vitality" of classic works.[3] The difference between their present reading and original meanings is not that large and one of the authors of *The Polish Peasant* made considerable effort to give those meanings a more universal reach (in this case, a humanist one). Thus my critical approach is not a revision but is rather intended to draw attention to less known aspects of *The Polish Peasant*.

Generally speaking, the form and range of *The Polish Peasant* is American: the set of cases of social organisation and disorganisation derives from the medical casebook. However, the content of the work – from its idealistic-romantic conception of culture through its *Völkerpsychologie* – derives from the German intellectual sphere. The picture is completed by a "reversed" Durkheim methodology.

It is also worthwhile, on this occasion, to emphasise the role of errors and chance – elements that are often overlooked in the history of ideas. In the case of Znaniecki, it was a matter primarily of Thomas's unexpected proposal and Znaniecki's consequent trip to America, which turned out to have been an escape from war – from a world conflict with consequences that were impossible to predict. These circumstances make it additionally difficult to place Znaniecki in the global intellectual network. His creativity is both exceptional and niche at the same time: in my opinion, due to the lack of a mentor. Not being dependent on one of the then dominant intellectual networks (that is, empiriocriticism, pragmatism, or neo-Kantianism), he remained, as he described himself, a "philosophical re-

[3] An interesting example is the inclusion of part of Znaniecki's output in the Marxist tradition by the sociologists Jan Szczepański and Józef Chałasiński at the beginning of the 1970s. In the 1950s a leading Polish Marxist, Adam Schaff, criticised the biographical method for neglecting economic factors and not paying attention to changes in the class structure. In the introduction to the Polish edition of *The Polish Peasant*, Szczepański "rehabilitated" Znaniecki, officially returning him to Polish sociology, in the following manner: "Currently, however, after several decades of experience in building the socialist system, we have become convinced of the power of those subjective factors and of the weight of the social microsphere in resolving the social problems that socialised means of production have not automatically solved. Thus today we look entirely differently at the use of personal materials in Marxist sociology" (Szczepański 1976: 37–38). The predominant argument was the fact that Frederick Engels, in studying the situation of the working class in England, had long before Znaniecki referred to letters and other personal documents (sic!).

bel" (Znaniecki 1984), which in his initial period of creativity allowed him to choose freely among various intellectual traditions: both the canonical ones and those that were less well known. This changed from the moment he accepted a position as professor at the University of Poznań, a new national institution, in 1920.

Znaniecki's specific intellectual trajectory meant that he approached work on *The Polish Peasant* as a philosopher and he remained one while writing it. Thus his "sociological conversion," which is frequently postulated, is rather a historiographical effect consisting in a later subordination of his achievement to the Polish sociological tradition.

From the sociological and historical standpoint, several factors in Znaniecki's intellectual biography reflect the fascinating movement of knowledge beyond political and geographical borders (see Burke 2020). Above all, a hybridisation of knowledge occurred – a not entirely controlled combination and mixing, as is all too visible in *The Polish Peasant*. Other effects were relative exclusion, detachment in regard to local affairs, and partial Americanisation. These left Znaniecki in the rather problematic but simultaneously comfortable situation of an uninvolved observer. It was only at the beginning of the 1940s that he no longer had to explain his professional path, as his biography was contained in *Who's Who in American Education*.

Transl. Michelle Granas

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/// Abstract

This text critiques a classic sociological text, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*. The value of the work, which consists in the successful combination of elements from several intellectual traditions, is presented in connection with the biographical and historical background of one of the authors, Florian Znaniecki. In conclusion, the author makes a number of remarks concerning the special situation of migrants in global intellectual networks.

Keywords:
history of ideas, sociological canon, Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant*

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THE CONCEPT OF VALUES IN FLORIAN ZNANIECKI'S EARLY WORK

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The concept of value has lost much of the theoretical and rhetorical power it possessed in the early twentieth century. One of Jürgen Habermas's and Niklas Luhmann's central interests was to demonstrate that other mechanisms could fulfil the integrative function in society. Values became more and more concomitant with moral conflicts rather than harmony and integration. In addition, relativistic perspectives deprived values of stable normative contents that could serve as orientation points in a world of accelerating social change. At the same time, the idea of "common values" still seems to resonate with the broader public.

The supposition that values were in crisis and the critique of values as empty phrases both involved a specific understanding of values and their definition as a stable, universalistic component of the social order. However, in the early twentieth century, when theoretical debates on values flourished, the concept also embraced opposite ideas of changeability, flexibility, and social dynamics. In the present paper I am going to argue that Florian Znaniecki's early concept of value was intended to provide the idea of creative dynamics for social theory. His attempt found little resonance in the United States and has been overshadowed by the functionalist theory of Talcott Parsons. On the other hand, the tradition of symbolic interactionism took inspiration mostly from the work of George Herbert Mead, who did not give the concept of values that importance in his theoretical work. The aim of the present article is to reconstruct the main ideas of

Znaniecki's early theory of values in order to demonstrate its advantages in constructing social theory.

/// The Discovery of Values

The concept of value, which emerged at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries, spread and continued to be widely used after the Second World War. Although the term "value" had already been used by Kant and by his followers throughout the nineteenth century, its tremendous career in the social sciences was sparked by Friedrich Nietzsche's idea of the historical and psychological genesis of morality (Joas 1997: 37–57). At the same time, the sociologists Max Weber and Émile Durkheim introduced the idea of common values in individualistic models of action, defining "value" as one of several important objects of sociological studies (Weber 1922: 12–13; Durkheim 1951 [1897]: Ch. 5). Values, as a distinct phenomenon of individual experience and a source of universalistic social norms, drew the attention of pragmatists and phenomenologists early on.

The theoretical fascination with values culminated in Talcott Parsons's theory (1937), which became mainstream and claimed value consensus to be the basis of social integration and to be constitutive of the intelligibility of other social functions. The elevation of values to the level of social control from the level of individual experience required one crucial step – which was actually made before Parsons by his colleague Clyde Kluckhohn (1951: 396). Values had been defined not as mere preferences or ideas of what is good but as second-order preferences controlling and navigating the spontaneous or instinctive first-order preferences. "Work," "learning," or "helping people" are values as far as they are not *prima facie* preferred but still prevail by allowing an individual to evaluate and suppress her own wishes.

It is easy to see that along with Kluckhohn and Parsons's definition of values the old Platonic idea of internal conflicts of the soul returns to the social sciences. Another aspect of this return was Stanisław Ossowski's (2000 [1967]: 84–89) differentiation – which inspired at least two generations of Polish sociologists – between instrumental and ultimate values. Despite the sophistication of the Parsonian paradigm, which distinguished the social sciences from classical economic thinking, the idea of second-order values has problems of its own. One of these appears clearly in the Weberian concept of value-orientation, which can be easily reduced to goal-orientation and deprived of its logical force (Boudon 2001: 93–117). The question of

how values emerge and what makes them socially irreducible remains valid. Values defined as a separate sphere or as analytical categories cannot be located in social reality unless there is resort to a metaphysical tradition, as Durkheim famously attempted. To avoid the dissolution of values in abstract descriptions or their displacement to a non-empirical world, values would have to be located in empirically accessible reality both as a personal experience and as a social function. This is exactly where, in my opinion, Znaniecki's idea of values demonstrates its usefulness (1987 [1909]: 21), even though it may seem to be more superficial, as it does not oppose values to mere preferences (Thome 2008: 279–281). The most obvious and literal interpretation would identify values in Znaniecki's philosophy with things *as they are seen from the actor's perspective*. Such a misreading would overlook one important point: for Znaniecki, values are not epiphenomena or images of things but are ontologically and epistemically primary to things, as they are to any other cognitive object. For instance, values are more fundamental than moral norms since the latter are always broken up into causal and teleological chains. In order to be moral, one has to intend the good and, at the same time, to deduce it from first principles. The two operations are not commensurable and presuppose values. In his early text on philosophical ethics and moral values (1987 [1909]), Znaniecki came to the radical conclusion that moral philosophy is not possible in light of the historical relativity of values.

/// Values and Reality

Znaniecki's idea of values differs from the Parsonian definition because it responds to a different problem. Znaniecki does not ask about the suppression of an individual's own preferences but about the possibility of stable ground in the ocean of constantly changing values. Because he states the problem differently, Znaniecki, contrary to Parsons, does not presuppose the existence of values or a social consensus about them, but focuses on their genesis – a matter virtually omitted in the Parsonian version of culturalism. Parsons did not have a problem with the presupposed objectivity of values because he did not take their social and dynamic aspect seriously enough. Znaniecki wrote that "the social and objective character of values contradict each other" (1987 [1909]: 24) and further that "there is no *a priori* principle to assign any primacy to the social rather than individual action of values" (1987 [1909]: 24).

In a later article on thought and reality (1987 [1911]) Znaniecki attempted for the first time to define the sphere of values and find their specific location. The result is a theory of action and temporality resembling the later ideas of Mead, as elaborated in his *Philosophy of the Present* (1932: 6–28). Znaniecki argues that the differentiation of thought and reality, which bothered so many philosophers, may be derived from the temporality of action, which objectifies its own stable functions as objects while remaining a dynamic process of thought. The action is not limited by goals or means but by the present, which constantly produces both pasts and futures. Values are most real in the present as the action provokes new contents and synthesises the old ones. However, values are atemporal in that they can be revoked at any moment. The time of values may be reversed, because the logic of values is not causal. Natural scientists have good reasons to differentiate the past and the future but the same difference is relative from the practical perspective: "facts belong to the past or to the future only with reference to the actuality. Namely, all that passed can return and all that will come might have already happened" (1987 [1912]: 95). As Znaniecki argues, the arrows of time fulfil a much more flexible function in the sphere of values by describing the directions of values' becoming: a value can either approach the actuality or increase its distance from it.

The only objective measure of individual values is their position in value systems, which extend beyond individual experiences and opinions. In other words, values constitute intersubjective systems that provide individuals with stable realities. However, for Znaniecki, the social understood in terms of group thinking is an illusion – one that is distinct in the Durkheimian tradition of sociology. In "'The Elements of Practical Reality," written in 1912, one year before his first meeting with William I. Thomas, Znaniecki stressed the metaphorical meaning of sociological vocabulary: social orders are no more than metaphors of value systems, and collective representations mean no more than collective points of view in individual minds. Znaniecki describes as "social" those values whose relationships remain the same from the standpoint of all or the majority of individuals. These entities do not live in any privileged type of reality, as, for example, "collective representations" do. On the contrary, their practical genesis makes them vulnerable to reflexive twists and situational vicissitudes. While each action seeks to solve a specific situation with which it is confronted, values gain all their meaning from being elements of action. Two ideas of special importance for Znaniecki's further career ensued from this practical foundation of reality: first, acting individuals are directly oriented

towards the Good, the immanent presupposition of the intelligibility of action, while values mean the reflexive, theoretically objectified ideas of the Good; second, cross-sectional social studies are doomed to failure as they are not able to reflect the processual reality of action and the dynamic character of values. This early methodological insight of Znaniecki's prepared the way for his later contribution to empirical studies on general value transformation.

/// Values and Action in Znaniecki's and Thomas's Works

The article "The Significance of World and Human Development," which appeared in 1913 and which Znaniecki probably wrote after his first meeting with Thomas, marked the beginning of a new stage in Znaniecki's intellectual trajectory. Along with a growing interest in the evolution of value systems, the text reveals new ideas in Znaniecki's arguments. He focused not only on the macro-level of cultural processes but also on the micro-level of the situational determination of action. Like the pragmatists, Znaniecki mentions the role of hindrances in modifying a course of action but is far from assigning to hindrances an exclusive or even a crucial role in shaping value-systems – a motif we encounter throughout Thomas's early work. For Znaniecki, hindrances awaken the "consciousness of an external influence before its actual occurrence" but do not exhaust the mechanism of human development. For Thomas, human beings can be reduced to adaptive functions, while Znaniecki conceptualises humans as subjects who create and shape the external world, thus making it completely dependent on them. Human actors are not just inventive in specific situations; they are creative by building a world which is "a world for them," a system of values governed by its own logic – sometimes irrational or paradoxical but still intelligible as an object for the human subjects.

The very fact that Znaniecki introduced into his philosophy elements that are crucial to Thomas's way of thinking may indicate that the mutual theoretical adjustment of the two authors started as soon as 1913. Andrew Abbott and Thomas Egloff (2008), who tried to interpret a change in Thomas's interests that took place approximately at the same time and was reflected in his teaching curricula, deny that Znaniecki had any influence on Thomas and falsely place the first meeting of the two in 1914. Contrary to Abbott and Egloff's suggestions, it may be argued that Thomas and Znaniecki's first encounter initiated their intensive intellectual dialogue (Kaczmarczyk 2018: 291–295; Thomas E.A. 1992; Wiley 2007: 137–139).

Unlike Thomas's texts, Znaniecki's article on the significance of world and human development is permeated by the idea of a freedom that reaches both to the future and to the past and grows along with the transforming force and complexity of new meanings. At the same time, more stable cultural contents diminish freedom and social development. Znaniecki formulates a dilemma of cognitive and moral stability on the one hand and creative freedom on the other. He writes that "You cannot be free in a secure world, you have to choose between your different wishes: the wish for security and the wish for new experience." Obviously, the same idea may be found throughout Thomas's later work, in particular in *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923), but it does not seem to be located at the same level of reflection. The constructivist thrust of Znaniecki's philosophy suggests an existential interpretation of his dilemma, while Thomas confines himself to a behavioural analysis, which raises problems of its own, as was classically formulated by Pitirim Sorokin in his critique of "animism" in social theory.

Nevertheless, Thomas is not unaware of the tension between freedom and stability but arrives at this problem in a completely different manner. In his early works he operates on three levels: that of biological instinct (e.g., the famous "gaming instinct" (Thomas 1901)), social control (e.g., the diffusion of imitation (Thomas 1899)) and social knowledge (institutionalised social experimentation and "the habit of change"). All levels imply different mechanisms and finally lead to a contradiction rather than a dilemma, because the biological principle of self-preservation cannot be reconciled with the creativity that spreads both habit and social bonds. The tension between empirical mechanisms analysed by Thomas also appeared to Znaniecki as a theoretical conflict – a situation he solved by his own creativistic theory of action.

We would do injustice to Znaniecki's concept of action by reducing it to the pragmatist idea of relativising goals and means in the classical concept of action. Znaniecki is clearly aware of this accomplishment of the pragmatist theory, but his own method of dealing with the shortcomings of goal-orientation differs in several ways. Apart from providing a constructivist basis of action in the form of values, he identifies the unity of the goal and the actual course of action as the essence of normative ideals (Znaniecki 1987 [1914]). If we consider the Socratic, Buddhist, or Christian visions of the Good we see that they define it more or less metaphorically as an Unknown which has to be achieved in practice without theoretical guidance. Znaniecki aptly expressed this inability of social theory to conceptualise or even perceive the dynamics of values in their creative phase.

At the same time he outlined his own alternative: a theory that brings together social action, the genesis of norms, and moral personality. In this context values are meant as anything but principles from which a system of norms could be deduced. They are rather the very process that produces new values, norms, and individual personalities.

/// The Role of Values in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*

The deep philosophical divergences between Thomas and Znaniecki and their parallel interests suggest that their cooperation was a mutually fruitful dialogue. Most interpretations of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* suffer from relative blindness to this context (Abbott & Egloff 2008; Blumer 1939; Faris 1951; Guth & Schrecker 2002). They either give the upper hand to Thomas or Znaniecki in creating the work or consider the work to be an almost mechanical synthesis of two commensurable concepts. However, a careful analysis of the authors' previous works makes it evident that they proposed a new theory, which solved their previous theoretical problems, after having confronted a rich body of empirical material. Nonetheless, they had to find a consensus regarding a common theoretical framework before starting the empirical analysis (Kaczmarczyk 2018).

The famous "Methodological Note" is probably the most read chapter of *The Polish Peasant*. Znaniecki produced three versions of it before reaching an agreement with Thomas. Therefore, it can be interpreted as the best documentation of the authors' dialogue, while its internal tensions reflect the lasting divergences between them, as exemplified by the very starting point of the "Note." On the one hand, the question about new forms of social control that would be adequate for rapid social changes corresponds with Thomas's dilemma. On the other hand, the critique of the biological concept of adaptation and the methodological focus on society in its full development indicate the influence of Znaniecki. Thomas and Znaniecki were in agreement with regard to the necessity of new forms of social control according with the rapidity of change. The problem united two major themes of their previous works: the lack of adequate control and the creative destruction of knowledge and institutions. At the same time they were fully aware that a trial-and-error method could bring social catastrophe to complex modern societies whose control requires systematic and precise knowledge. They were far from the anarchistic ideas of social experimentation that are spreading today under the influence of Bruno Latour. Another important point, which is easy to overlook in Thomas and Znaniecki's

agenda, is the critique of adaptation-focused social theories. For our authors, adaptation is an active process, never reducible to conditions, and involving a creative redefinition of the situation.

Before outlining the final answer to the problem formulated in the "Methodological Note," one remark on Thomas and Znaniecki's value concept seems necessary. In contrast to those interpreters who view the value–attitude scheme as a mechanical synthesis of the authors' major theoretical concepts, I suggest that the work introduces a new theoretical idea that allows the authors to operationalise Znaniecki's philosophical concept of values. It was in the "Methodological Note" that Znaniecki for the first time indicated the empirical mechanisms of value change and value genesis. Similarly, the idea of triangular causal explanations comprising the influence of attitudes or values on their pre-existing basis appeared as a novel element both in Znaniecki's and Thomas's thought. The idea was progressive in two different ways. First, in terms of methodological economics, the replacement of one explanans with two specific elements meant a vast simplification of the research process. It is much easier to ask how a specific value would change under the influence of a pre-existing set of attitudes than to decide whether this value may cause the invention of another one. Thomas and Znaniecki's explanatory strategy allows, thus, for general laws to be formulated by investigating concrete values in different social contexts. Note that this strategy would not be possible if Thomas and Znaniecki had an abstract, Parsons-like concept of values. According to the definition in the "Methodological Note," a value is "a datum of empirical content accessible to the group members with meaning which can be an object of activity." Values are no less concrete than things, but as opposed to them, they provide actors with meanings which can be ascribed to things in various manners.

While Thomas later distanced himself from the value–attitude scheme, describing it as going too far (Blumer 1939: 83), Znaniecki found it sound, although insufficient in certain respects. We encounter such a view in his book *Cultural Reality*, which was written simultaneously with *The Polish Peasant* and published in 1919. It is in this work that Znaniecki clearly juxtaposes the value–attitude scheme to the Durkheimian idea of searching for causes of social facts among other social facts (1919: 295). Further, Znaniecki, apart from repeating the assertions made in *The Polish Peasant*, recognises the limits of his and Thomas's explanatory scheme by writing that

> A theoretical reconstruction of social becoming based upon the concept of laws evidently cannot pretend to explain the appearance of absolutely new forms of social schemes, since the law as such is always a law of repetition. It can only explain how a scheme, already preexisting in concrete experience, became socialised, realised, and applied in a certain group at a certain epoch, but not how it appeared in the empirical world in general as a result of a new and spontaneous schematic determination of situations which were not schematised before (Znaniecki 1919: 297).

Znaniecki's emphasis on the necessity to explain the very genesis of values and not just their evolution indicates that his divergences from Thomas lingered during their cooperation and afterwards. Moreover, it documents Znaniecki's own research plans, which corresponded well with his early inquiries. The themes that dominate Znaniecki's thought already come to the fore in Part IV of *The Polish Peasant*, which was written at a time when Thomas was probably less engaged in the work due to the trouble infamously caused to him by the FBI and the University of Chicago. The "Introduction" to Wladek's life not only confirms that the value–attitude scheme goes beyond a mechanical synthesis of biologistic and culturalist concepts but reinforces and elaborates on the non-biologistic understanding of attitudes by dividing their organisation into two distinct types: temperament and character. While the former means no more than association of attitudes on the basis of instinct and habit, the latter involves reflexive reorganisation of attitudes on the basis of social demands. Since both terms refer to empirical regularities of human behaviour, they imply the constitution of habit in individual lives. However, the concept of habit utilised in Thomas's early texts is now strictly limited to the temperamental organisation of attitudes. With regard to character, the authors assert that contrary to biological mechanisms "social situations never spontaneously repeat themselves, every situation is more or less new, for every one includes new human activities differently combined" (Thomas & Znaniecki 1958: 1852).

Znaniecki's differentiation of personality organisations, in line with his value concept, is anything but an abstract and heuristic tool. On the contrary, it describes concrete subsequent mechanisms that are empirically accessible. Interestingly, the proof of the existence of character as a sophisticated level of attitude organisation is to be found on the biological level: "the attitudes organised for the permanent satisfaction of hunger or sexual

desire manifest themselves even while no hunger or sexual desire is actually felt and while the actual material conditions do not suggest them in any way" (Thomas & Znaniecki 1958: 1846).

Similarly, the concept of life-organisation that comprises a set of social values organised at the individual level explains the way in which individuals adapt to changing social demands, thus combining the concept of values with a theory of social control. The latter is not limited to the creation of norms and encroaches on the field of the psychological self-control of experience. However, the control is never static or completed. Each situation opens "the range of possibilities of further development remaining open to the individual after the stabilisation" (Thomas & Znaniecki 1958: 1853). Under such challenging circumstances the willingness to create new attitudes might be more or less pronounced and three types of personalities describe the poles of possible general orientations: the Philistine, the Bohemian, and the creative.

/// The Advantages of Znaniecki's Concept of Values

The above-mentioned typology, which applies Znaniecki's early concept of values to the analysis of empirical personality dynamics, suffers from the normative prejudices inscribed in Znaniecki's and Thomas's respect for creative people, but beyond that exhibits several advantages of Znaniecki's theory of values as compared to its sociological alternatives.

First, it is consistently a processual theory for which no static model of personality or society could be true. This leads outright to a methodological postulate to investigate personal development and entire lifespans rather than momentary systems of values or action plans. Life-organisation does not occur at any single moment but is a lifelong challenge. Personal developments and the sequences of values that shape actions are much more important than any particular mental state. Since human beings undergo continual development, the means of life-organisation are much more important than their goals or any particular stage. For this reason Thomas and Znaniecki find cross-cutting research methods essentially deficient, while autobiographies are the only "perfect" types of empirical material. Interestingly enough, Znaniecki would never again use the method of life-record analysis, while Thomas continued to make use of it, especially in his book *The Unadjusted Girl*, where he also widely utilised the concept of four wishes.

Second, the said theory of personality is strongly agency-oriented, thus avoiding the paradoxes and reductionisms relating to structuralist and otherwise determinist approaches. The human action is undetermined at its start; its first phase "is characterised by an essential vagueness" (Thomas & Znaniecki 1958: 1847) because in spite of the multiple desires that trigger human behaviour, the experienced complexity "is not ordered, values are not outlined" (ibid.). In other words, the source of vagueness is neither lack of will nor lack of social influence, as the theories of social anomie proclaim, but lack of values understood as an individual's own accomplishment.

Third, the introduction of Znaniecki's concept of values allowed the authors of *The Polish Peasant* to view social organisation and disorganisation as a process in which the equilibrium of both poles shifts in response to changing value systems. The disorganisation of individual lives in times of external challenges may cause social disorganisation, but it may also be the case that conformism is strong enough to suppress the articulation of life disorganisation. Social organisation does not correspond to the state of social or individual consciousness: "It is therefore impossible to conclude from social as to individual organization or disorganization, or vice versa. In other words, social organization is not coextensive with individual morality, nor does social disorganization correspond to individual demoralization" (Thomas & Znaniecki 1958: 1129). However, by creating new values and demonstrating better-adapted practices individuals are to some extent able to control the process and reach a new equilibrium. Thomas and Znaniecki call the process "social reconstruction," which is possible "only because, and in so far as, during the period of social disorganization a part at least of the members of the group have not become individually disorganized, but, on the contrary, have been working toward a new and more efficient personal life-organization and have expressed a part at least of the constructive tendencies implied in their individual activities in an effort to produce new social institutions." The idea of social reconstruction allows practical desiderata to be formulated but also changes the focus of empirical research. Instead of looking at the general social tendencies reflected in the quantitative data, Thomas and Znaniecki were much more interested in identifying the specific attitudes and values responsible for social disorganisation and reconstruction.

Fourth, Thomas and Znaniecki's theory goes beyond the indication of an integrative function of values and attempts to explain their genesis. In this respect the authors succeed in avoiding Parsons's main failing. As

we learn from the analysis of the vicissitudes of emigrant life exemplified in the numerous letters described in the first volumes of the book, actors create new values by observing their own new practices and reflecting on them. The most appropriate description of the sources of values in Thomas and Znaniecki's work can be found in Hans Joas, who argued in his own book on values that they arise in the experiences of self-creation and self-transcendence. The creativist theme that comes to the fore in the "Introduction" to Waldek's life would come back in the later phases of Znaniecki's work, especially in *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* (1940), which was published during the author's second, long visit to the United States.

Quite in line with the progressivist set of ideas that spread through Europe and the United States at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries, Thomas and Znaniecki believed the creativist type of personality to be the major factor in fast social adaptation and to be unrivalled for its adequacy. However, Thomas and Znaniecki complained both in *The Polish Peasant* and in their later works that social organisation and, specifically, education, in demanding mechanical compliance with rules or habitualisation, does not live up to the principle of creativity. A perfect school would allow individuals to recognise and express the fact that their life-organisation has been accomplished by the actors themselves. This theme returns in Thomas's descriptions of suppressed wishes for new experience in *The Unadjusted Girl*, but more extensively in Znaniecki's work on *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*. It is in the latter work that the themes of knowledge evolution and its social conditions culminate. The idea of values reappears in a new form: as the link between the social roles played by individual actors and the "social circles" of these roles. There would be no rationale for any professional activity if there were no public agreement about its advantages:

> Every social role presupposes that between the individual performing the role, who may thus be called a "social person," and a smaller or larger set of people who participate in his performance and may be termed his "social circle" there is a common bond constituted by a complex of values which all of them appreciate positively. These are economic values in the case of a merchant or a banker and the circle formed by his clients; hygienic values for the physician and his patients; political values for a king and his subjects; religious values for the priest and his circle of lay belie-

> vers; aesthetic values for the artist and the circle of his admirers and critics; a combination of various values which fill the content of family life between the child and his family circle (Znaniecki 1940: 14–15).

As Znaniecki argues in the third chapter of his book, for centuries different sets of values mediated between academic institutions (rooted in the tradition of sacred schools) and the public, which is interested in practical knowledge and professional expertise. However, along with desacralisation, individualisation, and the independence of academic roles, the old principle of authority has been replaced in universities by an authentic demand for discovering new facts and formulating new theoretical problems. The roles of ideological gurus and theory defenders could not stand the new pattern of explorative thinking that emerged from the parting with unbelievable – but still strongly entrenched or even sacralised – knowledge. The role of scientific explorer meant that the bond with the social circle would be broken or compromised. Explorers want more than the satisfaction of popular needs: "All new developments in the history of knowledge have been due to those scientists who did more in their social roles than their circles wanted and expected them to do" (Znaniecki 1940: 164). Old social values get exposed to the danger of social disagreement, while new values are difficult to find and to define. They emerge from the practices of the explorers, who ask new theoretical questions and formulate new scientific methodologies: "There is no 'logic' of creative thought; there are no principles of the search for new knowledge comparable to the principles of the systematization of ready knowledge" (Znaniecki 1940: 168–169). Moreover, in so far as the old patterns of scholarly and academic teaching and studying fail to foster the creative type of scholar, they serve to reproduce the existing social order rather than to develop knowledge for its own sake. As Znaniecki writes with reference to traditional schools: "The school of general education, on the contrary, as an institution of the modern society serves directly the maintenance of social order – whether it be a traditional static order or a more or less dynamic new order" (1940: 155). In a brave and often overlooked conclusion, Znaniecki stresses that the gap between social and purely scientific values might be overcome on the level of the general meaning of exploratory practices. By constantly questioning the pre-existing hypotheses and relativising the seemingly stable body of knowledge, explorers create a dynamic order that is never ready-made but, in return, raises the system of knowledge "above the arbitrariness and vari-

ability of subjective psychological experiences and impulses" (Znaniecki 1940: 192).

To conclude, Znaniecki's early idea of the intersubjectivity of values does not imply any necessity of value consensus. It rather means the mutual acknowledgement of the relativity of individual values as well as momentary sets of scientific beliefs. As a consequence, contrary to the traditional approaches, Znaniecki suspects a crisis of values in situations of little change: when old values are not questioned and no new values emerge. If values cease to be processual, they die out and are replaced by instincts and habits. This view conspicuously contradicts the classical visions of social stability but also proves that a radical alternative had been present long before the birth of symbolic interactionism.

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/// Abstract

One of the central concepts of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, especially highlighted in the "Methodological Note," is the relationship between values and attitudes, which frames the subsequent empirical analyses and conclusions. The aim of the present article is to reconstruct Florian Znaniecki's early idea of values in order to demonstrate its originality and later influence on his sociological contributions. As the author argues, Znaniecki's early insights with regard to values allow us to reconsider his collaboration with William Thomas and to interpret *The Polish Peasant* as a part of Znaniecki's long-term research programme.

Keywords:
Florian Znaniecki, William I. Thomas, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, value, attitude, definition of situation

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THE CHANGE IN WILLIAM I. THOMAS'S VIEW OF BIOLOGY

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Anthropologists, indeed, regard woman as intermediate in development between the child and the man.
(Thomas 1897: 40)

[D]ifference in natural ability is, in the main, a characteristic of the individual, not of race or of sex.
(Thomas 1907: 438)

In this article, I would like to trace William I. Thomas's changing views on the explanatory role of biology for sociology and social psychology. From the beginning, Thomas studied numerous subjects that involved both biological and sociological factors. He wrote on the nature of the sexes, race, instincts, prejudices, and evolution. As I will attempt to show, his starting point was the simple biologism with which he was familiar and which consisted mainly in transferring the theoretical structures of biology to sociology. Obviously, this understanding of biologism is completely obsolete today. Yet his view of biology's role subsequently began to shift towards what is currently the most popular approach, involving the assimilation of data interpreted in strictly sociological theoretical categories. This article is not a holistic review of Thomas's work in terms of his beliefs about the role of biology but rather describes a key moment in the qualitative change of approach that took place in the first years of the twentieth century. I will start with a brief outline of the biological topics that most affected sociology as it emerged and of modern methods of combining biology and sociology. Next, I will compare the earlier and later role of biology in Thomas's sociology.

/// A Basic Typology of the Relation Between Biology and Sociology

The relation between biology and sociology can be typologised in various ways, depending on what we consider to be the criterion of division. Undoubtedly, the two sciences can be compared in the fields of methodology, ontology, epistemology, and language. It is also possible to discuss the causal relations between biological and sociological factors. In the present article, in order to capture the relation between biology and sociology, I make use of a typology I have discussed in depth elsewhere (Remisiewicz 2017a) concerning types of contribution from biology to sociology. This typology assumes that there are three possible methods of transferring the resources of biology to sociology: the transfer of theory (which I call biologism without biology), the transfer of data (biology without biologism), or the transfer of data and theory (proper biologism).

The transfer of theory consists in carrying entire great relationally connected conceptual structures, or more rarely laws, from one area to another, and then organising data acquired from social research by those means. This use of biology stiffens theory – it forces the sociologist to find structures that have already been imposed from above and thus to conduct research while often assuming from the outset what is to be proved. As examples, cultural evolution theories can be given (in so far as they draw on biology) and the social psychology theories that seek hidden psychological structures analogous to those that are the subject of research on animals (e.g., instincts). In general, a way of understanding is also transferred along with theoretical structures and postulated laws of action.

The second way of combining biology with sociology is that of a strong socio-biology, which offers both data and a theory with which to organise it. In this approach, a human being is treated as a thoroughly biological entity, for which the laws of biology are considered sufficient explanation. All types of cultural phenomena are viewed as manifestations of hidden processes, laws, justifications, or rationalisations. This is an extremely "imperialist" relationship: it deprives sociology of its own identity as a discipline and very often imposes understandings that are overly simplified in light of the complexity of human societies.

The third type involves use of biology's data (along with narrow-range theories) to justify or enrich or nuance existing sociological theories. It would seem that this is the type of relation that today has the greatest potential and is used, for instance, in the form of neurosociology (Franks

2010). This type will be discussed below. Here it is worthwhile, though, to point out that in contrast to the previous approaches, this kind of relation does not premise changes in the sociological language, nor affect the ontological commitments of a given theory, nor postulate the transfer of the laws of biology to another class of entities, and thus it does not risk reductionism (further, see Remisiewicz 2017b). Sociological theories are not here subject to biological corrections – or they are subject only to a minimal degree: for instance, when some biological fact contradicts an accepted premise of the theory.

As I will attempt to show, Thomas's approach was dictated by a change in his thinking about the relation between biology and sociology, and as a passage from the second type to the third it opened the way to what is today the most up-to-date view of these relations.

/// On the Relations between Sociology and Biology in Early Sociology

Sociology emerged in the nineteenth century, in an age that was the turning point for biology as well. At the time the first theories were being formed in the world of biology, Charles Darwin's and Alfred Russel Wallace's concepts of evolution were being hotly debated in the world at large, and attempts were being made to transfer discoveries about the principles by which nature functioned to the operation of society as well. Herbert Spencer brought the idea of evolution to society with his idea of society's creation of complexity through the integration of parts. And although clearly these two modes of understanding evolution – the biological and the purely social – did not originally have many common links, their presence in scholarly discussions came to be intertwined.

The nineteenth century was also the age of technological discoveries, which made the rapid development of anatomy, physiology, and neurology possible. The growth of knowledge in these areas revealed the parallel traits of humans and animals, and also enabled increasingly detailed comparisons of individual human beings.

These discoveries called the prevailing convictions about the uniqueness of human culture and of human beings in general into question. First, the human being began to be treated as a part of nature, as an animal species. This in turn led to the conclusion that perhaps certain laws of nature also affected humans. It began to be considered whether, and to what extent, it would be possible to apply the new concepts of the biological

sciences to humans as individuals, to various group processes, and finally to society as a whole. A fairly natural argument was advanced: if all the operations of nature can be explained by a few principles and if humans are part of nature, then the activities of humans – as individuals and groups – should be explainable in this manner. Even though culture appears to be infinitely richer and more complex than all other forms of behaviour known in nature, in the end this idea is only a delusion resulting from the human perspective.

Another popular idea at the time was the concept of instinct, that is, a natural pattern of behaviour which every healthy representative of a given species exhibits without instruction. Although the idea has been elaborated in sociology and is associated chiefly with the work of William McDougall (2001), its framework existed in the social sciences much earlier and provided elements of theories as distant from each other as William James's theory of emotion and the behaviourism of John Watson (Richards 2018). In its developed version, instinctivism derived all social behaviour from a limited number of instincts. Naturally, from the beginning the theory was beset with problems. One was the impossibility of verifying it due to a vicious circle in reasoning: the argument for the existence of a set of instincts was the presence of similar phenomena in various cultures having no contact with each other. However, having made such an assumption, every problematic instance had to be subordinated to an arbitrarily established "net" of instincts. Moreover, the creation of an exhaustive list of such instincts was no easy matter, and in fact every theoretician had a different version.

Evolutionism also required the questioning of which traits of human nature are inborn and which acquired. The development of intercultural research and the stories of travellers seemed to allow those questions to be answered by comparing known societies with those that had not previously been studied. Traits appearing in all types of cultures could not be explained by imitation; thus they must have been shaped independently and this must mean they derived from human nature. The appearance of cultural differences, however, was a separate issue. On the one hand, it could be considered that, in spite of appearances, certain differences had common roots, for instance, they could originate from an instinct common to all humans. On the other hand, variations were also explained by natural differences between races in the functioning of the cognitive apparatus. Very often, methodological errors, imperfect knowledge of a local language, or lack of proper understanding of the context led researchers

to draw conclusions about the immorality or lesser intellectual potential of the "lower races." In effect, what was involved was the sanctioning of racism by science.

So-called social Darwinism thus required social institutions and all of society to be viewed as participants in the game of survival. Some scholars have pointed to the very strong influence of the idea on nineteenth-century and later education, in which the role of selection was magnified based on this paradigm. Students became competitors in a "natural" struggle in which the best-adapted won (Jeynes 2010). Of course, such a mode of thinking did not in any way take into account key social factors in the shaping of predispositions and also minimised care or aid for weaker persons, the disabled, or the marginalised. In the social Darwinist understanding they became simply "ill-adapted" to the prevailing rules. These kinds of theories not only had lethal social influences but were also burdened with errors, logical inconsistencies, and contradictions. Spencer, for instance, argued that white people were intellectually and morally superior to "savages" (Spencer 1855). Thomas, however, was a critic of social Darwinist theories. It is worthwhile to quote a longer passage from his writing:

> But, in spite of this, Spencer and others have insisted that he is incapable of self-restraint, is carried away like a child by the impulse of the moment, and is incapable of rejecting an immediate gratification for a greater future one. Cases like the one mentioned by Darwin of the Fuegian man who struck and killed his little son when the latter dropped a basket of fish into the water are cited without regard to the fact that cases of sudden domestic violence and quick repentance are common in any city today; and the failure of the city blacks to throw back the small fry when seining is referred to without pausing to consider that our practice of exterminating game and denuding our forests shows an amazing lack of individual self-restraint (Thomas 1907: 442).

These are the kinds of approaches to biological and sociological issues that were current when Thomas began his career and it is worth stressing that he became interested in the social sciences after reading Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*. It is also worth emphasising at this point that biology was only one of the areas that significantly affected his thinking. Others that should be mentioned include above all anthropology, ethnology, and also social psychology, which was then especially developed in connection

with pragmatist philosophy (Young 1962). In addition, Thomas was an erudite scholar and did not limit his interest to a narrow field of investigation. A certain connection with the philosophy of pragmatism enabled him to protect himself from dogma and to seek suitable solutions for the new research problems that were appearing in the rapidly changing turn-of-the-century world.

/// From Early Biologism to Contemporary Approaches to Data Instead of Theory

Historically, one of the causes for sociologists' widespread criticism of a biological interpretation of social life was the treatment of nature and culture as entirely separate elements. It was assumed that naturalist explanations must be competitive in regard to culturalist explanations and vice versa. Some sociologists, as if in opposition to the radical views of biologists, rejected any ties with biology and consequently increased the appearance of a conflict: instead of cooperating, biology and sociology became alternative explanations for certain phenomena.

Solely a change in the paradigm made it possible to perceive that these relations might be much more complex. They need not be treated in a single-track fashion, as the influence of one factor on another, but could rather be viewed as a series of feedback. The relation between the mind, society, and culture is a particular example. Although in the ontogenetic perspective the development of the brain is genetically programmed from the beginning, one of the components of its programming is neuroplasticity. The mind possesses the ability to create new connections solely on the basis of the stimulants it receives. Neurosociologist David D. Franks excellently summarises the matter: "A gene without experience and an environment is not a working gene" (Franks 2010: 14). For example, children possess the structures necessary to acquire any language but they require stimulation. If they do not receive it by their third or fourth year of life, they forever lose the ability to use language fluently.

From the beginning then, the mind is closely dependent on the stimulants it receives from the environment in which it exists. As Kimberly Noble has shown in numerous studies, the development of the entire anatomical structure is involved – for instance, the development of certain anatomical structures correlates with the socio-economic status of the child's family (Merz et al. 2019a; Noble et al. 2005; Noble et al. 2012). Obviously, this does not mean that the income of the parents or their education are

reflected in some abstract way in the mind of the child, nor that persons of varying socio-economic status genetically transfer specific traits that affect their children's development. Undoubtedly, however, there are many differences in the stimulants provided by families of low and high socio-economic status to their children: for instance, in the amount of attention, the amount of reading, or the level of complexity of the communications between the parents and the child (as shown in Basil Bernstein's classic study (1975)). The same mechanisms apply to the development of abilities of self-motivation or self-control. All these elements influence the shaping of neuroanatomical structures (Merz et al. 2019b).

Numerous intercultural studies also show the basic differences in the functioning of the brain at the sensory level, while taking into consideration the regulation of senses such as sight, hearing, and even smell (Ayabe-Kanamura et al. 1998). For instance, use of a tonal language favours the better development of an ability to recognise false notes in music (Wong et al. 2012) and being a musician facilitates the differentiation of quarter tones (Bailes et al. 2015). Europeans pay significantly more attention to objects in the foreground than in the background, while Asians concentrate on the relation between objects and their background (Duch 2009). Other researchers have pointed to the larger use of the right side of the brain among Australian aboriginal peoples in comparison to Europeans. Although if an aboriginal child is raised in a European culture, the domination of the right brain lessens and is similar to European models (TenHouten 1985).

All this means that reducing bio-social issues to a simple question of nature or culture is, in our present day, outdated and incompatible with the most recent scientific knowledge: both the biological constitution of the human species and the cultures of its societies, with the local micro-implementation of culture in daily interactions, have a mutual effect. Single-factor conceptions of the creation of societies from several basic "tendencies" or "instincts" are decidedly outdated, as are the conceptions of hard sociobiology[1] about the genetic determination of territorialism, nationalism, and tendencies to violence (Szacka 1991), which basically push the burden of explanation to a lower level. Indubitably, certain traits of the individual are genetically conditioned, but this is rarely a matter of rigid determinism: much more often the environment in the broad sense to some degree regulates these traits. It is also worth remembering that those traits can influence social activities and the social activities can influence neurological or other structures and thereby both factors are continually providing mutual

[1] I am using here John Alcock's (2001) division between *soft* and *hard* sociology.

feedback. Explanations of the functioning of society might be more precise if such interactions were better understood.

In the present article I will try to show that Thomas was a precursor of this type of thinking. Although he began with theoretical inspirations, he abandoned them in a later period, concentrating on biological data. Furthermore, his research, given the generally very early stage of reflection on the biological conditioning of culture and the cultural conditioning of biology, can be considered pioneering.

Every idea is the product of a certain time period and consequently of a certain social context. In Thomas's work we find numerous references to the existence of convictions and views that today are considered entirely erroneous. However, it seems justified to me to show that his ideas are to a certain degree precursors of new ways of thinking about the relations between biology and sociology and of explaining social facts as being not – as was then believed – biologically determined but rather coupled with biology.

/// Thomas's Earlier Views

Thomas's earlier views may seem singular to the contemporary sociologist, but they were undoubtedly influenced by earlier research that attempted to connect the discoveries of biology with the functioning of society. In the initial stages this inevitably led to errors. What is interesting is not so much what those views were but rather how they were justified. In this section, let us look at his views concerning the inequality of races and sexes.

Biologists differentiated two forms of energy use. Plants husbanded energy in an anabolic fashion, meaning that they collected and preserved it, and all expenditures of energy occurred as slowly as possible. Animals, on the contrary, managed their energy in a catabolic manner. Their lives, including their reproductive success, depended on expending energy, which had to be regularly renewed. In Thomas's opinion, an analogous relation occurred between the sexes: "femaleness is merely a repetition of the contrast existing between the animal and the plant" (Thomas 1897: 32). This distinction was the original source of the differences between the sexes in terms of physiology, mental life, and temperament. Men have more muscle, while women's bodies generate more fat. Men have larger skulls and thus are more intelligent. In addition, their inclination to activeness and violence is natural. In contrast, women are suited to a quiet life and subordination. Moreover, women are more sensitive, which has the positive evolutionary effect of creating the "first community" of a mother and children.

In Thomas's opinion, the societies that manage themselves best make proper use of both the anabolic and catabolic energy of men and women, being guided by the former in confrontational activities such as war or politics, and by the latter in the sphere of constructive activities. The reader might thus have the impression that anabolic and catabolic energy are here treated a little like *yin* and *yang*, that is, as being mutually complementary. It was on more or less such a basis that Thomas constructed his personal argument for the primacy of monogamy. The best evolutionarily adapted societies are those where the family is constructed of a man and a woman, who transmit to their children both types of energy: "Thus in the human species those races have prevailed in which in consequence of a monogamous system of marriage the providence of both parents is assured to the offspring, resulting in better nutrition and somatic and psychical training" (Thomas 1897: 61).

Early Thomas was a proper biologist: he combined biological data and the theoretical structures of biology to apply them to understanding sociology. To begin with, he ascribed to the sexes varying types of energy use. He referred to the theory used in the natural sciences concerning the anabolic and catabolic use of energy and then transferred that theoretical structure, replacing plants and animals with the male and female sexes. In order to justify the idea, he reached for the sources he had available in physiology or psychology. Having prepared such a basic mechanism, he derived far-reaching conclusions from it.

At the time, Thomas described his sociological position very clearly:

> It is increasingly apparent that all sociological manifestations proceed from physiological conditions. The variables entering into social consciousness and activity – technology, ceremonial, religion, jurisprudence, politics, the arts and professions, trade and commerce – have confessedly either a primary or a secondary connection with the struggle for food (Thomas 1897: 31).

What can be seen here is the distinct influence of the then popular single-factor explanation of social life by means of a presumed "hidden regulator." Thomas located the biological factor at the very beginning of the chain of explanations, and then deduced from it further consequences. This way of thinking is difficult to overcome: in fact, every action can be explained in the same manner, by adapting this story to present conditions.

Thomas drew similar conclusions on the subject of the relation between the sexes:

> Reproduction, a utilization of surplus nutrition, is also obviously in the closest possible relation with food, and the evidence here detailed is designed to show that the determination of sex is a chemical matter, maleness and femaleness being solely expressions of a difference of attitude toward food. If such a connection can be traced between sex and nutrition it will afford a starting point for a study of the comparative psychology of the two sexes and for the investigation of the social meaning of sex (Thomas 1897: 31).

Here in particular it can be seen that his main assumption is dogmatic, and all the rest is made to fit *ex post*.

It is worth pointing out that Thomas justified his ideas not only by referring to biological theory but also by use of biological data, and this is why I classify him as a proper biologist. First, he called attention to the widespread view of the nature of the sexes:

> Morphologically the development of man is more accentuated in almost every respect than that of woman. Anthropologists, indeed, regard woman as intermediate in development between the child and the man (Thomas 1897: 40).

Then he substantiated the view on the basis of the neurological data available to him, which concerned differences in the basic properties of men's and women's brains.

> Wagner decided that the brain of woman taken as a whole is uniformly in a more or less embryonic condition. Huschke says that woman is always a growing child and that her brain departs from the infantile type no more than the other portions of her body. Weisbach pointed out that the limits of variation in the skull of man are greater than in that of woman (Thomas 1897: 40–41).

Today, of course, the reliance on such types of measurements seems extremely naïve and oversimplified, reminiscent of a slightly more advanced physiognomy. Nevertheless, these beliefs led Thomas to further conclusions:

> Genius in general is correlated with an excessive development in brain growth, stopping dangerously near the line of hypertrophy and insanity, while microcephaly is a variation in the opposite direction in which idiocy results from arrested development of the brain through premature closing of the sutures, and both these variations occur more frequently in men than in women (Thomas 1897: 40–41).

Although it is unnecessary to point out that the above view is loaded with error, yet for all the naivety apparent in these kinds of convictions from the contemporary viewpoint, it should be noted that in Thomas's time they were neither strange nor particularly conservative. For instance, it would be hard to accuse Thomas of a rigid biological determinism, which was widespread among scholars adopting biological approaches. After all, society may be organised in various structures, but the starting point for evaluating the degree of its adaptation is how it allows for the anabolic and catabolic use of energy.

It cannot be said that Thomas's views changed gradually. In a relatively brief period they underwent a real revolution, including under the influence of new streams of thought about combining biology and sociology. It became increasingly clear that reducing sources of behaviour to one biological factor was entirely inadequate, as was transferring the entire theoretical structure used in biology onto sociology (as in the case of the two types of energy).

/// Thomas's Later Views

The new approach that Thomas adopted was for those times very fresh and innovative. Thomas's views altered under the influence of such scholars as Helen B. Thompson and John B. Watson. Rosalind Rosenberg considers that the change was due to the intellectual atmosphere at the University of Chicago, where Thomas worked together with Elsie Clews Parsons (Rosenberg 1975). Kimball Young noted the influence of the philosophy of pragmatism as well (Young 1962). These approaches moved the borders of thinking about men and women – on the horizon, the subject appeared of how society influences the sexes in adopting roles and also how those roles influence mentality in the broad sense. Thomas thus discovered various dependences between nature and culture. His statement on the traits ascribed to the brain is very interesting: "The brain receives impressions,

records them, remembers them, compares new experiences with old, and modifies behavior, in the presence of a new or recurrent stimulation, in view of the pleasure-pain connotation of similar situations in the past" (Thomas 1907: 435).

We have here a modern and still current assumption about the influence of the environment on the brain. The brain receives certain stimuli but also transforms them. In the second part of the sentence there is, of course, an echo of Watsonian behaviouralism, as the principle for this reworking is to be the comparison of old experiences with new ones on the basis of the economy of pleasure. This view is outdated, but it should be remembered that nevertheless the brain here ceases to be viewed as a variable that is independent of social processes and becomes a variable dependent on the social context. Such a view opened new possibilities for interpreting relations between the environment and biology. Physiological traits, such as the size or weight of a brain, no longer had primary importance for Thomas. Statistical differences in behavioural studies could be explained by social factors:

> the psychological differences of sex seem to be largely due, not to differences of average capacity, nor to difference in type of mental activity, but to differences in the social influences brought to bear on the developing individual from early infancy to adult years. The question of the future development of the intellectual life of women is one of social necessities and ideals rather than of the inborn psychological characteristics of sex (Helen B. Thompson after (Thomas 1907: 438)).

Similarly, the differences between various cultures could not be explained by the "natural abilities," or "higher potential" of the white race, but rather by the influence of society: "In this we are confusing advance in culture with brain improvement." According to Thomas, it should be assumed that all cultures and races have similar starting points, and progress occurs thanks not to whether some culture or race dominates the others in abilities but by the fact that cultures are accumulations of past experiences, in which there is also a biological dimension:

> With associative memory, abstraction, and speech men are able to compare the present with the past, to deliberate and discuss, to invent, to abandon old processes for new, to focus attention on

> special problems, to encourage specialization, and to transmit to the younger generation a more intelligent standpoint and a more advanced starting-point (Thomas 1907: 438).

In this connection, although people generally have fairly similar starting capital, later their lives, the stimuli they receive, and the problems they encounter, have an influence on their future thinking and abilities.

> The fundamental explanation of the difference in the mental life of two groups is not that the capacity of the brain to do work is different, but that the attention is not in the two cases stimulated and engaged along the same lines (Thomas 1907: 452).

Progress in culture occurs slowly. Each generation has the opportunity to add some small successive amount to the sum of knowledge. However, the entire transmission of knowledge, under the influence of this accumulation, means that each new generation learns slightly different things. Therefore, society's requirements and habits gradually change, forcing a person in the given society to greater use of those abilities that we are accustomed to consider a sign of intelligence. It is worth noting how close this idea is to the above-mentioned conclusions of contemporary research into the development of neuronal structures.

Naturally, Thomas's understanding was not perfect. Partly on the basis of the period's imperfect research methodology and partly on the basis of pure anecdotal proofs, various conclusions were drawn concerning the inferiority of women's intellectual abilities in comparison with men's, and the superiority of the white "race" over others. Researchers considered, for example, that women had greater problems with remembering facts and dates, and that the "lower races" had difficulty with associating facts and with abstract thinking. According to Thomas, the same conclusions could equally well have been advanced in comparing peasants and the upper classes. The problem was that these were erroneous conclusions.

The results of tests of these types of abilities differ depending on the given group not because groups are characterised by special biological properties but simply because they perform various activities more often than others do. Groups that do not participate in "intellectual life," and thus do not frequently use abstract ideas, obviously will lack practice in this regard and will necessarily display less ability when evaluated through tests and observations.

We should note that an entirely different understanding is being displayed here than that of the "early" Thomas. Abstract ideas derived from biology have ceased to play a role, giving way to social or environmental factors, which become explanations for biological and psychological factors. This kind of change in approach has the basic advantage of opening the field for corrections conducted on the basis of empirical material. Reasoning ceases to involve a vicious circle and becomes capable of verification.

Another issue worth mentioning here is that Thomas continually uses the idea of "lower races," which today would undoubtedly be a reason to accuse him of racism. In his defence, it should be noted that he was probably guided by a linear concept of social development. In this sense, as he undoubtedly considered American and European society to be the most developed, writing about the lower races could have had an exclusively descriptive and "objective" nature, if the truth of that theory were assumed.

Thomas became an adherent of a theory about the influence of habits. According to him, culture – that is, everything the mind absorbs and that becomes part of its consciousness – begins to shape the mind's views on the basis of habituation to specific types of activity. Every culture, family, school, religion, or occupational group requires different abilities, which a human being acquires through life in order to participate in it. Humans thus train themselves in certain types of thinking, which penetrate them through and through. These types of thinking cannot be changed by some rational and planned mechanism of instruction as the individual has absorbed them.

From these views, a revolutionary conclusion for those times emerged: as there is no natural barrier that would block the mental development of women or races, all potential differences are social in nature. And thus eliminating those differences – for instance, allowing women or the members of other races to be raised in the same conditions as men or white people – must indubitably lead to the development of the qualities the latter groups possess. Thomas's viewpoint is worth recalling and could be read as a manifesto of the time: "Certain it is that no civilization can remain the highest if another civilization adds to the intelligence of its men the intelligence of its women" (Thomas 1907: 469).

It is worth remembering how many countries have formulated their educational policy on the assumption of permanent, unalterable sex and racial differences. To overturn that view is to open the way for a policy of equality, ensuring equal opportunity for all.

Thus Thomas not only pointed to the error in widespread views, but formulated an interesting hypothesis on the reason those views existed:

> The instinct to belittle outsiders is perhaps at the bottom of our delusion that the white race has one order of mind and the black and yellow races have another. But, while a prejudice – a matter of instinct and emotion – may well be at the beginning of an error of this kind, it could not sustain itself in the face of our logical habits unless reinforced by an error of judgment. And this error is found in the fact that in a naive way we assume that our steps in progress from time to time are due to our mental superiority as a race over the other races, and to the mental superiority of one generation of ourselves over the preceding (Thomas 1907: 440).

Not only is the white race not in some way dominant in terms of inborn qualities of the intellect but it also falls victim to its irrational and emotion-based assumptions about other groups, guided by a primitive instinct to exclude others.

It would seem that Thomas lacked a certain element that would have allowed his thinking to be a departure point for contemporary neurosociology. He did not have access to the data the social sciences acquired much later. In considering the hypothesis on intellectual differences between the races, Thomas wrote that

> The first question arising in this connection is whether any of the characteristic faculties of the human mind – perception, memory, inhibition, abstraction – are absent or noticeably weak in the lower races. If this is found to be true, we have reason to attribute the superiority of the white race to biological causes; otherwise we shall have to seek an explanation of white superiority in causes lying outside the brain (Thomas 1907: 441).

Currently, we know perfectly well from empirical research that intercultural differences in perception occur – just as there are differences in memory and intelligence quotients between the children of parents of varying socio-economic status. But these differences have precisely the same cause that Thomas had pointed to earlier: on the intermediate level, omitting individual predispositions, they come from upbringing and stimulation. Just as the brain is not an independent variable, so perception and

memory are not independent. Perception is also shaped culturally and all types of memory can be successfully trained. If Thomas's understanding of this element had been supplemented, it might have been a potential departure point for a completely contemporary viewpoint. As is, it must simply be admitted that he had views that went far beyond the mental horizons of his time. His pioneering ideas on the connections between biology and sociology began to be developed only eighty years later.

Let us note then that the fundamental changes in Thomas's views on the nature of differences between the "races" and sexes arose from a basic reorientation of the relation between biology and sociology, which we could call the opening of sociology to biological data, with a simultaneous limitation of biology's theoretical influence on sociology. Thus, even though Thomas's modernised views were far behind what we would today consider current knowledge, and the language of his sociology is in many places anachronistic, we can list at least two indubitably positive sides to his change of mind. First, his view of biology as the main supplier of data opened a channel for the permanent correction of sociological theory. It was thus a qualitative contribution rather than a static transfer of theoretical structures or conceptual schemas from one area to another in a way that provides a conceptual framework but does not offer tools or guidelines for future revisions. Second, his conclusions revised the widespread convictions of the time about inborn mental predispositions in "races" and sexes. It was only when belief in the social influences on mental predispositions became widespread that the creation of a policy of equal treatment could be accepted. It is worth remembering, however, that in Thomas's homeland his views were several decades ahead of his times (as shown, for instance, by the boom in intelligence tests for school recruitment systems in the United States in the 1920s, which caused students to be assigned to classes based on convictions about their inborn predispositions) (Sacks 2000).

/// Conclusions

Thomas's great difficulty lay in being condemned to the simplified biological explanations of his time. He attempted to refine those explanations and adapt them to an ever more rapidly growing body of knowledge. The majority of sociologists of his day, however, were trying to rid themselves of this baggage – or perhaps it would be better to say, such biological ballast – in order to immerse themselves in entirely culturalist explanations. All this hampered the development of bio-sociological research for a long

time, and it was only the paradigm of socio-biology that briefly brought the subject to life in the 1970s (Wilson 1975).

However, on many levels the paradigm repeated the old errors of the earlier sociologists, continuing to derive ideas from the context of a conflict between nature and culture, in which the latter was assumed to be solely an epiphenomenon of the former (Alcock 2001; Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People 1991; Szacka 1991). The discovery of the plasticity of the brain and numerous studies of intercultural psychology, as well as the psychology of development, eventually proved that these relations are much more complicated and should be described by allegories of feedback rather than conflict. Although obviously Thomas did not in his time have access to the data we possess today, it can yet be argued that his sense of the proper direction of change was reflected in his attitude to the issues he studied and to the place that biology began to hold in his theories.

The aim of the present article has been solely to describe certain specific changes in Thomas's thinking about the biological bases of social life. A more in-depth study of the entirety of his work would probably enable not only his successive inspirations from biology to be indicated but would also divide his output into periods, in consideration of the influence of biology on the successive modifications he proposed.

It is important to observe that the later changes in the use Thomas made of biology did not arise out of the blue. His views changed not only in regard to contingent issues but also about the fundamental relations between biology and sociology. The reorientation of his beliefs about the nature of those relations – with new leads concerning what should be drawn from biology and what should become an autonomous subject of sociology – made him far more receptive to data and research and at the same time prevented the influx of theories, as is best shown by his later orientation towards concepts for defining situations and his declarations concerning the exclusively social nature of sociology's research object. For Thomas, biology had lost its potential to impose analytical categories but continued to provide information that could be used in a manner proper to sociologists.

Transl. Michelle Granas

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/// Abstract

In this article the author shows how the exploding role of biology in William Thomas's sociology and social psychology has changed. Since the beginning of his career, this researcher addressed numerous topics that involved both biological and social factors – he commented on the nature of gender, race, instincts, prejudice and evolution. His departure point was biologism, which proclaimed that innate predispositions are a variable independent of social processes. In the following years, Thomas changed his beliefs, recognising that it was culture and society that left its mark on physiological and psychological development. The changes in Thomas's reasoning are described by the author against the background of past and present views on the relationship between society and the brain, claiming that his late views could resonate with today's approaches.

Keywords:
neurosociology, biology, sociobiology, history of social thought, Darwinism

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WHEN A PEASANT CAN ONLY GRIEVE OR REJOICE:[1] THOMAS AND ZNANIECKI'S APPROACH TO EMOTIONS

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In 1998, during the International Sociological Association (ISA) congress held in Montreal, ISA members were asked to list five books published in the twentieth century that had most influenced their work as sociologists. *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* by William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki received as many votes as, among other works, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* by Herbert Blumer, *Frame Analysis* by Erving Goffman, and *The Gift* by Marcel Mauss.[2]

The strength of classical works lies in the fact that over time they remain relevant. They can be read anew, and their themes or "ways of seeing," which for various reasons might not have been adopted earlier, still have the ability to affect contemporary discussion. Undoubtedly, Thomas and Znaniecki's approach to emotions is such an example.

It must be made clear that the book *The Polish Peasant* has not yet been read from the perspective of the sociology of emotions. Although Gisela Hinkle (1952) considers the theme of emotions outlined in the monograph, she does so while discussing the concept of four wishes, which in her in-

[1] This is a provocative reference to Thomas and Znaniecki's comment on the subject of the peasantry's attitude to service in the Tsarist army (see Thomas & Znaniecki 1976b: 123). Helplessness in the face of power was revealed in a passive acceptance of the recruit's fate. On being drafted, a peasant could only grieve, and on leaving the army, then he would rejoice.

[2] https://www.isa-sociology.org/en/about-isa/history-of-isa/books-of-the-xx-century, accessed 1.02.2020.

terpretation is definitely psychological. Norman Denzin analyses the emotions contained in the empirical material (vol. 5); however, he completely disregards the analytical model developed by the authors (see Denzin 2009). Norbert Wiley (1986) sees an interesting possibility in the extension of Thomas and Znaniecki's theory to include affectivity, but at the same time he stresses that the authors' efforts went in a different direction.

This article aims to reconstruct Thomas and Znaniecki's approach through the lens of the sociology of emotions. First, I will clarify the specifics of the sociological approach to emotions and consider why this perspective might be implicitly present in the monograph. Then I will show how the theoretical framework proposed by Thomas and Znaniecki is suited for analysing emotions (defined as emotional habits, feelings, and sentiments). In the last part of the article, I will present how the authors took affectivity into account at the analytical level.

The subject of the analysis will be the first and second volume of *The Polish Peasant*, whose 100th anniversary provided an opportunity to re-read the work. The first volume contains the comprehensive "Methodological Note," in which Thomas and Znaniecki laid out the fundamentals of their research method and the foundations of their proposed theoretical approach. The attitude–value scheme they introduced is an attempt to bring together the micro and macro levels, a combination in which the authors saw the specificity of a new science, that is, sociology. The next part is an ethnography of peasant life and culture, presented against the background of the Polish class system. The last part of the first volume and the whole second volume consist of collections of letters ordered chronologically as parts of family series. A short introduction precedes each series, and the letters are accompanied by commentary of an explanatory or analytical nature.

/// The Sociological Perspective on Emotions

The sociology of emotions, which dates back to the 1970s, was created not only as a response to the growing interest in emotions in social life (the affective turn) but also as a result of disappointment with the dualistic concept of the social world. It emerged that the divisions into individual and society, micro versus macro, reason and emotion do not explain the complex, dynamic, and emergent nature of reality. The sociology of emotions provides the missing link between structure and agency. The contemporary understanding of emotions transcends the old dichotomies.

Metaphors of "the managed heart" (Hochschild), "the emotional brain" (Damasio) or "embodied thoughts" (Rosaldo) capture the complementary relation between the body and the mind. Whereas from the psychological point of view emotions appeared as quantities that exist inside an individual, sociology treats them also as elements of culture.

An emotional culture (Gordon 1989) encompasses affective socialisation, vocabularies for expressing emotions, beliefs about emotions, emotion scenarios and norms, and management techniques (e.g., emotional labour). All these elements are expressed in actions which are adapted to rules of feeling and of display (showing emotions). The rules change depending on the interactive and structural context (e.g., in accord with social role, status, class, or sex) (see Hochschild 2009).

With its proliferation of perspectives, the sociology of emotions does not offer one definition of emotion (see Bericat 2016; Stets & Turner 2006; Bendelow & Williams 1988). Furthermore, theorising in the sociology of emotions is an ongoing process, and in addition, some authors distinguish emotions, feelings, affects, and sentiments, while others use these terms as semantic equivalents. Sociologists assume that emotions encompass at least two elements: physiological arousal and cognitive labelling. Emotions are seen at the same time as embodied experiences and as Durkheimian social facts.

In short, the sociological approach broadens the previous understanding of emotions and involves taking into consideration the patterning of subjective experience by social structures. It emphasises the class, cultural, situational, and historical influences on how individual or group emotions are experienced and expressed.

It seems that traces of such an understanding can be found in the synergy of Thomas's and Znaniecki's ideas. Their life histories give reason to suppose their work would bring a new perspective to the affective dimension of social life. Given their different educational backgrounds, their book has at times been called a marriage of psychology with sociology (Blumer 1939), or of psychology with philosophy (Kaczmarczyk 2018). Thus it might be hoped that Thomas and Znaniecki would take the subject of emotion, which was so characteristic of psychology, into account. Further, it might be expected that their approach would be qualitatively different from the understandings of emotion that developed separately within the framework of those disciplines.

At this point, it is worth remembering that Thomas and Znaniecki, especially at the beginning, differed in their views on the nature of emotions

and emotion's role in social life. As far as Thomas is concerned, emotions were important, but for Znaniecki they were of little significance. Thomas formulated his interests in a Darwinian and Freudian context (see Hinkle 1952). He assumed that emotion is a physiological stimulus to satisfy a subconscious need for the survival of the species. In his article "On a Difference in the Metabolism of the Sexes" (1897), emotion is compared to energy that determines adjustive behaviour. It differs depending on sex: for instance, femaleness is anabolic (storing energy) and maleness is catabolic (destroying energy). Thus, females were seen by Thomas as lethargic and passive and males as creative and dynamic.

The problem of emotions is further developed in the four wishes concept. Thomas calls them "forces that impel to action." In *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923) he concludes that although human desires (wishes) have a great variety of forms, essentially there are four desires which people strive to fulfil: the desire for new experience (based on anger), the desire for security (based on fear), the desire for response (based on love) and the desire for recognition which stems from libido (see Thomas 1923: 1–4)

Undoubtedly, Thomas and Znaniecki shared an interest in the causes of human behaviour. However, there was a fundamental difference between Thomas's opinions and the views of the Polish sociologist. Znaniecki concentrated on the sociality of action. According to Mariano Longo (2020), although Znaniecki admitted that social action is influenced by inner impulses to act, he explained such impulses by excluding the topic of instincts and inborn tendencies. Instead, he concentrated on social tendencies and socialised emotions (perceived as real and taken into account as real in the course of interaction) which he refers to as sentiments (see Longo 2020: 33–35; Hałas 2001).

It is important to remember that as far as the sociology emerging at that time is concerned, the references to emotions were implicit. In searching for its identity, the new discipline was to free itself from the influence of biologism and thus, by definition, its interest in the emotional sphere was limited. Yet, it is not difficult to notice that both Thomas and Znaniecki consider affectivity to be an important aspect of life. They write in the "Methodological Note" that one of their aims was to outline the problem of social happiness (Thomas & Znaniecki 1976a: 95). In addition, they express surprise that the social sciences do not regard the issue with more seriousness. Their monograph was intended (among other things) to address the situation. The sociological approach they proposed was meant to

help in the study of happiness because, as they argue, happiness is closely related to social conditions (ibid.: 95).

Moreover, the very choice of research method makes emotions as such, and not solely those connected with social happiness, an essential part of the empirical data. Thomas and Znaniecki's monograph is based, among other things, on personal documents (letters and biographies). By their very nature, the accounts in the correspondence concerning changing life fortunes reveal the emotions experienced by emigrants and point to the emotions of other family members or community groups. The question is how Thomas and Znaniecki's idea to depict a chosen social class "in the totality of [its] objective complexity" (*ibid.*: 89) takes into account the issue of emotions.

/// The Place of Emotions in Thomas and Znaniecki's Theoretical System

Reconstructing Thomas and Znaniecki's theoretical ideas entails some difficulties from the outset. Among other things, one serious objection to the theoretical scheme proposed in *The Polish Peasant* is its lack of clarity about the meaning of the notions of "value" and "attitude" (see Blumer 1939). In fact, readers may have the impression that some concepts only become more precise as they read successive pages. This becomes even clearer when the reader tries to interpret theoretical ideas that are not explicitly clarified, for instance, the issue of emotions. On the other hand, what some people consider to be a flaw may determine the originality of the work, provided that the content of the "Methodological Note" is treated as a confrontation of two not always concordant minds. It is enough to see in possible inaccuracies a dialogical attempt by scholars from different ontological positions to resolve the dilemma of the individual versus society. This dilemma is equally important for the sociology of emotions, which seeks to determine the relation between the level of individual feelings and social reality *sui generis*. The question remains of whether and how emotions have been included in the scheme proposed by the authors.

The initial answers are provided by the authors' attempt to define and illustrate what an attitude is and how the attitude–value relation should be understood. "By attitude we understand a process of individual consciousness which distinguishes real or possible activity of an individual in the so-

cial world" (ibid.: 54 (22)).[3] Among other examples of attitude, the authors mention a poet's feelings expressed in a poem, a reader's admiration and liking for an author, the fear and piety manifested in the worship of a deity, and preference in creating, and thus we are led to think that emotions somehow fall within the category of attitude. An attitude always refers, through action, to a value, which has a social nature: "By a social value we understand any datum having an empirical content accessible to some members of a social group and a meaning by which it is or may be an object of activity" (ibid.: 54 (20)). Here, in contrast, the meaning of social value is revealed in individual actions.

Herbert Blumer gives a succinct description of this dependence: "The scheme proposed by the authors resolves social happening into an interaction of attitudes and values, which stand, respectively, for subjective dispositions and objective influences" (Blumer 1939: 42). In this sense, an attempt can be made to compare the attitude–value pair to a Meadow pair: a subjective self–objective self – (I–me). But, as Wiley (1986) points out, George Herbert Mead's concept reduces the role of emotions to insignificant gestures, enclosing the question of their meaning in the communication process.

The situation is different for the proposals of the authors of *The Polish Peasant*. For Thomas and Znaniecki, the affective character of the phenomenon is no reason why it should remain outside the scope of scholarly inquiry. What is important is that the behaviour observed is universal, not individual, and that it manifests itself in conscious action (Thomas & Znaniecki 1976a: 58–60). According to the authors, in principle it does not matter if the inquiry concerns such attitudes as "sexual love or a sense of group-solidarity, bashfulness or a desire to impress, mystical emotion or the amateur aesthetic attitude, etc." (ibid.: 63 (34)), in so far as they can be understood in relation to social values on the order of, for example, family solidarity, the legal system, or the process of individualisation. The authors write frankly about jealousy, pity, love, wounded self-esteem, hatred, revulsion (ibid.: 85–86), and many other attitudes. In other words, any attitude can be subject to research as soon as it turns out that "social culture" affects it (ibid.: 60).

Placing emotions in an attitude–value scheme gives them a specific character and sets the framework for possible reflection. In a sense, it is a way to avoid the trap of biology, which is inscribed in the very word

[3] The numbers in brackets refer to page numbers from the English version of the text (Thomas & Znaniecki 1927).

"emotion." Perhaps this is why, in principle, the authors do not use the word but prefer terms such as "emotional habit," "feeling," "emotional attitude," or "sentiment." This linguistic device refers to the equivalent of "emotion" (belonging to the world of nature) in the cultural world of meanings. Peter A. Bertocci (1940), with whose works Znaniecki was familiar (see Znaniecki 1971: 238), defines the relationship between emotion and sentiment thus:

> When, however, fleeting emotions are conditioned to aspects of the individual and the environment, they gain the permanence and consistency and direction desired. It must be further carefully noted that though a sentiment is in itself as complex as the number of emotions involved (in one's reaction to his mother, for example), its uniqueness, its core, is not in its emotional drive, but in the object, the idea, the mother. Hence the variability and the individuality of the sentiment depends on the person's evaluation of the object, as may be illustrated (Bertocci 1940: 249).

Thomas and Znaniecki are not interested in fleeting emotions, especially unconscious ones, based on drives and limited to physiological reactions. The possibility of conducting an analysis is determined by the question of whether the perceived affective states fit into reflection patterns or form part of a complex system of meanings (such as family pride, romantic love, attachment to land, longing for the home country). According to Wiley: "The shared term or link between the two concepts (attitude and value) is 'meaning,' attitudes being intra-subjective meanings and values, inter- and extra-subjective" (Wiley 1986: 30). Paradoxically, such an interpretation seems to be confirmed by Znaniecki's commentary on Blumer's remarks: "My attitude of hate toward an enemy is not a part of his meaning: the latter consists in his having hurt or being presumably able and willing to hurt, some positive values of mine. If I am a true Christian, my attitude toward him will not be hate but love, though his meaning may be still that of enemy" (Znaniecki 1939: 93).

Although Znaniecki's intention was to convince his adversary that values (an enemy) and attitudes towards values (hatred or love) can be analytically separated (one is thus not contained in the other), his example reveals more: that the essence of the difference lies in different orders of meaning. In relation to value it is an inter-subjective or supra-individual meaning (such as the dictionary definition) – an enemy is someone who has injured

me or threatens me, and in relation to attitude it is a subjective meaning connected with the situational definition of an enemy as an opponent or an enemy as a neighbour (definition of a situation). Thus, it can be said that social sentiments can be understood as meanings that are revealed in action. In any case, Thomas and Znaniecki state outright that meaning can manifest itself "in the sentimental and intellectual reactions which it arouses" (1927: 21), as occurs in the case of reading a poem, or can manifest itself in the feeling of pleasure (spending money) (see Thomas & Znaniecki 1976a: 54).

Such a trend of thinking about feelings allows the authors to formulate conclusions such as: "In a community where everyone wants more or less to be an object of general attention anybody who succeeds in this aim becomes in so far the object of envy. We may add that envy of notoriety is probably much stronger than envy of economic well-being, and success in any line is appreciated as much for the public admiration it brings as for the success itself" (ibid.: 139 (151)). This statement may be considered an unwarranted generalisation, but to read it in the context of the attitude–value scheme makes it worth quoting. Placing jealousy/envy in the cultural system of meanings causes the authors to move away from biology and psychology, thus opening the way to sociological understanding. On the other hand, they do not fully make use of the potential of the micro–macro connection that lies within the scheme they propose. Jealousy read through the prism of the attitude–value scheme loses its interactive specificity, dynamics, and colour. It seems, after reading the examples given in the text, that the dilemma of the individual or society is resolved in favour of the latter.

Even viewed in the context of a processual reality, sentiments seem to be reified and objective. Reflecting on the lack of progress in individualisation, the authors refer, for example, to the attitude of family pride characterising the peasantified gentry. They write: "In this case, familial pride, co-operating with the desire to advance, will create a mixed system of economic organization, with quantification of ownership, but without individualism" (ibid.: 78 (56)). Emotions understood in this way become an element of causal laws and are presented as an objective factor influencing the processes of social change.

/// Emotions in the Empirical Material

Can a similar approach to emotions be found in analyses and comments referring directly to individual cases? Can the empirical material collected

by Thomas and Znaniecki be considered "emotionally saturated"? Feelings are written about and expressed not only in the "sentimental letters" but in the majority of the correspondence presented in the first and second volume of the monograph. However, as can be expected, not all manifestations of emotions are analysed. With the exception of a few cases (see Thomas & Znaniecki 1976b: 261), the researchers were rather interested in those emotions in which they could see a manifestation of a "socially sanctioned attitude" (ibid.: 346 (361)). And so, for example, romantic love, not being very characteristic of the social class in question, is not given a separate analysis despite the repeated romantic themes in the letters. "As we know from the peasant letters, love, as idealization and individualization of sexual attraction, does not exist in peasant life in the form of a socially recognised and sanctioned attitude – though this does not mean that it does not exist as an individual fact. The fundamentally sanctioned attitude prior to marriage is 'liking' (friendship); after marriage 'respect'" (ibid.: 346 (1032)). In their first volume, when writing about the institution of marriage, Thomas and Znaniecki simply noted that romantic love is an emotional habit characteristic of a later stage of civilisation (Thomas & Znaniecki 1976a: 124).

Despite various categorical statements (such as the one above) in the theoretical parts of the monograph, generalisations based on induction often contain formulations of a lesser degree of certainty. The conditional character of these words manifests itself in the use of words such as "essentially," "seems," "presumably," "favours," and so forth. In addressing the question of the "sentimental friendship" between Zygmunt and Walenty (in the Fryzowicz series), the researchers note that "this form of emotionality is probably the result of the influence of religious life in towns – bigotry, ceremoniousness, the existence of confraternities with their superficial humanitarianism, complicated devotion, and lack of practical interests" (ibid.: 318 (988)).

The empirical grounding gives the analysis of emotions a more nuanced character. It can happen that emotions are presented as components of a role and as dependent upon situational context. The role of the widow may serve as an example. While discussing the effectiveness of widow Kozłowska's actions, the authors attribute her successes to her knowledge of the expectations connected with her role, and consequently her accurate perception of other people's expectations concerning the emotions she exhibits. Interestingly, their observations correspond with the later findings

of the sociology of emotions concerning emotion cultures (see Gordon 1989; Hochschild 2009). Kozłowska's role is set out in advance:

> Kozłowska tries to arouse only such feelings as are habitual in regard to a person of this character […] Further, she is a mother and a grandmother, and supposed to have feelings of love for them, longing for her absent children, grief for a child's death, anxiety for her grandchildren when they become orphans, etc. (Thomas & Znaniecki 1976b: 8 (530)).

In turn, social roles with built-in expectations about the emotions they express can be components of social types. For example, Walenty (in the Fryzowicz series), as a buffoon type, plays the role of a lover pretending to be in pain after the wedding of a girl with whom he used to flirt (ibid.: 345).

The expression of emotions is reflected not only in roles or social types, but also at the class level. Znaniecki and Thomas indicate in many places a class-linked distribution of rules for showing emotion. For example, they note that in the lower social strata it is permissible for men to express their feelings freely in relation to other men, including even the expression of affections of an amorous nature (ibid.: 148–149). They also point out that control over affections is more characteristic of the higher classes. In their commentary on the effusive letters (the Kozłowski series) they write that "in a more cultivated environment, more accustomed to restrain the feelings, her behavior would seem highly unnatural, distasteful, and hysterical" (ibid.: 9 (530)).

The presumption is thus, as the authors believe, that feelings are subject to regulation of sorts. Moreover, culture clearly defines what type of feeling, of what intensity and what duration, reflects the proper attitude. The authors write distinctly that a proper discernment of the expected emotion also includes a sense of how to gradate the strength of its expression (ibid.: 9). As far as the period of expressing a feeling is concerned, a good example is the length of mourning. Thomas and Znaniecki point out that not only a rather unusual intensity of grief demands a special explanation but its over-long duration does as well. Such a justification might be provided by the exceptional qualities of the deceased person, as when the authors explain a fragment of a letter stating that "Grandpa despairs continually after Hanka's death and he cannot forget her cleverness" (ibid.: 218 (838)). This observation is consistent with the remarks made by the authors in the "Methodological Note." They write there that attitudes are

subject to social control, whose aim is to prevent attitudes (undesirable feelings in this case) from manifesting themselves in action (see Thomas & Znaniecki 1976a: 61).

Interestingly, the regulation also concerns what Arlie Hochschild (2009) would consider to be "deep acting." It is not only about monitoring emotions at the level of expression, but also about control at the level of feeling. As scholars have noted, an example of such emotion work can be found in a letter from Zygmunt (the Fryzowicz series) in which he suggests that Walenty quashed his feelings of love towards his friend. There may also be emotion work *à rebours*, which consists in "absolution" from breaking the rules of feeling. Such an example is the idealisation of a dead daughter (the Łazowski series), which, according to the authors, is "an unconscious attempt to justify individual grief when it goes beyond the limit assigned by the social regulation of the attitude toward death" (Thomas & Znaniecki 1976b: 218 (837)).

Moreover, the presentation of letters in family series makes it possible to capture the processual nature of social life. In this way, the authors emphasise the role of micro processes in understanding great transformations. This approach was fully articulated in a later work by Znaniecki, in which he argues for the benefits of sociological research at the level of primary groups. In his opinion, sociologists should focus on observing many lesser social processes, rather than speculating about one all-encompassing process, leaving this ambitious task to philosophers (Znaniecki 1932: 37–43).

Indeed, the form of ordering empirical material proposed by the authors makes it possible to attempt the induction of cause-and-effect laws concerning feelings. The result of analysing the Raczkowski series of letters is, among other things, the statement that an increase in homesickness is connected with normalisation of the situation abroad. As long as the situation is new and unstable, there is no room for remembrance, which is a necessary condition for the creation of this sentiment (see Thomas & Znaniecki 1976b: 145). Moreover, on the basis of the same collection of letters, the authors note the differences between the impact of family disintegration on the feelings of the men and women. They write that "The personal feelings of women are never so completely subordinated to a form of social solidarity as are those of the men, and on the disintegration of the family the individual feeling of the women is less likely to disappear than the group-solidarity of the men" (ibid.: 142 (732)).

Moreover, the letters are a form of interaction between the sender and the addressee. Even if some letters – the responses – are missing in the

series, Thomas and Znaniecki draw conclusions about their potential content. In this manner they can, in a residual form, recreate the emotion work in an interactive dimension. An example is their observation of the expected emotional responses of widow Kozłowska's interaction partners. As mentioned above, the effectiveness of Kozłowska's actions is based on her ability to assume the role of another and to predict the feelings her behaviour will arouse. Kozłowska rightly recognises that helplessness will evoke compassion, while maternal feelings will meet with sympathy (see ibid.: 9). Moreover, the authors perceive the interactive dimension of emotions; they write that "There are also [emotional] reactions which can only be aroused by a person in a determined position. For example, envy is most easily awakened in peasants by a peasant. A clergy or noble will hardly succeed in arousing pity, etc." (ibid.: 8 (529)).

It can be said that the understanding of emotions proposed in the theoretical introduction to the monograph and the approach that can be perceived in the authors' analysis of specific empirical cases differ slightly from one another. Interestingly, when analysing empirical material, the authors very rarely refer to the attitude–value scheme. It can be said, however, that in a natural way they use the logic of this pattern, which is intended to combine the micro and macro levels. In relation to feelings, they depart from an objective understanding of emotions (as appears more clearly in the examples in the theoretical part) in favour of taking the subjective side into account. They notice that feelings can be felt, expressed, and evaluated in different ways, that is, that they have to be understood as "someone else's." In other words, it is an approach closer to the humanistic coefficient principle, which assumes that the data never belongs to anyone, in the sense that it always belongs to and is the same as the active experience of the subjects (see Znaniecki 1934: 37). Incidentally, this methodological postulate is a challenge for the researchers themselves, who do not always manage to avoid evaluations from their own perspective. A good example is the passage in which Thomas and Znaniecki comment on Stasia Krupa's admiration for the land between Kraków and Warsaw by adding that it is aesthetically the ugliest part of Poland (Thomas & Znaniecki 1976b: 332).

/// Conclusion

The aim of this article was to answer the question of whether Thomas and Znaniecki proposed a theoretical scheme and presented a method of analysis that facilitate consideration of the role of emotions in social life.

The reply does not take into account the entirety of their work; it only concerns the first two volumes, whose centenary has provided an occasion for studying a rather unexplored motif. It is to be expected that reading the following volumes would bring new findings and ideas to the sociologist of emotions. Proof can be found in the use that Norman Denzin (2009: 172–173) makes of court documents included in the fifth volume, which describe a case of domestic violence leading to the murder of a man named Snopczynski. In Denzin's opinion, this type of empirical material makes it possible to show aggression as the result of interactions in a triad. Consequently, further reading could bring new findings.

However, a preliminary interpretation confirms that the authors have proposed a model of analysis that allows us to treat affectivity as an aspect of culture. The useful value of such an approach lies, among other things, in the fact that it can be an interesting counterpoint to the proposal promoted today within the framework of "therapeutic culture" (see Illouz 2010). The currently popular podcasts by motivational speakers and the reading of handbooks and professional therapeutic narrations seem to uphold the "overpsychologised" concept of the human being. The promise of control over life that the Enlightenment project entails is transferred to the emotional sphere. Now more than ever, feeling emotion seems to be a matter of individual effort. People are taught to recognise, express, or repress emotions in an appropriate manner. Such regulation is mainly dependent on individual skills acquired through widely available services or is a matter of innate emotional intelligence. In addition to the many benefits, such reasoning carries with it the danger of overlooking the social nature of emotional life. Apart from their individual and subjective side, emotions also have their objective aspect, which is social and cultural, as is confirmed by a reading of Thomas and Znaniecki's monograph.

On the other hand, the idea of using biographical materials is also connected with having to take the subjective side of emotions into consideration. Embedded in a specific social and situational context, feelings must be analysed as being "someone's." When reading the first two volumes of *The Polish Peasant*, it is difficult to overcome the impression of a constant search for a "balance" between the individual and the social. In this sense, the approach presented there seems worthy of application not so much as a restrictive model of analysis, but rather as "a way of seeing" that allows a better understanding of the place of emotions in social life.

Transl. Michelle Granas

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/// Abstract

The present article represents a new attempt to read the first two volumes of *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* from the perspective of the sociology of emotions. Reconstructing Thomas and Znaniecki's approach to emotions entails defining the place of emotions (as emotional habits, feelings, and sentiments) in a theoretical framework of values and attitudes, and presenting how Thomas and Znaniecki took affectivity into account at the analytical level. The authors' approach seems to correspond to the contemporary understanding of emotions, which avoids a separation between the individual and the social, the emotive and the cognitive.

Keywords:
The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, W.I. Thomas, F. Znaniecki, sociology of emotions

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GENDER, FAMILIES, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND THE RURAL–URBAN DISCOURSE: *THE POLISH PEASANT IN EUROPE AND AMERICA* AS A STUDY OF FEARS AND FANTASIES RELATED TO MODERNISATION[1]

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The Polish Peasant in Europe and America was undoubtedly revolutionary for its times. Written in five volumes in the years 1918–1920, it effectively undermined an American moral panic over the 13 million immigrants from East Central and Southern Europe who had reached America's shores between 1900 and 1914. It was thus received with great reserve, or even an icy coldness, by most of the "social guardians," "ethical elites" or "moral entrepreneurs" of the day, that is, the politicians, activists, intellectuals, and publicists confronting modernisation (Connelly 1980; Zaretsky 1996). The instigators of the moral panic believed the "moral downfall" of America would be brought about not by the dreadful systemic conditions of life and work in American cities but by the influx of immorality from each successive wave of immigrants (Connelly 1980; Zinn 2016 [1980]). The Polish peasant, and particularly the Polish peasant woman, had quickly come to occupy a special position on the map of Americans' suspicions of Others.

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In public debate in America, and in the jargon of workers in social and charitable institutions, the descriptor "Polish" had come to signify sexual lasciviousness, promiscuity, alcoholism, vagrancy, and, among the men, criminality.[2] Immigrants from the remaining countries of East Central and Southern Europe did not escape a similar fate. The moral downfall of the United States was the expected effect of the external onslaught of Others upon Puritan morality. In the public debate this impact was even likened to the destruction of Rome by the barbarians. The arrival of the immigrants was associated with the moral decay of cities as the result of prostitution, venereal diseases, procurement, alcoholism, robbery, and vagrancy. Thus, the monumental *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, as the first to deconstruct the bases of these imaginings, entered history as an innovative work. Its authors, William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, showed how the immorality of Polish immigrants was far from being "un-American." They argued that it was actually *after* arrival in America that the immigrants became immoral as a result of having been uprooted and having to struggle for survival in overcrowded metropolises. The immigrants were thus truly "American" (Connelly 1980: 66).

But was Thomas and Znaniecki's work really ahead of its time by several decades? In its interpretation of family and gender problems did it really diverge from the mainstream discourse, which was laced with moral fears and fantasies about the effects of modernisation and was focused on the millions of women migrating from the countryside to find employment in the mushrooming urban factories, workshops, and well-to-do households? Did it diverge from the discourse in which the masses were seen as the source of unbridled moral chaos, criminality, revolutionary unrest, or at the very least, irresponsibility? In this article, I would like to show that if we consider *The Polish Peasant* as an analysis arguing against some of the bases for the moral panic over immigrants, then the work can be defended as innovative. It can also be defended as pioneering if we look at the revolutionary methods it introduced, such as the biographical approach, with its analysis of attitudes and values (see Hałas 1991). However, as I will try to demonstrate – without overlooking its internal contradictions and complexity – *The Polish Peasant* appears in an entirely different light if it is read as a representation of the typical fears and modernisation fantasies

[2] Polish immigrants constituted 25% of the population of newly arrived immigrants to the USA at the beginning of the twentieth century. In Chicago itself, where *The Polish Peasant* was written, there were around 350,000 Poles, making Chicago at the time the third largest city in terms of Polish population (after Warsaw and Łódź).

of its era. Even though, first, the authors intended to introduce the non-ideological theoretical concept of "organisation – disorganisation – reorganisation" aimed at change-resistant Puritan moralists and overtly racist social Darwinist fractions, and even though, second, this concept was to open a window to the recognition of social modernisation in its own right (e.g., urban individualisation, and even conditionally polygamy, as long as it was socially functional and did not harm the upbringing of children), yet the liberal progressiveness of the authors' assumptions is minimally visible in their analysis or at best sinks into ambivalent contradictions. The seemingly neutral concept saturates the empirical analysis with conservative, ideologised interpretations, full of gender bias and patriarchal schemes. By normalising patriarchal power relations in Polish villages and ignoring evidence of widespread violence against women, the authors create an opposition in which whatever is rural is the cradle of authenticity – of naturalised national and gendered family values – and whatever is urban is dangerous and demoralising due to escaping the former strong rural social control. The authors place equivalency signs between ruralism, a healthy national identity, and healthy social, family, and gender relations. In *The Polish Peasant* the authors thereby construct the morally healthy model of a patriarchal, rural community of families unmarred by individualisation and women's emancipation. Such a model had a patriarchal form of gender relations, with a hierarchical division of roles within a religiously devout, strong (meaning indissoluble), multi-generational family. In this article I will thus look at the structure of the above model. At the same time, I will indicate how the work omitted important processes which are worth reconsidering: the resistance of the weak and the social emancipation of Polish peasant women (e.g., the liberating potential of new institutions – e.g., courts, social workers – for immigrant women).

Analysis of the patterns of gendered family relations and ideals of femininity and masculinity constructed by Thomas and Znaniecki within the framework of rural–urban discourses must necessarily be preceded by a discussion of the moral values emerging in the United States and Poland at the turn of the century, when *The Polish Peasant* was written. In the first part of the text I compare the symbolic discourses of the two countries in order to understand the moral foundation for the authors' interpretative categories, in connection with the culture in which they lived. Such a comparison also permits me to understand both the authors' attitudes toward the subjects of their study and the values, which, as participants of that culture, they cannot escape. From the perspective of a hundred years after the

publication of the monograph, such attitudes are quite visible. I am thus following in the methodological paths the authors themselves first opened for the social sciences, in a note on methodology in *The Polish Peasant* (see Hałas 1991; Szacki 2002: 568).

/// Gender, Rural–Urban Discourses, and Fears of Modernisation in the USA and Poland

It is worth remembering that throughout Europe, America, and the rest of the New World (e.g., Australia) "the 'fears' and 'fantasies' about urban and rural life shaping public sphere conversation after 1900 were almost always informed by ideas about men and women" (Murphy 2010: 2). In these discussions, "women were used as markers for anxiety about urbanisation and modernity in general" (Murphy 2010: 44). The cause was similar regardless of the geographic latitude. The masses of women migrating to industrialising cities at the turn of the century entirely eluded the authority of their rural communities, husbands, and fathers. Work in factories in particular furthered the escape, while working as a live-in servant usually involved falling under a different patron, this time the controlling bourgeoisie. However, women avoided control even more effectively if they migrated abroad. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that the emancipation of millions of women and workers in anonymous cities of Europe, America, and Australia evoked a series of moral panics (see Ankum 1997; Boyer 1978; Conor 2004; Murphy 2010; Parsons 2000; Urbanik-Kopeć 2018; Walkowitz 1992; Wilson 1992). Thus, although fears were expressed about the mass of working people throughout the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, and various types of authors tried to find a way to obtain and maintain control over the "mindless" and revolutionarily "dangerous" masses (e.g., Scipio Sighele, Gustaw Le Bon, Sigmund Freud; see Urbanik-Kopeć 2018), women in the urban proletarian strata were the main subject of ostracism and of hundreds of moral projects (see Zinn 2016 [1980]; Zelizer 1994; Weeks 2017).

In the Polish context of the early-twentieth-century debate in which Znaniecki's views were formed, working women were blamed for all kinds of social problems, including for prostitution, the epidemic of venereal diseases, for abandoning children for the sake of work, and for minor crimes, but above all for moral depravation. As the social historian Alicja Urbanik-Kopeć has shown in studying working-class women in Poland, such a reaction to their growing numbers and emancipation was universal (2018). The

view was shared by both the urban intelligentsia and the land-owning and post-land-owning elites, to which Znaniecki belonged.

Polish liberals, socialists, Catholic conservatives, and emancipationists, regardless of the differences resulting from political orientation and sex, all agreed in perceiving proletarian working women as "bad women, deprived of the qualities traditionally ascribed to their sex" (Urbanik-Kopeć 2018: 10). For the public intellectuals of the time, "Their very existence contradicted the traditional role and place of women – they were on the outside, often beyond the care of a father, husband, or employer; they performed work that was previously unknown or that had been to that time ascribed to men. They were a new species of women, impossible to classify" (Urbanik-Kopeć 2018: 11). Proletarian working mothers and wives in particular were condemned in public opinion. Publicists, academics, doctors, and even working women's husbands perceived the work of married women as an attack on the man's position as head of the family and a violation of the domestic hierarchy. Thus, this group of workers met with ostracism and mothers and wives working in factories were subjected to pressure – from distinguishing them by particular garments in order to protect their "virtue" (in factories in Żyrardów married women wore special mob caps) to repeating endlessly that women in general and mothers in particular went to work not for the purpose of acquiring independence or for any other reason but solely in order, by their self-sacrifice, to save the family from starving to death (Urbanik-Kopeć 2018: 66). Even Polish women emancipationists, who came primarily from the upper classes, did not perceive, or even notice, these working-class women as an example of the realisation of their dreamt-of ideals. For instance, proletarian working women were self-sufficient workers, who independently provided for their children and often their parents and younger siblings as well, and this was possible thanks to the women's enormous solidarity and mutual support. Or, as another example, they initiated the first women's strike on Polish territory.[3] Nevertheless, they were viewed by the emancipationists as pragmatic and lacking in ideals, or simply as unthinking, and certainly as morally dangerous. At most, if the emancipationists saw them at all,

[3] The first strike by women in the Kingdom of Poland was a spoolers' strike in 1883. It was the largest workers' strike in the Kingdom of Poland before the revolutionary revolt in Łódź in 1905. It was prepared, initiated, and conducted exclusively by women factory workers. The men joined the strike considerably later; at the beginning only the young participated. The remaining men, if they did not hinder the strike, tried to persuade the women – their wives, daughters, and mothers – to desist (Urbanik-Kopeć 2018).

they viewed them not as being freed by work but as victims enslaved by it (Urbanik-Kopeć 2018: 7).

The Polish socialist movement did not bring anything new to the issue. The party declarations were far from expressing any idea of complete equal rights for women. "The revolution was supposed to be good for them not only because it would allow them to obtain workers' rights, but also because it would incline them finally to proper behaviour" (Urbanik-Kopeć 2018: 61), which was usually understood as a return to home life, and to their responsibilities as wives and mothers. A strong echo of such discourses can be found in *The Polish Peasant*, especially in the fourth volume. There, Znaniecki and Thomas interpret the practices of female workers newly come from the countryside to Polish cities in categories of sexual laxity. They consider one of the causes for the disorganisation of rural communities to be the explosion of hedonistic behaviour among peasant women travelling abroad for seasonal agricultural work. It is hard to be surprised at Thomas and Znaniecki (particularly the latter) for the conservative perspectives that emerge in *The Polish Peasant* when even emancipationists or socialists could not imagine a more respectable role for a woman than being a wife and mother. And yet the socialists and emancipationists belonged to those circles that had the liveliest interest in ideas of equality and social justice.

Thomas's views were shaped in a similar ideological context. However, the American version of gendered modernisation fears had the additional dimension of being a xenophobic reaction to a high rate of immigration.

> [B]etween 1900 and 1914 [alone] over thirteen million immigrants entered the United States. In earlier periods of the republic's history, immigrants had come mainly from Germany, Scandinavia, and the British Isles. During the progressive era, however, most immigrants – in some years, 80 percent – came from Italy, Austria-Hungary, Poland, or Russia. Not surprisingly, the "new" immigration (a contemporary reference to the change in national origins) became a major national issue during the progressive years, both for those who sought to deal with it sympathetically and for those of nativist opinion who feared it and worked to restrict it (Connelly 1980: 48).

These fears, though, had a deeper source in enormous civilisational changes. Between the turn of the century and the end of the First World

War, the United States "was transformed from a predominantly rural-minded, decentralized, principally Anglo-Saxon, production-oriented, and morally absolutist society to a predominantly urban, centralized, multi-ethnic, consumption-oriented, secular, and relativist society" (Connelly 1980: 7). Solely in the years 1860–1910, the largest American cities on average increased seven-fold in size. Chicago itself, where the documents for *The Polish Peasant* were collected, increased over twenty times in size to become one of the largest American cities, with 2 million inhabitants (Connelly 1980: 12). It is not surprising then that it was easy for social emotions to turn into moral panic, dominated by a sense of crisis and ending. People were faced with the fact that thousands of small towns and farming settlements around the country, which had formerly been the symbolic centres of nineteenth-century morality, of "civilized morality," were now "joined in a losing battle with the allure of the new urban life-styles" (Connelly 1980: 7).

In such a context of American urbanisation and industrial revolution, when women were increasingly willingly and numerously leaving households and the provinces to find work in urban industry, there was growing pressure to control the women, and best of all, to keep them at home. Thus the ideology of domesticity, of a "woman's place," gained in importance and was taught in schools, churches, and families. The aim was to justify assigning women to their natural space, the home, far from the dangers of the external world, which should be reserved for men (Zinn 2016 [1980]: 161–162).

Thus the ideal of the woman as an "angel of consolation" began to be reinforced (Lash 1977). The essence of this "cult of true womanhood," which throughout the nineteenth century was set forth in moral and also legal standards, is best described by Barbara Welter: "True Womanhood," the model for upper-class women, "could be divided into four cardinal virtues – piety, purity, submissiveness, and domesticity" (Welter 1966: 152, quoted by Urbanik-Kopeć 2018: 66). Nevertheless, the special virtue – over which the "ethical elites" were engaged in a fierce battle – remained "sexual purity," which was connected with the ideal of a woman as "submissive" and "passive" in relation to her husband. Such traits were supposedly the essential differentiation between femininity and natural male "aggressiveness" (Zinn 2016 [1980]: 161–164). It was assumed that men by their biological nature would sin, but that women must not give into temptation. As a certain male author cited by Howard Zinn wrote: "If you do, you will be left in silent sadness to bewail your credulity, imbecility, duplicity, and

premature prostitution" (Zinn 2016 [1980]: 102). The "idea of household calm," "the haven in the heartless world," (Lash 1977) contained the longing for a utopian pre-modern past. It evoked a picture of rural utopia and of stable, religiously strict, small American agricultural towns and farms. In the mass imagination these were asylums, free from the dangers of capitalist modernisation. Some American progressives "were drawn to the fantasy of a prosperous agrarian future which underpinned rural settlement schemes in the period" (Murphy 2010: 9).

The American strategy for dealing with gendered fears over modernisation, in which new cultural significance was accorded to the rural–urban opposition, had a special enemy – immigrant women, who at a certain moment came to be identified with all the prostitution and social pathology of American cities. As new "social devils" they quickly became the focus of dozens of moral panics, national anti-prostitution campaigns, and legislative projects. Engaging all levels of authority, preoccupation with the problem of prostitution was so widespread that up to 1910 there was "a clearly defined national position on the relationships between prostitution and immigration" (Connelly 1980: 60).

"[E]ven though no statistical evidence was presented," government reports, or reports drawn up by the authorities of the largest cities (the tradition of social vetting), suggested that immigrants had flooded the United States with a wave of prostitution. There was a conviction that the majority of prostitutes and those who benefitted from their work came from Eastern or Southern Europe. Naturally, this view was founded on deep racial and ethnic prejudices, as in the speech of a certain congressman: "Let us not now be betrayed to a Latin or Asiatic laxity of morals, lest we go the way of the great Latin and Asiatic nations that have fallen" (Connelly 1980: 60). Religious bias was another underlying element. In America, beliefs about the sexual depravity of Jews and Catholics derived from fairly vigorous anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic sentiments (Connelly 1980: 64). All of which masked the fact that the problem of prostitution had not been brought from abroad by the immigrant women and their countrymen-procurers but in reality originated in the socio-economic conditions of American cities.

Such multifaceted bias in the United States, and in Poland as well, contributed to form the pattern of public debate on modernity.[4] It was in

[4] Following Kathy Murphy's strategy I define modernity not as a particular historical interval, but as "a state of mind, the sense contemporaries had of their own modernity, an awareness of a break with the past, an exhilarating and frightening sense that they were negotiating uncharted territory" (2010: 1–2).

such a context of anti-emancipation fears and national anti-prostitution campaigns that Thomas decided to write *The Polish Peasant*. He had begun to collect material on migrations from Chicago institutions considerably earlier, that is, at the beginning of the 1910s (Sinatti 2008; Szacki 2002). Znaniecki joined him later, while acting as director of the Emigrants' Protective Association in Kraków. Apart from providing aid and advice to migrants in choosing the best place to immigrate, Znaniecki's role in the institution then was to keep the best educated people in Poland and to facilitate the departure of the others (Wieruszewska 2012: 20). It is not surprising, therefore, that both authors, who were at the time deeply engaged in the public debate and the problems of their countries (see Firlit-Fesnak et al. 2013), decided that the analyses and explanations of causes of disorganisation in *The Polish Peasant* should fall within the rural–urban binary discourse. The rural–urban binary discourse, as Raymond Williams noted in *The Country and the City* (1973), symbolised at the time an "unresolved division and conflict of impulses" between the pre-modern (the traditional, the known, the authentic) and the modern (the unknown, the uncharted) (Murphy 2010: 1). In this discourse the countryside had the role of a symbolic panacea, where traditional social control could be preserved. While in the debates of the era the home was supposed to guarantee performance of the ideal of True Womanhood, the countryside, as a collection of households and a closed social network, was supposed to provide the stability that would ensure its performance to an even greater degree. And although Thomas and Znaniecki do not postulate a return to the pre-modern conservative world, they do not avoid its nostalgic idealisation.

/// Constructing a Patriarchal Rural Idyll – The National Mythology behind the Concept of (Dis-)Organisation

The disorganisation of social life among immigrant families in American cities is not the sole main subject of analysis in *The Polish Peasant* and only the last volume (the fifth) is devoted to the question. For Thomas and Znaniecki, it was more important to reconstruct the organisational model of patriarchal peasant families, the basis of traditional rural society in Poland. In terms of proportions, it is rather telling that two of the three analytical volumes of *The Polish Peasant* concern this model, which has a symbolic function extending far beyond the theoretical aims of the monograph. I will thus consider at what points the authors' interpretations move more in the normative (ideological) direction and towards a roman-

ticising moral discourse. I will furthermore reflect on what issues spark the authors' fears and fantasies in regard to modernisation.

These idealisations are primarily to be found in the way the authors construct their analytical concept as a binary opposition. On the one hand, there is the model of "family organisation" wherein whatever is moral – that is, a patriarchal marriage centred in a strong peasant community of families – can only be located territorially in the rural world of the (Polish) nation. In observing the essence of the organisational model of the peasant family in rural Poland, Thomas and Znaniecki continually underline the value of its unconditional continuity; they explain that such continuity is possible thanks to the subordination of the interests of the individual to the community. Continuity is created in practices of social control and in the principle of group solidarity, which is capable of subduing the resistance of rebellious family members and of directing them toward a higher aim. The aim is always defined by the imperative of the community's indissolubility, which applies regardless of the needs of individual community members, and even in spite of the bad experiences of husbands and wives. The above traits of continuity and solidarity become the basis on which the authors construct a romantic myth of the peasant family in Poland, with the oft-emphasised collective, motivating strength of the family, and hierarchal gender roles. The authors locate everything "disorganised," that is, everything they call depraved and asocial, at the other pole, as if in opposition. What is immoral is identified with the city and with the process of migration to the city. The most important morality issue is the "breakdown of conjugal relations" and of the extended family, but the authors also placed phenomena that lead to this disintegration in the category of the immoral: "economic dependency," the "sexual demoralisations of girls," the "vagrancy and dishonesty of boys," and "murder" (Thomas & Znaniecki 1920, vol. 5: 113–114).

It is worth observing that within the framework of the binary opposition thus constructed (organisation–disorganisation), the reference criterion – the value that inclines Thomas and Znaniecki to judge the process of becoming an immigrant as disorganisation – is a violation of unconditional, sanctified marital continuity, with the patriarchal role of the husband and father and control by the community of extended families. Furthermore, the authors repeatedly underline that the context for disorganisation, that is, demoralisation and the breakdown of marital pairs in the United States, is "the novelty of American legal standards" (1920, vol. 5: 221), which not only make divorce accessible but also have numerous social se-

curity provisions for wives and mothers. As the authors maintain, divorce in America is easier to procure because of "the decay of the large family," the "weakness of the Polish-American community" (1920, vol. 5: 221), and the significant decline in the number and kinds of church and parish social control over the lives of immigrants:

> in this country the large family is no longer a real social body with concrete common interests – for usually only a few members have immigrated and these are often scattered over a vast territory. The community has also only a small stock of old traditions left and cannot efficiently enforce even these unless the individual chooses to participate actively in common life. Further, in spite of the great vitality which the parish has as a social institution the authority of the church as religious institution is much weakened, perhaps for the very reason that the existence of the Polish-American church depends on the free will of the congregation (1920, vol. 5: 222).

Thus we find from the authors' analyses that immigrants, including Polish women, discovered and took advantage of the new legal possibilities. The consequence was that divorce spread in the peasant and working classes that came to the United States. However, phenomena that might have been recognised to fall within the category of emancipation, that is, phenomena that I called the proletarianisation of divorces, or the transformation of relations between the sexes in families, is described only in categories of immorality and disorganisation.[5]

It might also appear that the binary opposition constructed by the authors in regard to the organisation of the family in rural Poland and its disorganisation in American cities is justified in the light of theory and methodology. The authors were attempting to recreate models and processes relating to individuals' attitudes and values and their cultural system. The authors' pioneering approach was moreover a paradigmatic breakthrough at the time. However, a deeper analysis of the work shows that Polish immigrants' departure from the model of marriage inviolability – that is,

[5] It should be remembered that during this period, at the end of the nineteenth century, the divorce of Catholics was impossible throughout most of Poland, which was divided between neighbouring partitioning states. The exception was the Prussian partition, which had a secular but very restrictive law on divorce. The fully secularised civil right to divorce in Poland was introduced only after the Second World War, in 1946. However, before the Second World War, divorces were rare even among the metropolitan intelligentsia and artists. Even after the Second World War, in the collective imagination divorce continued to be something unknown and rather dangerous, and hardly existed as a real possibility of resolving marital conflict (Klich-Kluczewska 2015: 138).

marital breakdown and divorce mediated by American institutions – is not analysed by the authors from the perspective of the migrating peasant women, nor as a path to emancipation and empowerment. In other words, the important qualitative dimension to the social change revealed in the practices and attitudes of some of the migrating peasant women (thanks in particular to their newly acquired civil rights to divorce, social security measures, and alimony) is not reflected and not perceived in the work. Instead, the entire potential of resistance and revolt disappears within the category of social disorganisation, in which the practices of men and women immigrants are interpreted as demoralisation, immorality, and asociality. Repeatedly, the authors clearly fail to recognise the subjectivity of and reasons for women's resistance. Nor do the authors interpret these strategies and subjectivity in the categories they define as reorganisation; they do not perceive the continuity of the attitudes transported from Poland. Instead, they paternalistically and condescendingly explain the psychology behind the actions and attitudes of women immigrants. Thus, a frequently encountered representation of Polish peasant women and successive generations of their daughters in America is one of "unusual quarrelsomeness" (1920, vol. 5: 254), of wives and mothers who do not care for their homes, and who make use of newly acquired legislation to fight their husbands, always due to a difference of opinion over "trifles."

In the authors' interpretations the strong influence of the Puritan context and of Polish moral fears over modernity in response to women's emancipation are very visible. Above all, women's leaving the home to enter factories and appear in the streets is considered morally suspect as an activity outside the sanctified sphere of the home (the ideology of domesticity). These are not solely categories that emerge from documents written by Puritan American social workers and judges (which form the basis for analysis), but are also categories Znaniecki and Thomas produce themselves. They seem intentionally to choose such fragments about deviances from reports of local visits; they rework notes full of those kinds of images of women, and finally reproduce the images in their interpretations.

The decline of the peasant family in American cities is always presented by Thomas and Znaniecki in contrast to the organised, certain, stable rural past and with a particular focus on fears about the downfall of the patriarchal family in the city due to immoral wives and mothers. Thus a picture of the family and gender relations in the new urban context is presented in categories of decline, break-up, and disorganisation. Let us look at the subject more closely, by analysing passages from the source.

/// The Trifling Motivations of Quarrelsome Polish Women versus Wounded Male Dignity – Masculinist Fears over the Breakdown of the Patriarchal Family

When Thomas and Znaniecki try to prove their thesis about the key role of American law in the breakdown of peasant marriages and families, their model for interpreting the practices of men and women reveals a strong masculinist perspective with strong patriarchal gendered bias. Such bias is especially visible in those passages of the fourth and fifth volumes where the authors refer to women's recourse to the law in order to divorce or to insist on the father's obligation to provide child support. The authors then write of the women's practices in a paternalistic and condescending tone, which is entirely different from the tone they adopt in discussing the practices of the men. Analysis of the differences leads to the conclusion that the authors find civil rights (citizenship) legitimate depending on a person's gender (see gendered citizenship). In practice, this means the authors do not recognise or find justification for the legal measures to which women resort, and that they consider wives and mothers to be second-class citizens.

In the fourth volume, the chapter defining the causes of family disorganisation contains the following illustrative passage:

> The acquaintance with the legal standpoint of abstract individualistic justice has contributed in a very large measure to the decay of the family tradition, and the development of litigation has been the consequence. This is particularly marked in Galicia, where acquaintance with law is older than in the Congress Kingdom. Exactly similar is the effect which the American laws on marriage, support of wife, divorce, etc. have in helping dissolve the Polish family life in this country, chiefly by giving the wife an exaggerated conception of her "rights" (1920, vol. 4: 37).

This mode of thinking, in which the "rights" of the wife are placed in quotation marks and awareness of possessing those rights is considered "exaggerated," expresses a lack of recognition for those rights. The authors also demonstrate their lack of recognition for women's rights by making an equivalency between peasant wives turning to the law and their being litigious. Such thinking recurs throughout the work. For instance, the fol-

lowing passage in the fifth volume again reflects the authors' paternalism and condescension:

> The consciousness that she can have her husband arrested any time she wishes on charges of non-support, disorderly conduct or adultery is for the woman an entirely new experience. Though under the old system she had in fact a part in the management of common affairs almost equal to that of the man, yet in cases of explicit disagreement the man had the formal right of coercing her, whereas she could only work by suggestion and persuasion, or appeal to the large family. Now not only can she refuse to be coerced, since the only actual instruments of coercion which the man has left after the disorganisation of the large family – use of physical strength and withholding the means of subsistence – are prohibited by law, but she can actually coerce the man into doing what she wants by using any act of violence, drunkenness or economic negligence of his as a pretext for a warrant. No wonder that she is tempted to use her newly acquired power whenever she quarrels with her husband, and her women friends and acquaintances, moved by sex solidarity, frequently stimulate her to take legal action. Such action is, of course, radically contrary to the traditional significance of marriage, but this significance is weak and apt to be forgotten in a moment of wrath, since there is no large family to keep it always alive (1920, vol. 5: 268).

In the above passage it is clear that not only do the authors not speak the language of civil rights, but of human rights in general.[6] The women's motivations are not at all associated with rational, justified, and legitimate actions but are reduced to the emotional impulses of excitement – of "anger" during "a quarrel." The authors' invalidating view of violence against women and of women's unequal position in the patriarchal system is a serious problem. It is clear from the above passages and many others that the authors do not take violence, drunkenness, or financial neglect as legitimate reasons for divorce – that is, reasons for women to take legal action. The authors do not recognise these circumstances as being significant for women. Abuse and violence are rarely taken seriously, but when mentioned they are seen as an "excuse," a "pretext": a "temptation" for women to use

[6] Of course, the limitation of their discursive framework could easily be explained by the time context, as women then were legally excluded in essence, without even the right to vote.

their "newly acquired power" of civil and legal rights. The practices of women are thus paternalistically viewed in terms of a battle between the sexes (the women are "moved by sex solidarity") in which women are the "quarrelsome" side and are motivated by "trifling reasons." The authors associate women's actions with the women's "forgetting themselves" and with a loss of reasonableness in a situation where a monopoly on reasonableness is held by the extended family in rural Poland and, in the United States, by the scattered national elites. Furthermore, the authors frequently – as in the fifth volume – accuse women of attaching too much importance to their newly acquired rights and of attempting to supplant the "moral obligation" of the peasant community with their "exaggerated feeling of coercive power" (1920, vol. 5: 171). Such associations appear frequently in the work, and always where women's use of legal means is discussed, as in the following example: "if the girl does not prove too contentious or insistent upon her rights, the relation may be established later, voluntarily and without legal pressure" (1920, vol. 5: 269). The authors do not acknowledge the women's new practices in regard to the law even within the framework of a possible reorganisation: as a model for reorganising the family workings after disorganisation.

A key role is played here by the authors' category of "temperamental misadaptation" (1920, vol. 5: 145), which is based on implicit premises that men and women in pairs are in equal positions, or that men are in an even worse position on account of their financial obligations, as the authors declare outright in various places. Reducing the sources and causes of marital breakdown to "temperamental misadaptation" is a classic psychologisation procedure that has the effect of invalidating structural factors, even though the authors are aware of their importance. In many places in the text, the authors speak of the structural economic dependence of women, for instance:

> In general in the woman the connection between sexual interests and other interests seems to be closer than in the man, though on the other hand her greater economic dependence and stronger affection for the children make her usually willing to lead a double life whenever by breaking her conjugal tie for the sake of a more satisfactory sexual relation she would risk her economic security or be in danger of losing her children. Thence so many of the "boarder" stories which have become a well-known feature of Polish-American life. The woman has a secret sexual relation with

> a boarder and at the same time preserves her conjugal relation for economic and family reasons (1920, vol. 5: 258–259).

In a situation of inequality, where wives – especially those with multiple children – are economically dependent on their husbands, such a psychologising view fails to take violence seriously. Let us look at the most important argument for the mechanism of "temperamental misadaptation," which, according to the authors, appears in most of the instances they cite:

> Usually temperamental misadaptation manifests itself more in the behavior of the woman than in that of the man, probably because of organic differences between the sexes and because the woman's indoor life and household occupations make her ascribe more importance to trifling circumstances. The unusual quarrelsomeness of Polish immigrants' wives certainly springs for the most part from this source; in man temperamental misadaptation expresses itself in "ugly temper," often in beating the woman – though beating may also have as its source in sexual jealousy or unsatisfied desire for sexual relations – and regularly in alcoholism, for drinking (particularly drinking with friends outside of the home) is the habitual means of escape from the quarrelsomeness of the wife – an artificial hedonistic substitute for the comfort and response of home life which the man needs (1920, vol. 5: 253–254).

If we group the above interpretation with the real examples to which they refer, we see that what the authors describe as "trifling" and "unimportant" causes are in fact instances of serious abuse and violations of the law. Yet according to the authors the causes lie in biological traits determining the "quarrelsomeness" of Polish wives and their belonging to the private sphere of the home, which is of less importance than the public sphere. The Chicago Legal Aid Society, whose documentation was analysed by Thomas and Znaniecki, was the resort of wives and mothers who had experienced multidimensional violence. The women complained of "maltreatment," of beatings, rapes, being forced into prostitution (a husband's attempts at procuration), murder threats, and attempted murder. They started proceedings against their partners/husbands who did not want to pay for the household and children, or avoided paying child support by fleeing, or engaged in cadging, or became alcoholics, or abandoned their responsibilities, or refused to recognise a legally instituted marriage,

or engaged in bigamy, or committed adultery, or molested their daughters, or adopted other forms of violence, including destroying or setting fire to property. That the authors' invalidation of maltreatment is a major strategy can be seen in the following passage, in which the authors claim that in Poland a marriage would not break down as the result of such factors. In a situation where divorce is not available and flight is not possible, "temperamental misadaptation" would be "maintained within certain bounds thanks to the influences of the social environment." In another situation:

> even if the extended family and society were unable to control them, the marital pair, being aware that there was no escape from the situation, would feel the need to accept their difficulties and at least to a certain degree attempt to adapt to one another (1976, vol. 5: 162).[7]

Moreover, the authors tell us what consequences a woman might have to accept and what practices society sanctioned if her behaviour departed from the accepted norm:

> Usually the desire for revenge manifests itself in the man by physical violence – for however indignant the American social worker may be with a husband beating his wife from jealousy this behavior is perfectly sanctioned by tradition and socially normal (1920, vol. 5: 260).

What is curious is that Thomas and Znaniecki do not mention the normalisation and sanctioning of wife-beating in the Polish tradition in order to criticise the practice or raise moral objections, though they do not hesitate to raise such objections in other questions. Wife-beating is also not mentioned by the authors in explaining the practice of women leaving their marriages, that is, they do not speak of women's pursuit of divorce in categories of resistance or rebellion – even though that resistance is clear in the clerical reports of specific family histories or in the declarations made by parties to a dispute and their witnesses. The authors mention wife-beating solely in order to show the strength of patriarchal social control in rural Poland and that peasant men and women cannot divorce there in the event of problems as they can in the United States. The authors emphasise that in Poland a peasant man can unload his frustrations through a socially ac-

[7] Translated from the Polish edition.

cepted resort to physical violence while preserving the sanctified continuity of marriage and the family.

The authors' interpretation of the peasant men's strategies is essentially paternalistic, but above all they interpret the strategies of the peasant women stereotypically and with great simplification, reducing everything connected with abuse to an "unpleasant situation," as in the following example:

> Whereas here [in America] not only is there little if any social check to prevent the expressions of misadaptation from indefinitely increasing, but both husband and wife know that they can escape the unpleasant situation – the man by deserting, the woman by taking out a warrant against her husband, and both by divorce. It is this possibility of an escape which, in connection with the original temperamental misadaptation, produces in the individual the feeling that his marriage is nothing but a burden to be rejected as soon as it becomes too heavy, and makes him forget at least temporarily whatever positive elements there may be in his conjugal life (1920, vol. 5: 254).

Let us look now at how very differently the authors interpret the attitudes of men whose partners or wives institute legal proceedings, including for recognition of paternity and child support:

> And the action once taken is irreparable, for the husband will never forget or entirely forgive an act which introduced foreign official interference into the privacy of his conjugal relations, *humiliated his feeling of masculine dignity* and put him for the time of his arrest on the same basis as a criminal. […] The man may be cowed into submission by fear but his marriage relation has ceased to imply any familial solidarity in his eyes and is no longer a voluntary union but an enforced cohabitation and economic contribution which taken together appear much akin to serfdom (1920, vol. 5: 268–269).

The contrast in how the authors treat the two sides of a marriage is striking. They exhibit concern for masculine pride, freedom, and feelings, while evincing a lack of such concern when interpreting women's practices. While the attitudes of the men – their flight from women, their abandonment of the responsibilities connected with marriage, their violence – are

morally justified by the authors, the practices of the men's wives are interpreted by the authors as "trifling," dictated by impulse, and characterised by "quarrelsomeness." The authors believe the men-immigrants do not recognise marital rights and responsibilities defined by institutions that are abstract to them and thus external.

Similarly, the men do not find interference in family matters to be legitimate, particularly in situations where their wives have recourse to the law and official institutions to insist on their fulfilling their responsibilities. The authors explain here, in referring once again to the mythical cooperation of the rural community, that the Polish peasants recognise a responsibility only when it is in the common interest of the primary group (the extended family and the neighbourhood community) as obligations derive from the solidarity of that group. However, the authors do not ask themselves the question of whose interest is ordinarily involved and who is excluded from that group solidarity. The authors do not at all address the issue, although in other places in the text they themselves admit that the unequal position of men and women was the norm in Poland's patriarchal systems. With that awareness, it should not have been hard for them to acknowledge that reproducing the principles and continuity of the Polish primary group was in the interest of male domination, and the principle of solidarity in essence referred to the masculinist vision of the family. The above line of interpretation gains in significance when we see that male pride comes to be injured solely in the United States – precisely when women acquire individual rights and can take advantage of them (as, moreover, they do not hesitate to do). The authors, however, do not interpret the new attitudes of immigrant men and women in categories of the breakdown of the patriarchal world and the erosion of the principle of domination, though such an interpretation might have revealed that the changes produced by migration involved the emancipation of women.

If we look at the practices reflected in the texts that Thomas and Znaniecki selected from the archives of charitable organisations and the courts, a broad picture emerges of the Polish peasant women's structural resistance and emancipation. That emancipation goes almost unacknowledged by Thomas and Znaniecki,[8] even though numerous instances show

[8] An exception to this scheme is their way of interpreting young girls' abandonment of household chores (cleaning, cooking) and opposition to giving their earnings to their parents. The authors directly call these practices "revolt" and explain the economic pragmatism at the root of these new individualistic attitudes: "the element of revolt against the drudgery and coercion of home life is very strong" (1920, vol. 5: 336). Fragments in which the authors discuss polygamy in functionalist terms is a similar departure from moralistic discourse. Such perspectives appear in

that the peasant women in America became active citizens, aware of their rights. First they would discover that they had defined rights as wives and mothers in the new country. Then they would take advantage of those rights through legal proceedings and with the support of governmental and philanthropic institutions. Let's look at some of the numerous examples of the agency of Polish peasant women to appear in Thomas and Znaniecki's works on the basis of the *Records of the Chicago Legal Aid Society*. The descriptions were prepared by volunteers helping these women and families:

> *Michalski Family*. […] the Michalski family tried living together once more, rented a flat and bought new furniture. After 2 weeks Stanley Michalski left and **his wife went to the Legal Aid Society** to complain that he was running around with another woman and giving her only $5 a week. **She was now willing to get a divorce.** Nothing was done in the matter, however. Six months later **she again applied to the society.** The night before her husband had come to her flat and threatened to kill her and Helen. He turned on the gas and tried to choke her into unconsciousness, but she screamed so loudly that he became alarmed and left, seizing a photograph of himself that was hanging on the wall and taking the child with him. **Mrs. Michalski called a policeman**, arrested him and got the child back (1920, vol. 5: 233–234; bold type added).

> *Piotrowski Family*. […] **Usually the matter is brought before the Society by the woman** and only later the man's story is heard (1920, vol. 5: 236; bold type added).

> *Wozniak Family*. Stella and Julian Wozniak had been married in Chicago in 1896 and lived together happily for 7 years. When Mrs. Wozniak was pregnant for the third time her husband suddenly deserted, leaving her without a cent. After his desertion John Pawlowski began to "be good to her." They lived together for 4 years and had 2 children. **Mrs. Wozniak then appealed to the Legal Aid Society to get a divorce for her** so that she could marry John (1920, vol. 5: 240; bold type added).

Thomas and Znaniecki's book only in the margins and contradict the dominant perspective based on conservative patriarchal assessments.

> *Zakrzewski Family*. Zakrzewski never supported his wife nor their 3 children properly, went around with other women and deserted her after 4 years of marriage. But he continued to annoy her occasionally. Twice he went to her rooms and spread such stories about her and created such a disturbance that both times she was asked to move. Five years later he again returned and made a scene, taunted her with being still alive, although tubercular, and said he would have to kill her to get rid of her. **She then asked the Legal Aid Society to get a divorce**, so as to escape being annoyed by him, but she was very ill and was soon taken to the hospital (1920, vol. 5: 246; bold type added).
>
> *Frankowski Family*. Bronisława had known Peter Frankowski in the old country. She had been in this country about 2 years when she had a child by him and had him arrested, hoping he would marry her. They were married in court but after the ceremony he refused to live with her or have anything more to do with her. He soon returned to Poland and she heard he was to marry another girl there. Bronisława's people tried to stop the marriage but the priest did not recognise Frankowski's civil marriage as valid. **Bronisława then asked the Legal Aid Society to have her marriage annulled** (1920, vol. 5: 251; bold type added).

It is not hard to notice that in Thomas and Znaniecki's interpretations there is a lack of acknowledgement that the women were struggling, by means of the courts, to reach the same ends for which the community and the extended family struggled. In requiring their husbands/partners to fulfil their obligations as husbands and fathers they were fighting for the preservation and continuity of the family. Leaving aside the new element that they received from the law – the potential to fight for respect and dignity – we can also see that the pattern is not solely one of disorganisation. There is a growing awareness of the rights and responsibilities of family members and a sense of the real force of the legal instruments ensuring fulfilment of those obligations. In addition, there was the ultimate possibility of resolving the problems in a relationship through divorce. These elements escape the attention of Thomas and Znaniecki, even though they are studying the values and attitudes of peasant men and women. Furthermore, they invalidate the importance of those values and attitudes by interpreting the efforts of American institutions in categories of support for the struggle

between the sexes and by placing men and women in the roles of competitors, of opponents (1976, vol. 5: 170). In effect, they reduce the practices of these institutions to an active role in destroying family continuity, which they contrast with some abstract, hypertrophic, and supra-individual image of community solidarity in rural Poland (1976, vol. 5: 169–170).

The sources of a lack of acknowledgement for structured practices, in categories of the peasant women's resistance and emancipation, can also be explained by looking critically at Thomas and Znaniecki's key use of the category of "temperament." The authors refer to the latter every time they try to explain the sources of the peasant men and women's new practices, which in their opinion were demoralising. According to the authors, when the old Polish social principles automatically lost their significance in the United States, the Polish peasants would base their practices exclusively on temperament, or more precisely, on biological drives, instincts, and the pragmatic desire for security. The new marital and familial practices in America were "based almost entirely on the sentimental attitudes of the individual," or on "sexual desire, the maternal instinct, and to a much lesser degree, paternal feelings, the desire for mutuality, and the desire for security" (1920, vol. 5: 144).[9] It might be thought that Thomas and Znaniecki preceded, by decades, Anthony Giddens and his concept of a "pure relationship," that is, a "pure love," which is possible because it is removed from any economic or social dependence. Such a conclusion would be erroneous, however, as Thomas and Znaniecki, in enumerating the peasants' drives and instincts, practically do not recognise the feeling of love. Thomas and Znaniecki claim that love "is especially rare among peasants, with their traditional subordination of the individual to the group" (1920, vol. 5: 144). They reserve love, along with the "norm of decency," for higher classes, that is, for the elite: "intellectuals," or those in "leading circles," to whom they ascribe "rationally motivated idealism" (1920, vol. 5: 144). Among the lower classes, however, after leaving the fatherland and the strong original social group, the only tie-creating mechanism is the sexual-procreative instinct and economic pragmatism. According to the authors, in America these are "practically the sole forces that draw a pair together and unite them" (1920, vol. 5: 144). By such interpretations, Thomas and Znaniecki deprive the migrants of any patterns of higher moral feelings beyond instincts, impulses, or temperament, and reveal successive layers of

[9] Translated from Polish.

psychologising reductionisms.[10] These were also typical ways in which the intellectuals of the period viewed the lower classes.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the authors write only marginally about the emancipation of women and then exclusively in categories of women's sexual misconduct and their abandonment of domestic chores. Such categories are typical of the discourse of the era, which saw the practices of proletarian working women and housewives uniquely through the prism of the risk of sexual laxity and irresponsibility. Thus not only is there no picture of peasant women's becoming empowered citizens, but the authors also reduce the emerging dimension of women's entrepreneurship and economic resourcefulness to impulses and instincts. Yet it would have been possible to find patterns of resourcefulness, with a kind of power and consistency, in the wives' and mothers' organisation of their livelihoods – strategies that contradicted the opinions of the Polish and American elites and especially the morally strict officials of aid societies. An interesting example is the story of Mrs Ziółek, the mother of three children, a woman in ill health who was abandoned by her violent husband after eight years of living together and who took in four "boarders" in order to maintain herself. The ChTPP, a charitable organisation, proposed "out of fear for the state of her morality" that she should move to a smaller apartment and promised to help her, perhaps even by obtaining a widow's pension for her. The idea was that as a mother she should give up living with "boarders," a practice associated with immorality (and in fact, one of her boarders was the father of her third child and afterward married her, but was continually running away). Mrs Ziołek refused the ChTPP's offer, explaining her decision by a lack of faith in the institution's real desire to help her given its refusals of her earlier appeals for financial aid. We can see then that Mrs Ziółek had the courage to stand her ground. She continued to maintain herself from the boarders' payments, which was a strategy she considered more stable and controllable. Perhaps it also ensured her a greater degree of agency than did dependence on the decision of an institution as to whether, as a mother, she deserved help. Such interpretative paths, which perceive the women's resourcefulness as continuing patterns (present in Poland as well), are not to be found in Thomas and Znaniecki's work. They qualify Mrs Ziółek's case as an illustration of marital breakdown due to… the woman's sexuality and immorality (1920, vol. 5: 145). In the authors' interpretation, the necessary pragmatism of single mothers,

[10] And although the concept of race did not refer to biology in Thomas and Znaniecki, the ways of categorising peasants bring to mind today's category of cultural racism.

young childless women, or women in ill health, who, like Mrs Ziółek, with unequal opportunities and worse pay, must yet manage to provide shelter for themselves and their family, pay the rent, buy food, and secure health care, is reduced to immorality. They see such pragmatism not as arising from a moral plan but from sexual impulses and as guided by values that they regard as disorganisation. On the other hand, the sexual liberation of women is not, in itself, understood in categories of subjectivity or empowerment. And although in some parts of the text Thomas and Znaniecki appear to suggest liberal interpretations – as in their reference to a rebellion against household duties, or when they discuss polygamy in functionalist rather than moral terms – the liberal interpretations quickly disappear under the weight of their moral judgment or the gender bias that primarily shapes their analysis.

/// Conclusions

The Polish Peasant is indeed a work turned nostalgically towards the past, which is conceived to be a ruralised space with idyllic family relations and hence gender relations. Thus, like other researchers and intellectuals of the period, the authors of *The Polish Peasant* create an opposition in which whatever is rural is the cradle of authenticity, of naturalised national values. These include healthy patriarchal relations in the family and among neighbours, and traditional – thus perceived as authentic – femininity and masculinity. Furthermore, in this opposition, whatever is urban is dangerous due to escaping the former strong rural social control. The anonymous city is a source of disorganisation and thus breaks apart and demoralises the patriarchal family and model relations between the sexes. In *The Polish Peasant* we find the typical moral discourse of the time, with a similar nostalgia for "pre-modern" rural conservative civilisation. Such a nostalgic turn towards the past among the interpreters of modernisation – including, paradoxically, those supporting modernisation – has been perceived by, among others, the Australian social historian Kathy Murphy (2010), who compares the public debate of the era in the Anglo-Saxon countries (America, Australia, and England) and in parts of Europe. She considers that the "rural space or ruralised national identities" were intended as a panacea for the chaos and threats of modernisation. In this discourse of rurality, a special place and role was assigned to women, because "[i]t was also a project about female citizenships, based upon a conviction that the country was the best environment for their 'natural' conservatism and

maternalism (the basis of ideal female citizenship) to flourish" (Murphy 2010: 43). Thus, although Thomas and Znaniecki accurately deconstruct the assumptions behind Americans' stereotyping and racialisation of the Polish immigrant, they do it, as I showed above, by referring to a model of interpretation that was typical of their era. They place symbolic equivalency signs between ruralism, a healthy national identity, and healthy social, family, and gender relations. In *The Polish Peasant* the authors thereby construct a model of a national and patriarchal community of rural families unmarred by individualisation and women's emancipation. Such a "morally healthy" model had a patriarchal form of gender relations, involving a patriarchal division of roles within a religiously devout, strong (meaning indissoluble), multi-generational family. Women as citizens are located in this model within the household, and preferably within a patriarchal rural family. As in Ferdinand Tönnies's ideal community (*Gemeinschaft*), this reversion to ruralism contains a kind of idealisation of the world of the patriarchal peasant order, which was disintegrating before Thomas's and Znaniecki's eyes. Perhaps there was also an element of the idealisation of the land-owning life, on whose existence the world of the peasant was dependent, and of which Znaniecki was representative. Therefore, although we know that the authors did not want to return to the pre-modern world (some traces of which we find in the work), they did not manage to go beyond the dominant patriarchal discourse of the era.

What makes Thomas and Znaniecki's *The Polish Peasant* such a current and worthy study is that we can observe such idealisations in today's Poland. As at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century, such concepts and gender idealisations of rurality have become popular in response to a wave of contemporary moral fears. Globalisation, mass migration, nationalist movements, and above all intense changes in intimacy, gender relations, and the family, with the emancipation of women, have produced many anxieties, backlashes, and moral fantasies (see Hryciuk & Korolczuk 2015; Korolczuk & Graff 2018; Urbańska 2015). Contemporarily, there is renewed interest in an idyllic vision of the countryside as the cradle and fortress of conservative Polish family values. Such interest shows how timeless the fears and fantasies regarding social change seem to be and how the rural–urban gendered cultural discourse has once again been revived. If we want to understand the importance of ruralism for traditional patterns of defining the ideal of the Polish family, then Thomas and Znaniecki's work is key to understanding the subject.

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/// Abstract

The aim of this article is to reread *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* as a representation of the fears and modernisation fantasies of its era. I analyse the patterns of gendered family relations and ideals of femininity and masculinity constructed by Thomas and Znaniecki within the framework of rural–urban discourses. As I will show, in *The Polish Peasant* we find huge contradictions between the liberal and conservative perspectives presented. On the one hand, the authors introduce the concept of "organisation – disorganisation – reorganisation," which is supposed to be scientific and thus non-ideological. On the other hand, the authors' patterns of interpreting empirical data show numerous gender bias and patriarchal schemes. As a result, the authors create an opposition in which whatever is rural is the cradle of authenticity, of naturalised national and gendered family values, and whatever is urban is dangerous and demoralising due to escaping the former strong rural social control. In *The Polish Peasant* the authors thereby construct the "morally healthy" model of a national and patriarchal rural community of families untouched by individualisation and women's emancipation. Such a model had a patriarchal division of gender roles within a religiously devout, strong (meaning indissoluble), multi-generational family. In *The Polish Peasant* we can find both a nostalgia – which was typical of its era – for a "pre-modern," rural, conservative civilisation, and worry about the moral health of women in the urban world. However, it is an ambivalent nostalgia accompanied by a conviction of the inevitability of social change.

Keywords:
ruralism, gender, family, modernisation, moral panics, rural–urban discourse

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ką Polką [Farewell to the Polish Mother] (2012) and *Niebezpieczne związki. Macierzyństwo, ojcostwo i polityka* [Dangerous liaisons: Motherhood, fatherhood, and politics] (2015), edited by R. Hryciuk and E. Korolczuk. She has been awarded a number of prizes, including the Prime Minister's Award for Best Doctoral Thesis. She is a member of the board of the Polish Gender Society and a member of the Polish Sociological Association.

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REVIEWS

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UBI CARITAS...

MIROSŁAWA GRABOWSKA, *BÓG A SPRAWA POLSKA. POZA GRANICAMI TEORII SEKULARYZACJI*

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Religiosity in Poland has become the research equivalent of a minefield. Let me explain what I mean by referring to the cover picture of Mirosława Grabowska's book *Bóg a sprawa polska* [God and the Polish cause]. In the centre of the well-known black-and-white photo taken in the Lenin Shipyard in August 1980, we see the chaplain of Solidarity, Henryk Jankowski, hearing the confession of a worker. The two are surrounded by a crowd of strikers on their knees, awaiting their turn to confess and be absolved – the simple but powerful piety of hard-working people, and the brave priest supporting them spiritually in their struggle against the common enemy. The picture once conveyed deep pathos: a sense of historical mission seemed to shine in the weary faces, the Church joined forces with the weak to face the mighty, and truth and justice had finally risen up against hypocrisy and inequity.

In the summer of 2019 the picture no longer carries the same meaning. To me, it conveys an unbearable irony. After 1980, the late prelate Jankowski was not only found to have informed on the very people whom he served as chaplain, he had also become an eponym of greed, gluttony, and pride. Soon another cardinal sin, that of lust, misdirected towards minors, was added to the list.

In addition, the simple Catholic religiosity of the working class no longer carries an emancipatory power. It contributes to the dark force fuelling hostility towards refugees as well as towards sexual, national, ethnic, and religious minorities – and in fact all minorities – and a stronghold of political support for the party directly responsible for demolishing the democratic rule of law in Poland after 2015 (see Grabowska 2018: 212ff. on the electoral behaviour of Polish Catholics). The year 2019 brought even more troubling developments. Yet while members of the clergy are found guilty of child abuse, while bribery, insider trading, and tax fraud involving the highest state and Church officials are plausibly alleged, while laws are proposed prohibiting sexual education at schools, and while the idea of effective segregation of the LGBT+ population is advocated and is gaining popular support, Polish society at large remains faithful to the Church. *Polonia semper fidelis*. It stays loyal not only to the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church (whose current leader's ideas are hardly congenial to the better part of the Polish clergy and congregation) but primarily to the local, culturally embedded Polish Church, which has arguably never been closer to state power in modern history.

To enter such a research field calls for a lot of courage, and it is hard to do it right. Mirosława Grabowska, who is a professor at the Institute of Sociology of the University of Warsaw, lacks neither the nerve nor the competence to address difficult questions. The evidence on the religiosity of Polish society is bountiful. The quantitative studies conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, CBOS), which she has directed since 2008, are among the most reliable of sources. As a social scientist, Grabowska has demonstrated her ability to offer nuanced and comprehensive perspectives on Polish society in numerous works, at least one of which, *Podział postkomunistyczny* (2004) belongs to the finest achievements of Polish sociology after 1989. Moreover, even though the sociology of religion has always been one of her fortes, Grabowska is first and foremost a sociologist of politics. Like no other author, she has the necessary sensitivity and experience to analyse the interface of politics and religion in post-communist Poland, including its most recent developments.

Of course, currently no one can really keep up with Polish public life. It is a sign of that uncanny acceleration that to assess a book published in 2018 fairly we have to ask: right, but when exactly in 2018? On the other hand, *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*: the Catholic religious setting is among the firmest characteristics of Polish society. It has indeed become,

as Grabowska states at least twice in her book, "a part of the Polish landscape" (2018: 210, 211), and so has its political effects. Although Grabowska studies religion rather than politics, the deep politicisation of religion in today's Poland makes her book a must-read for any student of politics in this part of the world.

Grabowska's description of the Polish religious landscape combines the past and the present in a single far-reaching outlook, which offers the reader valuable tools to understand contemporary Poland. Her book is based on a substantial load of data and offers theoretical insights in a clear and concise way. An additional merit of the book – though not, I expect, one fully intended by the author – is its capacity to give a sensation of estrangement to the anxious observer of Polish politics and social life in 2019: its argument is framed in a way which, for a number of reasons, diminishes its immediate relevance.

The principal reason is already explained in the subtitle: "Beyond secularisation theory." Of course, Poland has ever been a problematic case for secularisation theorists: a post-communist society in the middle of Europe, which not only failed to secularise under communism, but has also resisted the allegedly secularising impact of capitalism, modernisation, and the rising living standard and human development indices. Even if we regard secularisation theory – which has been heavily criticised for some decades now – as a supreme proof of the secular West's blind narcissism and wishful thinking, it remains as influential as the West itself. So it is fully plausible to use the problem of religion in Poland as a test of secularisation theory, to which Grabowska takes a "critical and polemical, but not negative and hostile" attitude (2018: 132). Her review of the development of the secularisation hypothesis and then its critique is a very informative and comprehensive summary of a voluminous corpus of knowledge. But delving into the flaws of secularisation theory involves a noble temptation which, I believe, Grabowska simply could not resist. Secularisation theory depicts religion as doomed by modernisation – bulldozed by the global trend. If we also take into consideration that socially weaker groups are consistently more religious, and that the global North is less religious than the global South, the inevitable result is that by questioning secularisation theory we somehow end up on the side of religion. This in turn makes us probably less willing to address its less agreeable features. Unless, of course, we endorse the view that religion as such is an utterly disagreeable phenomenon, which in turn would push us more towards the defence of secularisation theory, on the sound principle that disagreeable social phe-

nomena are largely eliminated in societies where people live more agreeable lives.

Clearly, Grabowska is not an enemy of religion. For example, she frequently uses the phrase "to push religion out of the public sphere" (*wypychać religię z życia publicznego*), but I have not found one single instance of her describing the opposite situation as "pushing religion into the public sphere." One reason may be the relatively small significance given to the distinction between religiosity and the Church throughout the book. For Grabowska, religiosity is a social phenomenon which is not coextensive with Church membership but relates to it both in its practical and cognitive dimensions (an assumption which, to my mind, is utterly unproblematic in a society where any book about religion ends up being a book about Catholicism, for purely statistical reasons). A large part of Grabowska's theorising in the book pertains to macro-level Church–state relations, and her historical discourses are written from that vantage point, too. On the other hand, the analyses of Polish religiosity highlight its micro-sociological and subjective aspects, and often thematise the tension between religious experience and institutional religion. This duality allows the author to characterise the (macro-)political effects of religion as distinct from their intimate and personal causes. Thus, Grabowska seems to overlook what is wrong about a good thing.

Grabowska's remarkable historical sensitivity may be one additional factor at play here. Let us look at Chapter 2, which discusses relations between church and state. The author begins with a very informative depiction of the historical development of the relationship between church and state in two paradigmatic cases, the United States and France, offering a useful typology of church–state relations (Grabowska 2018: 107). What I find particularly commendable here is her appreciation of the role of individuals in history, including individual leaders of religions and states: she avoids the fallacy of agentless agency, which is so common in contemporary sociology. In a rich, comparative overview she describes a variety of solutions to the problem that in biblical terms involves separating what is God's from what is Caesar's. She examines the legal settings, historical path dependencies, and cultural contexts in which various religions and religious institutions operate in the world. This part is largely a summary of secondary literature, supported by extensive references, but it is a comprehensive and clear one. It is no wonder that it shares some of the deficits of the sources: a number of societies seem to fall out of the frame, including those with a major presence of non-axial ethnic religions (notwithstand-

ing their official and organisational status), those with a large segment of religions operating without any church-like institutionalisation, and those with a significant presence of Islam (with two exceptions, Iran and Saudi Arabia, which are cited as examples of theocracies). As the book is about Poland, these omissions are not to be held against the author. Still, the reader is prompted to ask if some new insights could be obtained by positioning Poland against a less familiar backdrop, or if the conceptualisations of church–state relations could be more embedded in the connected histories of the global world.

The theoretical sections discussing church–state relations are but an introduction to the close-up of Poland, which begins with the third chapter. Again, a rich, thorough, concise timeline leads the reader to what could be described as the "miracle of uniformity": Poland's population, which was religiously, linguistically, and ethnically heterogeneous before 1939, became almost homogenous, with over 91% being Catholics, whose faith, unshaken by communist propaganda, increased with the "good conjuncture" in the late 1970s (Grabowska 2018: 126) and when a Pole was elected to the Holy See in 1978.

The part of Grabowska's book that focuses on Poland reads like a story about a different country than the one we know from the daily news. As a result, it counteracts prejudice and prevents hasty interpretations, thus fulfilling the proper function of quantitative data analysis, which, rather than confirm what we hold to be true, should confront us with the Durkheimian *sui generis*, which can only be observed indirectly. In this sense, Grabowska's writing balances the more radical outcries in academia and beyond by showing a more benign picture of religion in contemporary Poland. Still, her choice of problems and research questions downplays the political effects of religiosity.

Let us consider Grabowska's treatment of a problem that can by no means be called benign: the anti-Semitism of Polish Catholics. Even though Chapter 4, which tackles this sore issue, is a reprise of an unpublished paper written in 1990 based on research conducted in the second half of the 1980s, it still offers precious insights into Polish anti-Semitism as well as the likely roots of the xenophobic aura detectable in twenty-first-century Poland (see Bilewicz et al. 2012). Grabowska remarks that the interest of this chapter is greatly augmented by the debate on the "Polish Holocaust law" adopted by Poland's parliament in 2018 (see Bucholc & Komornik 2019). Indeed, due to this short-lived legislation the question "Why do Polish Catholics hate the Jews?" – which Brian Porter-Szűcs once

called "a stupid" question to which we can only try to find a "reasoned answer" – has not ceased to reverberate in the world (see Porter-Szűcs 2014). In the 1980s, Grabowska's team sought a reasoned answer by interviewing Catholics representing "ordinary" and "new" variants of Catholic religiosity (the latter were operationalised as an affiliation with a group favouring religious renewal within the Church), as well as non-believers. The resulting picture of the "Jewish question in the Polish ethos" is far from coherent, yet the anti-Semitic bias of traditional religiosity is clearly evidenced by one of the findings: the non-believers turned out to be the least likely to have anti-Semitic sentiments, which is partly explained by the prevalence of members of the intelligentsia in the group. This finding would probably stand in 2019, too. Hence it might be expected that the political impact of religiously rooted anti-Semitism should be analysed, at least in light of the "Holocaust law" debate. Incidentally, the problem of anti-Semitism does not resurface in the fifth chapter, where Grabowska discusses the influence of religion on various spheres of social life.

This is the part where the religiosity of contemporary Polish society is characterised longitudinally, split by generations, which is a very enlightening way to present these data, allowing the reader fully to appreciate their rate of change (or, more often than not, the absence of change). As a methodologist, Grabowska is aware of the limitations of survey data in studies of religion and points them out to the reader with fairness. However, she also argues that there is *no better* empirical foundation for speaking of the religiousness of a society as a whole. She then proceeds to discuss the findings regarding the main components of religiosity, such as declarations of faith and church attendance, and concludes the chapter with a discussion of the impact of religion on morality and, last but not least, politics.

The findings are hardly surprising (Grabowska 2018: 171–188). The CBOS results for the period 1992–2018 analysed by Grabowska show a deeply religious society, with over 90% of believers throughout the period and a slowly rising share of non-believers, never exceeding 7%. Even though Poles are becoming less religious as time goes by, the steady drop in declarations of faith is negligible. Large-city dwellers and younger people are more prone to disbelief than the population in general, but the differences between age cohorts are small, with the exception of the youngest adults, who are the only ones declaring lack of religious faith, in over 17% of cases. Other socio-demographic factors, like education, also correlate with religiosity, but the relationship is weak. What Grabowska dubs a "crawling process of secularisation" is more conspicuous in the declarations of

religious practices: the share of regular practitioners has decreased while that of non-practitioners has risen. At the same time, non-regular practitioners account for 40%, and non-practitioners for 25%, of the large-city population. In the dimension of religious practices, secularisation is definitely accelerating, including intergenerationally, especially in the youngest cohorts. Moreover, respondents turn out to be increasingly selective in terms of their religious practices and beliefs, and feel free to drop some of the official teachings of the Catholic Church, which Grabowska connects with the social context of religious rites and traditions. Practices that are embedded in family life, are customary, or are simply more pleasant seem to resist oblivion better than theological principals, which have not been familiarised.

In opposition to the uneventful general picture of Polish religiosity, the subchapter on the socio-cultural influence of religion (Grabowska 2018: 188ff.) is extremely thought-provoking and illustrates the difficulty of setting the moral and the political apart in today's Poland.

As far as politics is concerned, Grabowska dedicates only two pages to the question and refers the reader to her many previous works on the subject, including the recent and comprehensive chapter "Religiosity, the Catholic Church, and Politics in Poland" (2017). In as much as I sympathise with this choice, I find the omission a drawback of her work. Another decision which seems understandable yet somehow unfortunate is the choice of electoral behaviour as the key indicator of political attitudes. The section on politics deals with electoral preferences as a function of religiosity, and as a result, the time span of analysis shifts: while the data on religiosity in general include the most recent polls (conducted during the first four months of 2018), the research on political views and choices covers the period between 1989 and 2015 (the date of the last general election before the publication of the book). However, the year 2015 has become a very significant caesura in Poland's recent political history, and electoral preferences hardly exhaust its meaning. The Law and Justice party's whole first term in power (the party won a majority in the parliament again in 2019) has been marked by an *entente cordiale* of Church and state, and some quantitative examination of this relationship would be in place in a section on religion and politics. The mere fact that no elections took place between 2015 and 2018 should not, in my opinion, discourage the author from including other types of evidence covering the period.

Such a reductionist and election-centred understanding of politics is not entirely convincing given that Grabowska's discussion of religion and

morality is far more politically loaded than the section on politics: a number of stances on moral issues, including contraception, euthanasia and abortion, which have become global hallmarks of Catholicism, are also pivotal political matters in Poland (as elsewhere). Today, the list calls for an inclusion of further points, which fall within the domain of Catholic sexual and reproductive morality and for which Grabowska's analysis, focusing on the statutory regulation of abortion, offers no explanatory tools. A whole range of phenomena is related to this morality: doctors refusing to conduct legal abortions in state hospitals, pharmacists declining to sell medically prescribed contraceptives, politicians reluctant to subsidise in vitro fertilisation, proponents of "LGBT-free zones," Church spokespersons publicly equating homosexuality with paedophilia, and hooligans throwing stones at gay activists. The exemplary cases of criminal prosecution for offence of religious feelings on account of LGBT+-related images (see Davies 2019) have demonstrated that the Catholic ethos is a public matter and a challenge to state politics. The wave of accusations against child molesters in the Church has led to a reaction in the form of an "anti-sexualisation" campaign, which is supposed to protect children and youth from premature sex by preventing them from having any reasonable education about sexuality. Such cases are just as indicative of religion's impact on Polish life as the abortion law. They strongly suggest that the salience of sexual and reproductive morality in the Polish Catholic ethos cannot be reduced to the pro-life–pro-choice dilemma stated in juristic terms. Although some of these matters emerged or culminated only after the book's publication, their cultural foundations have been a part of the Polish landscape for decades.

The Polish Catholic ethos cannot be reduced to faith, church attendance, rites, and celebrations. Polish Catholicism is a worldview, and a worldview is a political matter: the stake is the definition of Polishness as much as that of Catholicism, which entails political actions involving Church agency on various levels of ecclesial organisation.

To the naked eye, the Catholic ethos in today's Poland appears to be Church-oriented, exclusivist, and aggressively political. Although this kind of ethos is not the ethos of all Polish Catholics, it is the culturally dominant and politically influential version. It is disturbing that the questions to which Grabowska pays a lot of attention in her deeply humanistic argument – the value of religious motifs in the greatest achievements of Polish culture and language, the historical role of the Church as a supporter of national independence, as well as a defender of human rights and political

freedoms – no longer resonate authentically in the Polish public sphere. The non-exclusivist and emancipatory heritage of the Church in Poland may have been irreparably lost.

But some of the universal, less locally anchored aspects of religion have been lost too, as also transpires in Grabowska's narrative: the depth of the experience of faith and its inexpressibility, the inaccessibility of the core of the religious experience to any standardised cognitive devices, the personal and intimate side of religion, which can be a progressive, moderate, universalist, and humanistic political force. Even though these aspects of religious ethos are an important part of the author's vision, they are hard to spot in her evidence-based tale. The more sublime facets of religion do not matter much in the big picture of how God relates to the Polish cause today, as God has been zoomed out.

Bóg a sprawa polska is, in fact, a book about the demise of the ethos of the Catholic intelligentsia in Poland: a requiem for a form of religiosity that seems most congenial to the author and that once enabled Polish Catholicism to stand genuinely on the side of the weak. She writes that "the Church sometimes must be a sign of resistance, but it must also practise *caritas*." Is it resistance to be on the side of the big battalions? Is it *caritas* to hit the Other on the cheek as a preventive measure? Grabowska's book is a reservoir of data and a toolbox full of useful concepts. It is well ordered and accessible, offered to the reader generously, and never overburdened with extravagant conceptualisations or esoteric theorising. And yet the general picture of Polish religiosity that this work produces is no longer of this world. The book's cover gave a sense of irony to the writer of these words – reading it induced nostalgia.

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WHAT KIND OF – TERRIBLE – COUNTRY IS THIS? WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE...? IN RESPONSE TO MARTA BUCHOLC

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I look at the cover of my book and see a priest "hearing the confession of a worker. The two are surrounded by a crowd of strikers on their knees, awaiting their turn to confess and be absolved" (Bucholc 2018: 143). The reviewer, Marta Bucholc, recognised the priest to be Henryk Jankowski, who is accused – and she repeats the accusations – of being an informant of the Security Service, and also of pride, greed, gluttony, and the sexual abuse of children. Even if all these accusations were fully justified, they do not invalidate the truth of that moment, that time.

In the same way, the various accusations against Lech Wałęsa, including of cooperation with the Security Service, do not lessen his leadership of Solidarity and the strike in the Gdańsk Shipyard. As an aside, is it an exceptional situation that someone who is far from ideal should accomplish something significant? Or create some great work?[1] What Lech Wałęsa and Father Jankowski did in 1980 affected the history of our country. Historians (and the Lord) have called the latter to account for his sins – the courts were not in time.

I am not a historian. I have not studied the cooperation of priests and monks with the Security Service, nor do I know of a reliable work on the

[1] For instance – to avoid current Polish examples – Ezra Pound was a great poet even though he was fascinated by fascism and during the Second World War gave a propaganda speech on Italian radio.

subject. It should not be forgotten, however, that priests and monks were a social category "under special supervision." Each one, at the moment of entering the seminary or beginning a novitiate in an order, would have had a file begun on him in which compromising evidence would be collected and might be used to incline him to cooperate. We do not know the proportions: how many there were for whom compromising evidence was found and who were thus persuaded to cooperate. I do not want to guess what would be the outcome of the use of such a strategy in regard to the academic milieu.

Undoubtedly, it is not only priests and monks who engage in the sexual abuse of children, but in their case it arouses special moral outrage. But again, the scale of the phenomenon has not been credibly diagnosed. It is worth remembering that the communist system paradoxically "spared" the clergy many opportunities: in Poland before 1989, the Catholic Church basically did not run schools with dormitories, boarding houses, orphanages, etc., and thus circumstances allowing for the sexual abuse of minors were rarer than in Anglo-Saxon countries. There is thus no basis to assume that the scale of the phenomenon was similar. Independently of the scale, however, every such instance, whether occurring within the Church or outside of it, and whether perpetrated by a member of the clergy or a lay person, should be investigated *ex officio* and tried by a state court.

If I had to decide again about the cover of my book, I would again choose that photo of confession during the strike in the Gdańsk Shipyard: a photo of the "simple but powerful piety of hard-working people, and the brave priest supporting them spiritually in their struggle against the common enemy" (Bucholc 2018: 143).

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But the question of our country or society is larger than the appraisal of an individual priest. What kind of a country is it, where

> Catholic religiosity […] contributes to the dark force fuelling hostility towards refugees as well as towards sexual, national, ethnic, and religious minorities – and in fact all minorities – and a stronghold of political support for the party directly responsible for demolishing the democratic rule of law in Poland after 2015 […]. [Where] the clergy are found guilty of child abuse, while bribery, insider trading, and tax fraud involving the highest state and

> Church officials are plausibly alleged, while laws are proposed prohibiting sexual education at schools, and while the idea of effective segregation of the LGBT+ population is advocated and is gaining popular support […] (Bucholc 2018: 144).

And that's not the whole of it by any means, because there is responsibility for anti-Semitism, and for how doctors, pharmacists, and politicians behave… Are there any Polish sins at all, for which the Catholic Church is not responsible? Has the Church ever done, or is it doing, anything good? Has its teaching had any positive effect?

Let us skip the details, although they are important because cumulated and inflated they provide the image of a "dark force" (what is implied is not affirmed – the Church did not propose the law forbidding sexual education in schools or the segregation of LGBT people, etc.). Very generally speaking, there are two ways to analyse societies: more ideologically or more sociologically. In order for the first method not to have negative connotations, let us call it the "critical" method. Marta Bucholc adheres to the critical approach: there is a certain ideal; there are certain standards to which we compare a given society.

The ideas presented in such an approach can be disputed in two ways: by questioning the ideal (which I will not do, as – I imagine – to a certain degree I share it), or by a sociological analysis, involving the change of social attitudes over time and by a comparison with other societies. I adhere to the second, sociological approach and in this manner I will answer the reviewer's censure and observations. However, even if we unreservedly adopted the critical perspective and were to draw up a detailed accounting of Polish society and the Catholic Church, the balance would not be as unambiguously negative as in the review.

1. First, in regard to the reviewer's opinion that I devote too much space in the book to politics and elections, here I do not agree: I focused on an area in which the effects of religiosity have been consistent and strong, perhaps the strongest.

The Catholic Church has consistently called for participation in elections and did so before other social institutions and authorities. Guided by the hermeneutics of suspicion, we might say that the hidden intention of those appeals was to provide voters – in the Church's interest – for the Law and Justice party. Nevertheless, if we check how believers and practitioners (hereafter, a "practitioner" means a person attending Church at least once a week) voted in the 2019 parliamentary elections, it emerges

that only (or as many as) 55% of believers voted for Law and Justice. The rest chose other parties: 19% voted for Civic Coalition, centred on Civic Platform, and nearly 8% for Democratic Left Alliance (or more precisely, the coalition centred on Democratic Left Alliance). Two-thirds of practitioners voted for Law and Justice; over 11% chose Civic Coalition, over 8% the Polish People's Party (more precisely, the coalition centred around the Polish People's Party), and nearly 5% chose the Democratic Left Alliance. More non-believers than believers voted for the Confederation.[2] This is a voting pattern that is repeated in many European countries: believers (of varying confessions) support conservative parties – because what other parties would they vote for? Radical right-wing parties are supported rather by non-believers, as religiosity does not favour radicalism (including of the right).

Whether such a situation – the connection of religiosity with a single political party – is advantageous for the Church is a separate question. But it is a question that should be addressed to the Church and definitely not to social reality.

To what degree do Law and Justice's voters constitute that "dark force"? Nearly 16% are managerial personnel or specialists with a higher education; over 18% have a higher education; 13% are under 34 years of age. Of course, Civic Coalition's electorate is located higher in the social structure (41% are managerial personnel or specialists with a higher education) and better educated (40% have a higher education), while the Confederation's electorate is much younger (40% are under 24 years of age).[3] But should we raise the voting age in order to prevent the possibility of nationalists getting into the Sejm? Should participation in elections depend on having passed the school-leaving exam? Perhaps Civic Coalition's problem, and to a certain extent Democratic Left Alliance's, too, is that they do not recognise or represent either the interests or the convictions of inhabitants of the countryside (where 39% of the population resides) or people of lower social levels (those with less education, and lower household incomes)?

Perhaps, thus, that "dark force" was tricked by Law and Justice and allowed itself to be deceived? If so, it has been a long-lasting mental disability because 94% of those who voted for Law and Justice in the parliamentary elections in 2015 chose the same party in 2019. The electoral preferences of Civic Platform's supporters in 2015 were maintained to a certain degree in 2019, when 71% voted for Civic Coalition. And the rest? Nearly 16%

[2] My own analysis of data from the CBOS survey in November 2019 on a random sample, $n = 996$.
[3] My own analysis of data from the CBOS survey in November 2019 on a random sample, $n = 996$.

of Civic Platform's voters of 2015 chose Democratic Left Alliance, and the remainder divided their votes between the Polish People's Party, the Confederation, and even Law and Justice.[4] Of what can we accuse them? Of betrayal? Of mental eclipse? Or can their electoral behaviour rather be explained by disappointment with the policies of a party they earlier supported?

I would be very careful in labelling party electorates: all are internally varied; each vote is backed by serious motivations – "serious," since the voter wanted to vote (and let us remember that nearly 38% of those entitled to vote did not bother to go to the polling station).

2. The balance sheet of the Catholic Church's activities should not omit its positive impact on the condition of civil society, which I merely mentioned in passing in my book. Believers and especially practitioners have more trust in people and greater trust in institutions, and trust is an essential element of social capital and a strong driver of civil society. Practitioners, to the highest degree, declare their readiness to help other people. Consequently, to a greater degree they work socially (voluntarily and without payment) on behalf of their community and engage in helping the needy. They are active to a greater degree in civic organisations. The Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) has many times documented these pro-civic attitudes of believers and practitioners (see Boguszewski 2016, 2018; Głowacki 2018; Grabowska 2012). It is characteristic that this research is not to be found in the news and does not reach the media and public opinion.

3. The Catholic Church as an institution and Catholicism as a confession has had a fundamental importance for Polish society – for historical reasons: I wrote extensively about it in my book. It is also obvious to many foreign authors, historians and sociologists, among others, José Casanova (1994; Polish ed. 2005) and Charles Taylor (2007). Whether that tradition survived the Second World War, the Holocaust, and communism, what survived of it and to what degree – these are the things I tried to grasp and present in my book.

Marta Bucholc raises several issues in regard to which she ascribes social attitudes to the influence of the Church, and perhaps to Catholicism: these are anti-Semitism, the attitude to refugees, moral questions such as the attitude to abortion and euthanasia, in vitro insemination, sex education, LGBT… (which have become political – in this respect I am in complete agreement with her). She criticises me for not having devoted enough

[4] My own analysis of data from the CBOS survey in November 2019 on a random sample, $n = 996$.

attention to these matters. I did not devote attention to them, it's true – I would have had to write a second book on these topics. But in response to the review, I would like to make some brief supplementary comments.

(a) I treated the attitude to abortion as an example of a moral question in which positions are affected by the influence of religiosity and the Church. Obviously, religiosity favours the rejection of abortion. But even the majority of practitioners accept the right to interrupt a pregnancy in the instances listed in the law in force: when the life or health of the mother is endangered, when the pregnancy is the result of a crime (rape, incest), or when it is known that the child will be born impaired. They do not accept abortion when a woman is in a difficult material or personal situation, or simply does not want to have a child, but the majority of non-practising persons also do not accept abortion in these situations.[5] The case is similar with rejecting euthanasia (48% reject it, practitioners much more often),[6] approbation for in vitro insemination when a married couple cannot have a child (76% approve of it, practitioners less often),[7] and sex education (84% approve of sex education in schools, practitioners less often) (see Kawalec 2019).

(b) The next issue, the attitude to LGBT people, could be dealt with in a like manner: while society has a generally unfavourable attitude towards gays and lesbians, the attitude of believers and practitioners is even worse (on a 7-point scale, where "1" signifies great dislike and "7" full acceptance, the average among the total of those surveyed was 3.53, for believers 3.40, and for practitioners, 3.23, and thus all the averages are located below the middle of the scale, and reflect dislike). The same appears in the perception of homosexuality as a deviation from the norm, and in the rejection of the possibility of two persons of the same sex entering a formal partner relationship,[8] not to mention the adoption of children. But since 2001 (when CBOS began monitoring the issue) specific opinions and the general attitude have been changing – very slowly, it is true – in the direction of slightly greater tolerance and openness towards gays and lesbians

[5] My own analysis of data from a CBOS survey in October 2016 on a random sample, $n = 937$. It should be added that although attitudes to abortion are characterised by stability, they may have undergone change since 2016 – that is, the attitudes, not their dependence on religiosity.

[6] More precisely, shortening the life of terminally ill patients at their request (see Boguszewski 2013). Also my own analysis of data from a CBOS survey in July 2013 on a random sample, $n = 1{,}005$, with the reservation that these attitudes may have changed.

[7] See Boguszewski 2015, with again the reservation that these attitudes may have changed.

[8] It should be noted that 48% of Polish society considers homosexuality to be morally reprehensible, while the societies of all the post-Soviet and post-communist countries (with the exception of the Czech Republic) condemn homosexuality to a greater or much greater degree (Estonia 64%, Latvia 68%, Lithuania 72%, and Hungary 53%). See: https://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-in-central-and-eastern-europe/, accessed 21.12.2019.

and their needs.[9] Should it be expected that the Catholic Church will act to hasten the process *in toto*? Or will its position rather attempt qualification: homosexual persons – yes; some of their rights – yes; full equality of rights for homosexual couples – no?[10]

(c) The attitude to refugees and migrants is difficult to analyse: various studies have provided varying results. In international studies, Polish society falls below the average: better than the Hungarians, but worse than the societies of Western Europe, which are friendlier to refugees.[11] In comparative studies conducted by CBOS in cooperation with research centres in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, the Poles emerge (that is, emerged) somewhat better than their neighbours: fears of an influx of refugees were strongest among Czechs and Slovaks; the majority of Hungarians, on the one hand, accepted providing shelter to refugees, on the other hand, two-thirds were against accepting refugees from the Middle East and Africa (Bożewicz 2016; Kowalczuk 2015). It should be remembered, however, that Hungary had already experienced a massive influx of refugees and the problems related with it. Poles, however, were more often inclined to offer shelter to refugees, especially refugees from Ukraine, from the territories involved in armed conflict.[12]

Nevertheless, the conclusion that it is worse elsewhere is no comfort, as the attitude to accepting refugees and the attitude to migrants has been changing over time and not for the better. In the last surveys on the subject (from 2017) 63% of the respondents (three times more than in May 2015) did not agree that Poland should accept refugees from countries involved in armed conflict (without specifying where). We do not want to accept refugees from the Middle East and Africa, and especially from Muslim countries – 74% of the respondents were against it, even if we were threatened with the loss of EU funds. On the other hand, a majority (61%) were willing to accept the inhabitants of Ukraine migrating from the territories subject to military operations (Feliksiak 2017).

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[9] My own analysis of data from a CBOS survey in April 2019 on a random sample, $n = 1{,}064$ (see also Bożewicz 2019).

[10] In the spirit of the declaration by Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, President of the Polish Episcopal Conference on 8 August 2019: people belonging to milieus of so-called sexual minorities are our brothers and sisters, for whom Christ gave his life and whom he equally wants to lead to salvation. Respect for specific persons cannot, however, lead to the acceptance of an ideology whose aim is to bring about a revolution in social mores and interpersonal relations. Pope Francis holds a similar position on the question. See https://episkopat.pl/przewodniczacy-episkopatu-o-lgbt-szacunek-do-osob-nie-moze-prowadzic-do-akceptacji-ideologii-2/, accessed 22.12.2019.

[11] See https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/09/people-around-the-world-express-more-support-for-taking-in-refugees-than-immigrants/, accessed 21.12.2019.

[12] A study in 2017 had similar findings (see Feliksiak 2017).

It is true that believers and practitioners are slightly more likely to be against Poland accepting refugees (63% of all respondents, 66% of practitioners) and accepting Muslims, even when a loss of EU funds is threatened (74% of all respondents, 75% of practitioners), but – as can be seen – these are not large differences (although they are statistically significant). In regard to accepting Ukrainians, there is no dependence on religiosity, that is, believers and practitioners do not differ from the whole of society, and, like the general population, are inclined to accept refugees from Ukraine (61% of respondents were for accepting them, 61–62% of believers and practitioners).[13]

It might be wondered whether the unfavourable change in attitudes resulted from the extensive news coverage of terrorist attacks,[14] or from the media discourse, or finally from Law and Justice policy, which consistently rejects the acceptance of refugees by our country. However, the Catholic Church has spoken many times on the question of refugees.[15] It might be wondered whether such statements were not too late, and whether the Church tried too little to change the attitudes of the faithful and, indirectly, the attitude of the whole society. Whether, given an attitude characterised by such determination (we won't accept Muslims even though we might lose by not doing so), more energetic action by the Church would have been effective, is another question.

(d) Finally, the problem of anti-Semitism. I am not competent to analyse the attitude of the Catholic Church to Judaism and the Jews. We can agree, I hope, that it has been historically variable and that it is presently better than it was in the past. In the Second Republic of Poland, in a country in which the Jewish community constituted nearly 10% of the population, slightly over 3 million people declared themselves to be of the Jewish faith and nearly 2.5 million declared Yiddish to be their native language.[16]

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[13] My own analysis of data from a CBOS survey in October 2017 on a random sample, $n = 948$.

[14] In 2015, in Paris in January and November, in 2016 in Nice in July and in Berlin in December, in 2017 in London in March and June and in Barcelona in August, in 2018 in Carcassonne and Trèbes in March and in Strasbourg in December, to mention only the most widely reported attacks in Europe.

[15] The statements and homilies of Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, President of the Polish Episcopal Conference, including on 2 July 2017, see https://episkopat.pl/abp-gadecki-w-sprawie-uchodzcow-kierunek-wskazuje-jezus-nie-politycy/, accessed 4.01.2020; the so-called Twenty Points of Activities on Migrants and Refugees: https://episkopat.pl/dwadziescia-punktow-dzialalnosci-ws-migrantow-i-uchodzcow/, accessed 4.01.2020; the Council of the PEC on Migration: a Christian should see a brother in the refugee, and not a problem (27 September 2019) see: https://episkopat.pl/rada-kep-ds-migracji-chrzescijanin-powinien-widziec-w-migrancie-brata-a-nie-problem/, accessed 4.01.2020.

[16] In the Population Census of 1931 – see: GUS RP. *Statystyka Polski*, Series C, folder 94A. Warsaw 1938, Tab. 10, p. 15.

To generalise, the Catholic Church treated Jews as outsiders, and individual hierarchs and priests approved of anti-Semitism; they viewed anti-Jewish actions (ghetto benches at universities, pogroms) with tolerance and even considered them to be manifestations of patriotism.

In 2018, a large international study was conducted, surveying 16,500 persons from 12 EU countries identifying as Jews (422 persons from Poland participated). In their appraisal – in regard to anti-Semitism – our country does not come out very well: 39% of the respondents indicated anti-Semitism to be a very large problem (many fewer than in France, fewer than in Germany and Belgium, more than in the United Kingdom and Hungary, and many more than in Denmark). The respondents (70%) consider that Poles are convinced that Jews have too much power in Poland, and that Jews make use of the Holocaust for their own aims (67%). In Poland the largest share – 32% of the respondents – were witness in the last year to other Jews being verbally insulted and/or physically attacked; 21% of the respondents had experienced insulting commentary or threats; 20% had experienced insulting commentary online and on social media; 15% had experienced insulting gestures or hostile glances (fewer than in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium; more than in Denmark, in Hungary, the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium). Most – 91% of the respondents – consider that the government is not making efforts to combat anti-Semitism.[17] Although in many respects our country does not come out that badly – and the survey is not representative – it is not possible to be indifferent to the feelings and opinions of over 400 of our fellow citizens.

In the latest CBOS survey concerning Poles' perception of Jews and Polish–Jewish relations, it is visible that the image of Jews is strongly rooted in the past, especially in the times of the Holocaust. At the same time, the ambivalent stereotype – creating admiration and resentment – of the Jew as a person with business interests, a merchant or a banker, has persisted. The majority of Poles (55%) consider that in a time of war more persons helped the Jews than reported them or murdered them. But the conviction prevails that the murders and pogroms committed by the Poles against the Jews should be remembered (many people expressed compassion for the victims and condemned the perpetrators of the crimes) (Roguska 2015). Emotional reactions to the Holocaust did not, practically, depend on the

[17] https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of antisemitism-survey_en.pdf, accessed 4.01.2020; for a Polish summary, see: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey-summary_pl.pdf, accessed 4.01.2020.

religiosity of the respondents: believers and non-believers, practising and non-practising, in equal measure expressed compassion for the victims, were moved by their fate, and as Poles felt shame at the thought of the crimes committed by Poles against Jews.[18]

It is not hard to notice that the results referred to here are not very recent. Undoubtedly, attitudes to such an important question should be monitored more systematically. A certain substitute for such monitoring is the annual CBOS survey on attitudes to nationalities (national groups, ethnic groups). The respondents are asked to rate the degree of their liking for a given national group on a 7-point scale.[19] Since the first survey in 1993, liking for the decided majority of nations has grown: in this time, the condition of Polish society improved; we entered the European Union; we began to travel. Liking for Jewish people also grew (from 15% in 1993 to 31% in 2019), although they still belong to one of the less liked groups (Omyła-Rudzka 2019). However, believers and practitioners do not differ much from the rest of society: the average on the scale for all respondents is 4.0 (which might be interpreted as indifference – neither liking nor dislike), and for both believers and practitioners 3.8 (which might be interpreted as weak dislike).[20]

For such results, what "grade" would the reviewer give Polish society, and Polish Catholics?

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The point of my response to Marta Bucholc's review is not to brandish surveys and percentages. The reviewer is not obliged to follow the results of various studies, although – I repeat – it is typical that she knows and refers to certain data and not to others. Certain findings do not make their way into the media and public opinion. Confirmation of the anti-Semitism of Polish society always finds a place in the news, while the finding that the attitude to Jews is improving does not.

However, it is clear that:

- first, Polish society had and has its moments of glory, of praiseworthy events, and its dark moments, its shameful events, while on a daily basis it exhibits various shades of greyness;

[18] My own analysis of data from a CBOS survey in July 2015 on a random sample, $n = 1044$.
[19] On a scale where "1" indicates dislike and "7" liking.
[20] My own analysis of a CBOS survey in January 2019 on a random sample, $n = 928$.

- second, the Catholic Church influences attitudes and opinions – in some spheres very strongly and in others weakly; but
- third, the faithful of the Catholic Church, even those who practise systematically, do not constitute an army that votes as the leader commands. They do not have uniform convictions; they are different, and sometimes they are critical of the Church as an institution. The expectation that the Church will change mere mortals into angels is a naïve expectation;
- fourth, institutionally the Church is not free of sin. Sometimes, maybe at present, it lacks outstanding leaders: charismatic leaders, intellectuals and theologists, moral authorities, social activists and politicians. Well, there are fat years and lean years, just as in science, and at the university. Should we withdraw our reverence for and faith in the university as an institution because in a given place and time it is doing poorly? Charisma and talent cannot be planned; neither the university nor the Church can be "managed" in such a way as to achieve those things. The only thing to do is to do one's bit and wait – the faithful can pray.

To conclude, I would like to make an appeal and offer thanks. Marta Bucholc writes that the image of Poland I present is different from "the one we know from the daily news." It is different – I treat that as a compliment. At the same time, I want to appeal to everyone interested in the subject: we should rely less on the news and more on our own observations and experiences, and more on research. And I sincerely want to thank the reviewer: in a time when other people's books are not read – maybe their articles but not their books – Marta Bucholc disinterestedly, from pure scholarly motivations, read my book and wrote a review that inspired me to dig out numerous surveys and to clarify my position, for myself and I hope for others.

Transl. Michelle Granas

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RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY FOR A NEW, MEDIATISED WORLD

MARTA KOŁODZIEJSKA, *ONLINE CATHOLIC COMMUNITIES: COMMUNITY, AUTHORITY, AND RELIGIOUS INDIVIDUALISATION*

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The book opens with the description of an image comparing Saint Peter's Square in 2005 and 2013. In the photo from 2005, the people are simply standing, their backs turned towards the photographer. The image from 2013, while showing a similarly composed scene, shines in the glow of smartphone screens. Nearly all the visitors, not being satisfied with merely looking at what is before their own eyes, are photographing or filming what they see. This image, which is mentioned at the very beginning of Marta Kołodziejska's *Online Catholic Communities: Community, Authority, and Religious Individualisation*, sets the scene. The author describes a world in which experience (including religious experience) is becoming increasingly mediatised. Even personal, immediate experience is transformed by the introduction of new media, changing our relationship with the world around us. Furthermore, due to the proliferation of personalised digital devices, the division between online and offline worlds has stopped making sense; these realities, which are no longer distinct (if they ever were), constantly merge.

In *Online Catholic Communities*, Kołodziejska describes how religious communities function in this highly digital modern context. She presents

Catholic Internet discussion boards as an example of a new type of religious medium, which has emerged in step with the expansion of the Internet. Her work marries detailed description of a very specific research subject with broader reflection on the transformation of religion in today's world. In an analysis well-grounded in both theoretical reflection and empirical evidence, she investigates Internet forums in the context of the individualisation of religion, its mediatisation, and transformations of religious authority. She argues that Catholic discussion boards, which are based on sharing religious knowledge and its interpretations, allow for the emergence of both grassroots religious experts and new types of communication communities within the Church.

Adopting Susan Herring's approach of computer-mediated discourse analysis (CMDA), Kołodziejska frames her research questions in a particular way. First, she shifts attention from communities defined as static objects towards a more processual approach, which allows for a more nuanced analysis. Thus, it is not enough to ask, "Is this group a community?" It should rather be asked at what level a group constitutes a community. Furthermore, she identifies the construction of authority as an important part of the process of community building. Consequently, her main research questions could be summarised as follows: (1) how is religious authority constructed on forums?; (2) what levels of community building can be identified on forums?; and (3) how can these specific types of communities be placed in the broader context of modern religion, especially in regard to its individualisation?

Kołodziejska's analysis is based on the study of three Polish-language Catholic Internet message boards. The study was conducted using qualitative research methods – namely, discourse analysis supplemented with online questionnaires and personal interviews with the most active users. Kołodziejska followed debates in chosen threads, identifying moments of conflict and the exercise of authority.

However, before she proceeds to answer her research questions, she offers a comprehensive overview of the state of religion today, as well as the theoretical current in which she works. She begins these introductory remarks by discussing the development of sociological reflection on the transformation of religion and religiosity, focusing primarily on the theory of secularisation in Karel Dobbelaere's version. For Kołodziejska, the main factor driving the transformation of religious communities and religious authority is individualisation. By this she means both the pluralisation of religious options (the proliferation of religious denominations and

the growing numbers of non-believers), as well as a more and more pronounced "pick and choose" tendency within the Church. While the process of religious individualisation appeared well before the development of the Internet, it has been further amplified by the mediatisation of religion and the growth of online religious content. This does not mean that the relationship between the Internet and traditional religious authority is straightforwardly adversarial. Digitalisation does not always result in institutions losing their power. On the contrary, religious authorities can (and do) use the Internet for their own goals. Kołodziejska shows at length the Church's responses to the Internet and its challenges. Nevertheless, while the relation between the Internet and authority may be more complex than has traditionally been thought, it can be said that the emergence of alternative religious communication channels is closely tied with the process of individualisation.

Having characterised modern religiosity as more and more individualised, Kołodziejska turns to online communities. She proposes analysing them as processes by describing specific observable dimensions of the community. This allows the features of online communities to be taken into account: the constant flux of members, with a more rapid rate of change than in offline communities, and the detachment from traditional boundaries of territory, kinship, and so forth. Furthermore, Kołodziejska describes them as communication communities, bound by practices rather than by values or structures. This processual and discursive concept of community is rooted in works by theorists such as Gerard Delanty, Zygmunt Bauman, and Michel Maffesoli. It is also compatible with contemporary thinking on the changes in the religious landscape, particularly with Heidi Campbell's notion of networked religion. The Internet, while offering space for a particular type of community (networked, malleable, individualistic, flexible), is not detached from offline structures, institutions, and communities. Using the Internet can either empower established communities or undermine them.

Following this grounding in sociological theory, the core of the book contains empirical data from Kołodziejska's own research. She analyses the exchanges on the micro level, often quoting extensive passages from online debates and investigating them in detail. The first part is devoted to the construction of authority online, the second to establishing the symbolic boundaries of online communities.

In the online Catholic forums studied by Kołodziejska, authority is based on religious knowledge, that is, on a person's proficiency in referring

to sacred texts, to dogmas and tenets of the faith, or to religious institutions. This kind of knowledge-based authority is constructed and referenced in online exchanges. Religious knowledge is used in two main contexts: in giving advice or offering support in private matters (such as marital problems), and in more theoretical "source book" debates on dimensions of religious authority (the topics range from the meaning of specific Bible passages, through inter-religious dialogue, to incongruences between religious and scientific worldviews). Knowledge may be deployed for various (informational, persuasive, or confrontational) purposes.

These types of interactions result in the emergence of informal religious experts, who have demonstrated their knowledge of specific areas (such as Canon Law, Church teachings on a specific subject, or other religious denominations) and are recognised by other Internet users. Usually, the offline identities of the participants have no bearing on their authority online (especially since forums, in contrast to social media, are largely anonymous). While informal experts may be considered religious authorities independent of the official Church structure, they do not challenge it. A double-framing of authority occurs: top-down (ascribed) and bottom-up (achieved) authority exists concurrently.

In fact, due to their extensive knowledge, informal experts often serve as intermediaries between traditional sources of religious authority and other users. They interpret texts and offer guidance in understanding them. Informal religious experts cannot be considered a replacement for traditional authorities, but they perform a different role, vital for the religious self-empowerment of forum users. The online exchanges tracked by Kołodziejska served to further the democratisation and individualisation of religious knowledge in two main ways. First, informal experts share their knowledge, making it accessible to those who do not possess the skills or resources necessary to acquire it themselves. And second, while often acting as advocates of official Church positions, they have no control over the practical application of their advice, leading to the valorisation of personal (informed) choice. This is especially pertinent in regards to practical matters debated on forums, such as the use of contraceptives, and sexual morals in general. The informal experts generally cite relevant passages from the Canon Law and other Church documents, but they also emphasise the role of conscience in individual decisions.

Similarly, just as informal experts do not explicitly challenge the traditional hierarchy, online communities do not aim to replace offline ones (although dissatisfaction with the latter is often expressed). They supplement

it by offering a different mode of religious communication. Kołodziejska devotes the final part of her work to showing the dimensions of community that can be observed on Catholic forums. Conforming with the model of communication communities, their boundaries are established discursively and symbolically. Symbolic boundaries are constructed online to differentiate between various user groups within forums, with the segmentation based mainly on the interpretation of sources of knowledge and underlying worldviews. These communities are not solid; alliances are constantly formed around certain interpretations of sources of knowledge, and they dissolve and reform when the topic of debate changes. In contrast to offline religious communities, which tend to be stable, their online counterparts are constantly in motion, detached from any kind of material anchoring. However, this does not mean that the symbolic boundaries are established chaotically: the same groupings appear again and again. On the forums studied by Kołodziejska, the division between the "(anti) religious rebels" (who view religion as subject to scientific understanding or rationality) and the "rigourists" (who understand religion as reality *sui generis*) systematically reappeared. In addition to these internal boundaries, the division between the forum as a whole and "ordinary Catholics" (as a negatively valorised group of reference) was established.

The book offers an insight into how the growing importance of the Internet as a medium for religious content affects the way in which religious authority is constructed, and what consequences it can have for religious communities. The digital nature of online communities amplifies processes that can also be observed in offline religious groups, making the former especially useful subjects for analysis. Throughout her work, Kołodziejska presents online Catholic forums as inherently individualistic. They are founded for the dissemination of knowledge to the benefit of individuals, not the community; they focus on the expression of opinions and emotions; their membership is based on people's personal decisions to join or leave.

Kołodziejska's work succeeds in no small part because of her well-chosen research material. Online Catholic discussion boards prove to be communities encapsulating important developments in mediatised religion. Yet the author's discourse on her own data occasionally feels defensive, as if she were excusing herself for studying discussion boards and not trendier topics, such as social media. This seems entirely unnecessary because, although these types of online communities may be losing popularity to other platforms, they still constitute an interesting research object, as the

book attests. In fact, being closer to providing an "ideal type" of Internet interaction (anonymous, flexible, with no fixed boundaries, independent of offline constraints) than social media, discussion boards may provide better material for grasping the specificity of online communities.

The strength of Kołodziejska's book lies in her integration of its parts – her ability to inscribe her own research object into the broad context of studies on the transformations of modern Catholicism. Detailed analysis is never detached from theoretical considerations. While the excerpts from forum debates are discussed at great detail, the book never strays too far from its main argument. The empirical data is always there for a reason: to illuminate the crucial processes of individualisation and mediatisation. At the same time, the data does not function merely as an example of familiar social phenomena. Kołodziejska's analysis sheds new light on the transformation of religion in today's world, mainly by presenting how authority is established in online religious communities. The image of communities based on the dissemination of knowledge and interpretation of religious sources (primary texts such as the Bible or the Catechism, but also recent statements of institutional authorities), and the ensuing democratisation of religious knowledge, are especially pertinent.

Working in a well-defined research tradition, Kołodziejska envisions her book as a building block in a broader project. As she puts it herself, its "general conclusions contribute to the body of research by adding another piece to the puzzle" (2018: 59). There is little doubt that it serves this purpose well. This writing strategy provides *Online Catholic Communities: Community, Authority, and Religious Individualisation* with a singular focus and decidedly advances its main argument.

At the same time, the "puzzle" approach positions the book not as a self-contained work but rather as an element of a greater whole, leaving some questions unanswered. First, by focusing on the inner workings of online communities, Kołodziejska largely leaves open the question of how Catholic forums fit in the larger picture of the religious experience of their users (although she did write more about the relationship between forums and offline communities in one of her earlier research articles (with Neumaier, 2016)). Second, it could be beneficial to situate religious online communities in the context of other modes of digital interaction. Kołodziejska does reference sociological theory on online communities, but there is little direct comparison between religious communities and those coming together in connection with other interests. For now, in regard to religious

online communities, we cannot be sure which features result from their religiosity and which from their online character.

Some of the editorial decisions further amplify the need to consider *Online Catholic Communities* as part of a broader project rather than a standalone work. It should be read together with the author's research articles, which are cited throughout the book, as is especially visible when the discussion on methodology is relegated to a footnote, with reference to an outside source. While the decision not to repeat information presented previously is understandable, it may lead to the omission of important details.

In the end, *Online Catholic Communities* is a concise, focused work, pursuing a well-defined research objective. It supplies a deep analysis of a specific type of community, illuminating transformations of religion in the contemporary world. The author's investigation of how religious authority is established in the online context is especially novel and worth considering. And while she does not try to paint a comprehensive picture of networked, multi-site religion, her conclusions may have far-reaching application. If, as Campbell suggested, "the features of religion online closely mirror changes within the practice of religion in contemporary society" (2012: 65), then studying those processes in an online context might prove crucial for a scholarly understanding of the modern religious landscape. For this reason, *Online Catholic Communities* is surely a valuable addition to the study of digital religion, and religion in general; as such, it is vital reading for scholars in the field.

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WORK, GENDER, AND THE LAITY: NORMS AND THEIR REPRODUCTION IN THE CHURCH

KATARZYNA LESZCZYŃSKA, *PŁEĆ W INSTYTUCJE UWIKŁANA. REPRODUKOWANIE WZORCÓW KOBIECOŚCI I MĘSKOŚCI PRZEZ ŚWIECKIE KOBIETY I ŚWIECKICH MĘŻCZYZN W ORGANIZACJACH ADMINISTRACYJNO-EWANGELIZACYJNYCH KOŚCIOŁA RZYMSKOKATOLICKIEGO W POLSCE*

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With the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church turned towards lay people. At least theoretically, such people were to play an important role in renewing and updating (*aggiornamento*) the Church organisation and community. What is their status at present? What is the actual position of lay women in the Church? Katarzyna Leszczyńska's book *Płeć w instytucje uwikłana* [Gender entangled in institutions], which was published in 2016, contributes to answering these questions.

The subject of the book is the reproduction of gender patterns by lay men and women working within the structures of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. As her research problem, Leszczyńska asks how the employees of the Church's administrative and evangelising organisations present the norms of masculinity and femininity, what have been the experiences and activities of the respondents in the gender context, and what strategies they adopt to deal with the divergence between the models and

their daily experience and practices. This last question is also associated with a query about the kinds of gender models that are reproduced by the Church's lay employees. Leszczyńska analyses data collected during in-depth interviews concerning these three questions (the perception of norms, personal experiences, and reproducing norms and harmonising them with practices and experiences). The theoretical bases of the work are concepts from the field of gender studies, new institutionalism, and social agency.

/// Gender and the Church as Elements of the Public Discourse in Poland

In Poland, the subject of gender and the Church arouses not only media discussions but also the interest of artists and academics. Gender has become an important category in speaking of discrimination (for instance, in regard to employment and pay), human rights, or abuse. Mention might also be made of the debates on public policy in regard to the care of small children, where the category of gender plays a significant role, or the discussion of feminine forms in the Polish language, which has been particularly prominent in the media in Poland in recent months.

In terms of equality of the sexes, Poland comes out poorly in comparison with other European Union countries: according to indicators of the equal rights of the sexes prepared by the European Institute for Gender Equality, Poland is in twenty-fourth place in the EU (out of the then twenty-eight member countries).[1] The voice of women in the Polish public sphere is strong, however. In 2016 a new initiative on behalf of women emerged: Polish Women on Strike. It began as a protest against making the law on abortion more restrictive. It is worth adding that the Polish initiative gave rise to International Women's Strike.[2]

The Church itself is an important subject of debate in Poland. According to Pew Research Center, 87% of Poles consider themselves to be Catholics (Pew Research Center 2017: 52). In addition, 64% of the country's citizens claim that being a Catholic is very or moderately important for truly being a Pole (ibid.: 12). The Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) conducts research concerning Poles' appraisal of the position of the Catholic Church in Poland.

[1] Data of the Gender Equality Index for 2019 (from the year 2017): https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2019, accessed 8.12.2019.

[2] See more at International Women's Strike, http://parodemujeres.com/, accessed 28.12.2019.

The proportion of those who considered that position to be good remained stable at above 50% in the years 2013–2018. 2019 was the first year since 2013 in which the rate fell below that level: in May it was at 48%; in June it returned to a level above 50% (53%); and it fell again in July to 48% (CBOS 2019b: 17). The problem with the Catholic Church in Poland most commonly indicated by the respondents was paedophilic behaviour by members of the clergy (60%). In second place was the Church's engagement in politics, which was indicated by 37% of respondents (CBOS 2019a: 3).

In her book, Leszczyńska addresses both questions, which are prominent, controversial, and simultaneously very important on account of their continual presence in the public discourse in Poland. In studying gender and the Church organisation she adopted an intersectional approach, and this is one of the good points of the work. She thus produced an in-depth scholarly study, and her findings not only clarify the position of lay women in Church organisations, but she also shows the universal mechanisms that create social norms.

/// A Book on Gender, Institutions, Work, and Lay People

Leszczyńska's book can be divided into four parts, although she does not introduce such a division. In the first, which is composed of three sections, she outlines the theoretical background of her research. The second portion of the book is a single chapter reconstructing the Church's narrative on gender on the basis of the formal rules prevailing in the Church. The third part, which is also one chapter, is a description of the research methodology used. The final, fourth part, comprising chapters six through nine, is an analysis of the empirical material.

The title of the book seems to refer to another work in the area of gender studies: *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (Butler 1990). In the title of Judith Butler's book, gender appears as the active and creative side, while in Leszczyńska's title it is the opposite – it appears passive and created. From the book we know that Leszczyńska is sceptical about the premises of "Butlerite" feminism and therefore the title might be treated as an expression of her attitude towards that current. In appreciating the work of both authors, I will allow myself yet to read both titles as indicative of the ubiquity of gender and the possibility of its appearance in two different roles: active and passive. Gender can entrap and subjugate

an individual and at the same time can itself be dominated and shaped by people and their institutions.

There are not many publications that discuss the reproduction of gender models. There are more works concerning the reproduction of social structures in general. The small collection of the former includes articles by Tatiana Barchunova (2003) and Beverley Skeggs (1988), and now this book by Leszczyńska.

Leszczyńska shows that both men and women reproduce gender roles and rules, and thus they contribute to preserving models of femininity and masculinity, while acts of subversion or transgression – that is, of resistance and change – are rarely attempted. *Płeć w instytucje uwikłana* is also a publication devoted to institutions, which are understood as social rules made present in actions. For Leszczyńska, gender is one such institution. Furthermore, she writes about the usefulness of new institutionalism in studying gender and, more broadly, the usefulness of the institutional approach to gender, as an alternative to identity concepts. She additionally tries to define the place of the gender category in religious studies.

The study was conducted in an unusual place, and its participants are also out of the ordinary. For her research, Leszczyńska chose a group of lay people who declare their ties to the Church and religious faith. Her respondents work in institutions of the Catholic Church, which is treated here as an employer. The interviews were conducted in the workplaces of the respondents. The *genius loci* and the lay status of the respondents recur repeatedly in the book as a background to the narrative about gender. Thus the book can be considered a sociological account of lay people in the Church, while it also throws light on working conditions in Church organisations and the relations that exist there.

/// Norms, Experience, and Agential Reproduction: The Research Findings

Leszczyńska conducted fifty individual in-depth interviews with lay employees of fifteen diocesan curias (for instance, the secretariats and offices of curias, departments, committees, episcopal courts, and media belonging to diocesan information organs) and entities of the Polish Bishops' Conference (for example, secretariats, councils, and commissions). Thirty-one women and nineteen men, who were specially selected, participated in the qualitative study, which was conducted in the years 2012–2013.

In the empirical part, Leszczyńska first relates what the respondents themselves understand by "being a woman" or "being a man." It emerges that femininity and masculinity are subjected by the respondents to essentialisation and naturalisation. This means that in their consciousnesses, there is a binary division into men and women, and the source of male and female traits is nature. A human being has no influence over these traits (Leszczyńska 2016: 189–190). Femininity is associated chiefly with emotionality directed at another human being, and thus is characterised by, for instance, empathy or love. At the same time, the respondents emphasise that women experience emotion intensely, which is manifested in effusiveness or anxiety. Masculinity, on the other hand, is connected with rationality, action, and individualism (Leszczyńska 2016: 190–193).

Regardless of their gender, the lay functionaries of the Church in their understanding of masculine and feminine roles remain in accord with the teachings of their employer and adopt the Church's point of view.[3] For instance, the women consider that men are by nature more proper persons to fulfil important roles within the Church (as deacons, administrators, ministrants, or curial specialists). Only when there is a lack of men can women be delegated to fulfil such functions.

Leszczyńska explains the state of affairs as follows: "The conditional acceptance of women in the Church administrative structures, with the simultaneous distancing from femininity in various Church functions, can be explained in terms of gender queues (*labour queue theory* [emphasis added])" (Leszczyńska 2016: 210). In my opinion, this conclusion is too far reaching. I sense that the views and practices revealed during the study can solely be considered an empirical reflection of gender queues, whose existence is noted in labour queue theory. An explanation of the "conditional acceptance" of women's fulfilling important roles in the Church would be an answer – which Leszczyńska does not give – to the question of why this occurs.

The author's analysis of the respondents' experiences reveals the partial mismatch between those experiences and the models in the respondents' consciousnesses. For example, not all the women had managed to fulfil the model of a woman as a housewife, caring for her husband and children. The stories of curial specialists' experiences of being overworked, because

[3] Leszczyńska reviews the Church's teaching on gender, and not solely the roles of men and women in the Church, based on her own analysis of Church documents (the Catholic Code of Canon Law, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, papal encyclicals, the letters and documents of the Polish Episcopate).

as unmarried women they are given extra, after-hours tasks to do, are also interesting. This type of story shows that an institution whose model of femininity is based on being a wife and mother, paradoxically does not give singles the opportunity to begin following that model.

The Catholic lay people, when faced with the disparities between their own experiences and the models, try to justify those disparities, to legitimise or overcome them. Leszczyńska interprets their methods of dealing with a contradictory situation, as revealed in their narratives, in categories of gender strategies. Their strategies involve various practices in which Leszczyńska sees primarily a reproduction mechanism.

She does not exclude the possibility of the transformative potential of the strategies but she assigns it lesser importance: "In these strategies, I am looking first for various practices directed at maintaining the normatively interpretative imaginative models, and then, in second place, for practices that can be read as transforming those norms or freeing them" (Leszczyńska 2016: 266).

However, in both cases, those practices have an agential nature. "I interpret these strategies […] in categories of reproducing the practices of models of femininity and masculinity, perceiving in them an agential potential, seeing in the lay people actors participating in creating gender rules and not solely their passive recipients," writes Leszczyńska (ibid.: 265). Intuitively, we might associate agency rather with transformation than with stabilising the existing order. In Leszczyńska's opinion, though, the activities of individuals maintain the norms and models, and in this way the maintaining is agential. Agential actions need not be reflective or intentional (ibid.: 85–86). Individuals need not know that they are causing something to happen.

Leszczyńska's position is not obvious, as she emphasises herself (ibid.: 82–85), but similar ideas can be found in the existing literature. This position is part of the debate on the conditions of agency, which oscillates around the following questions: (1) are actions agential only if they are directed at changing the status quo?; (2) are actions agential only if they are reflective and intentional?

Some authors link agency with intentionality, reflexivity, and opposition to the status quo. In what is probably the only collective work on the Polish market devoted to the sociological category of agency (Mrozowicki et al. 2013), we can find these connections simply by looking at the table of contents (there are numerous references to reflexivity in the titles of the works). Leszczyńska mentions the work of Butler, or, in Poland, of Magda-

lena Nowicka, as examples of understandings of agency that are contrary to her own (2016: 82).

On the other hand, Anthony Giddens, for instance, offers a view of agency that is closer to Leszczyńska's: "For Giddens, structure and agency imply each other. Structure is *enabling* [original italics], not just constraining, and makes creative action possible, but the repeated actions of many individuals work to reproduce and change the social structure" (Giddens & Sutton 2014: 56). Apparent passivity and repetition can thus be agential. Agency consists here in both reproduction and in changing the norm. The cited portion of Giddens and Sutton's work evokes one further problematic question concerning agency – its status in regard to the social structure – which was addressed by, among others, Pierre Bourdieu, Margaret Archer, and Anthony Giddens (ibid.: 52–58), Adam Mrozowicki (2010), and Agnieszka Trąbka (2016).

From a cursory review of the sociological literature in both Polish and English it can be concluded that a view of agency as an action which is not necessarily subversive or transgressive and need not be intentional is slowly gaining in popularity. Such a view is held by Leszczyńska, by the abovementioned Giddens, by Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische (1998), and also by Laura M. Leming (2007).

/// Intersectional Insight into the Reproduced Institution, or, on the Methodology of the Work

One of the very good points of Leszczyńska's research is its theoretical basis and methodology, which might be used in university courses as model examples of the qualitative research process. Leszczyńska's research process did not involve the automatic application of some template. On the contrary, she shows how to formulate and apply an appropriate methodology, to conduct the research process to its conclusion, to indicate the drawbacks and difficulties involved, and at the same time to write a good book.

The publication could thus be a good supplement not only for academic courses in research methods or the conduct of projects but also for (self-)education in academic writing. Several of her methodological and conceptualising actions and steps are worthy of emphasis: (1) the conceptualisation of gender as an institution; (2) departure from the assumption that the institution of gender is reproduced, and not the structure or the social order, by means of gender; (3) the use of an intersectional perspective; and (4) non-involvement in the meanders of grounded theory.

Gender as an Institution

Leszczyńska bases her analysis on the theoretical framework of new institutionalism, which differentiates institutions from organisations. The use of the term "institution" in the book refers to gender, not to the Church, which, in the paradigm of new institutionalism, instead of being an institution should rather be given the status of an organisation (see Jessop 2001: 1220). It is the institution of gender and not the Church organisation that is the main subject of the analysis. In adopting the institutional paradigm and the definition of an institution it has shaped, it is possible, in Leszczyńska's view, to overcome the practice of treating gender exclusively as a system of oppression and to recognise it as a socially created institution (2016: 36). Gender would be, as she writes herself, the normative context of activities which could simultaneously be shaped by social actors (ibid.: 35). In essence, the institutional approach allows Leszczyńska to conceptualise gender innovatively: not as oppression, but contrarily, as having agential potential (on the subject of the category of agency in Leszczyńska's book, see above).

Premises about Gender Reproduction

In contrast to the authors of certain classic works (Bourdieu & Passeron 1990; Giddens 2001), Leszczyńska draws attention to the process of reproduction of a particular institution and not a social structure (which depending on the author is understood slightly differently but primarily as a system of distances and social hierarchies). Her approach may seem slightly similar to that of Giddens, in which human practices play an important role in reproducing the social structure. Giddens (2001) devotes considerable attention to the creation of the practices themselves, but he simultaneously points to the influence they have on shaping structures (of the system).

Leszczyńska does not investigate the role of gender practices in creating structure and order; she stays at the level of analysing the process of creating the practices or institution (depending on the nomenclature adopted). This seems to be a less common approach in the sociological literature than analysing the creation of the structure. The adoption of such a research conception is closely related with Leszczyńska's other method, that is, the above-mentioned conceptualisation of gender as an institution.

Intersectionality

The creator of the concept of intersectionality, Kimberlé Crenshaw, defines the intersectional approach as "methodology" in one of her articles (Crenshaw 1991: 1244, footnote 9), thus Leszczyńska's use of the category should be considered to be a methodological procedure. In interpreting Crenshaw, Justyna Struzik explains the sense of an intersectional analysis in the following manner: "an intersectional analysis […] emphasises the necessity of taking into account the many social categories that are basic for the shaping of identity in reflecting on roles, experiences, or social practices" (2014: 237).

Kaja Zapędowska-Kling adopts a very similar understanding of intersectional analysis: "An intersectional analysis assumes the interpenetration and simultaneous mutual influence of various social categories […]. The essence of an intersectional analysis is simultaneously taking account of the many variables that, overlapping and interfering with each other, form individualised biographies and, it follows, an individualised social risk" (Zapędowska-Kling 2017: 22). Elsewhere, we find the statement that "An intersectional analysis involves the parallel analysis of multiple, intersecting sources of subjugation/oppression. It is based on the premise that the influence of a given source of subjugation could vary depending on its connection with other potential sources of subjugation (or privilege)" (Denis 2008: 667). We can thus see that even though the idea of intersectionality is used in various contexts (for instance, identities and experiences, social risk, relations of subordination), it serves to clarify the role of connections between socio-demographic traits and their being taken into account in research.

Leszczyńska's use of the concept of intersectionality was in itself unusually fitting. The mechanisms situating lay women in the Church structures are better described by diverse socio-demographic categories and by the lay women's experiences in combination rather than individually.

In the study, what most strongly seems to condition the position of a given Church employee is gender and belonging to the laity – viewed intersectionally, of course, with the mutual connections. Those connections become visible in Chapter 6 and in part of Chapter 8, when Leszczyńska describes the earnings of the Church's lay employees, both men and women, and their location in positions of power (2016: 241–254). These passages show that the small proportion of women holding important Church

functions may not be conditioned solely by gender but also by belonging to the laity.

However, according to Leszczyńska, the intersectional connection becomes visible in another place: "at the meeting point of position in the structure, age, and family situation" (ibid.: 226). Although age or family situation could indeed condition the experience or situation of women in the Church structures, the mutual interaction of these socio-demographic categories does not emerge from the research material as distinctly as the connection of gender with belonging to the laity. That connection could have been brought to the foreground, because in reality it is the leitmotif of the book. The title itself reveals that the book will be about lay people in connection with their gender.

Nevertheless, a clear indication of the intersectional relation of gender and status in the Church is only to be found in the portion in which Leszczyńska discusses formal norms and legal arrangements (ibid.: 121). In many places, the intersectional connections become visible, but they are left without commentary. Readers who are not acquainted with the category of intersectionality might not be aware of them. It would seem, therefore, that the potential of an intersectional analysis was not fully utilised.

The Problem of Grounded Theory

In analysing the research material, Leszczyńska freely refers to the theoretical concepts she adopted before the study, and also to others, which she did not mention earlier. In this regard, her work seems at times to be an example of the use of grounded theory, and yet it is not. Leszczyńska explains in detail that the methodology she adopted was the result of a synthesis of two models of "understanding the social experiences" of people: from outside (from the viewpoint of the observer) and from inside (from the viewpoint of the group).

Two different theoretical-methodological approaches are associated with these models: the deductive and inductive, respectively (grounded theory can be placed within the inductive approach). Leszczyńska's approach is neither purely one nor the other, but a synthesis of the two. She departs in fact from certain theoretical premises but at the same time she creates new formulations of a theoretical nature and modifies the premises in response to the data obtained during the research process (see ibid.: 130–131).

"I note, with some concern, that 'grounded theory' is often used as rhetorical sleight of hand by authors who are unfamiliar with qualitative research and who wish to avoid close description or illumination of their methods" – thus Roy Suddaby (2006: 633) expresses his dissatisfaction with an overly trivial treatment of grounded theory. In this light, Leszczyńska's awareness of the sense of grounded theory and reluctance to describe her own research by that term is indubitably one of the virtues of the work.

/// What Else? Other Strong and Weak Points of the Work

The book contains many other interesting theoretical or methodological categories in addition to those mentioned above (the patriarchal dividend, Erving Goffman's phenomenological framework concepts, Alfred Schütz's typification, and the idea of gender domains). There is no room to discuss them all. I will just mention a few of the book's other advantages and drawbacks, which fall outside of research methodology: the author's critical thinking about theory and her openness in describing how the work arose (these are advantages), and the work's apsychologism (a defect).

Leszczynska's criticial thinking about the state of theory and gender studies research is undoubtedly one of the strong sides of the book. In Leszczyńska's opinion, the limitations of gender studies concepts to this time appear in their weak link to general sociology, excessive empiricalisation, and the perception of gender relations in religious institutions solely in categories of oppression, the authority of men over women, and the marginalising situation of women in society.

In addition, as Leszczyńska writes,

> In my perception these concepts [she precedes the statement by a reference to the concepts of Michel Foucault and Judith Butler], which are applied on the basis of traditional studies of social orders, such as religions and the people within them, provide grounds for a paradoxical androcentric perspective, reproducing the conviction of one correct model of emancipation and liberation, namely, the individualistically understood subversion of gender norms, that is, exclusively from the viewpoint of values identified with stereotypical masculinity (2016: 223).

The criticism itself could, obviously, be criticised; nevertheless, questioning the premises of what sociological circles consider to be mainstream

premises of gender studies must have cost Leszczyńska some effort and required some courage, and furthermore, it constitutes a departure point for a wider debate about the justifiability of those concepts.

Leszczyńska makes another brief and thus modest comment that is not precisely critical but is similarly valuable from the academic standpoint: she notices that in light of the approach she adopts to institutions, gender, and their social reproduction, the traditional definitions of the Church proposed by writers of classic works on the sociology of religion (Joachim Wach, Günter Kehrer, Ernst Troeltsch) may have become out of date. They emphasise the weight of formal norms, "the role of Church functionaries, centralisation, and hierarchisation" in constructing these definitions, and they omit the importance of actors which fulfil subsidiary functions in the Church understood as an organisation and institution (ibid.: 144).

Another advantage of the work is that Leszczyńska does not smooth over the difficulties she met during her research process and in compiling the book. She writes, for instance, about ethical questions, including the issue of double loyalty (towards the respondents and scholarship), relations with the respondents, the anonymisation of data (ibid.: 148–152), or the possibility of overinterpreting the respondents' statements (ibid.: 298). She is also not uncritical in regard to her own methodology (ibid.: 298–299).

As to defects, Leszczyńska warns readers, for example, that she does not perceive the single women's "familiarisation" of work in the Church structures as a need resulting from a single life, where work would be a substitute for a household and family ties. She treats it rather as a strategy for "achieving conventional femininity" (ibid.: 277), by being warm, pleasant, and interested in the other employees and in the workplace. But why should one exclude the other?

Moreover, during reading I wondered how much the statements and convictions of the respondents are psychologically conditioned. I will cite the remark of Agata, a participant in the study: "my ideal would be a fellow who would say 'I said so and that's that.' I would be able to submit to a just authority. And for me, a guy is a guy. A father, someone responsible, who does what he says he'll do" (quoted after Leszczyńska 2016: 212). This method of shaping the ideal of masculinity by women did not appear particularly often (at least in the statements quoted by Leszczyńska it was not visible). Nevertheless, Agata's statement inclines the reader to think about individual factors (personal experiences, deprivations, or identity dilemmas). Leszczyńska, however, does not refer in the book to possible

psychological explanations, which is a lacuna in an otherwise well-framed theoretical and methodological framework.

In the book, we certainly do not find a catalogue of models that are reproduced and those that undergo modification due to the actions of the respondents. Such information might be extracted from the interviews quoted, but no summary is given that would synthetically answer the question of what models are reproduced. From the Conclusion it would seem solely that the gender models functioning in Church teaching and at the same time largely characterising Western society are reproduced (Leszczyńska 2016: 293).

In reading the book I had the impression that we do not learn what gender models are created by the respondents but rather we better understand the processes of the reproduction of norms and gender rules. It might be learned, for instance, at what stage of dialogue with the norm the gender models are created, at what stages there is potential for their negotiation, and about the non-obvious meaning of agency (agency need not be connected with reflexivity).

The book is worth reading, especially if the reader is a person interested in the subject of gender, work, and the Church. It is understood that drawbacks are unvoidable, but the book has many advantages: an interesting, mature, and appropriate methodology, an intriguing and little-studied research problem, and a critique contributing to the discussion on the subject of theoretical and methodological gender and feminist studies. Leszczyńska's research methods are good enough that the book could be used for teaching, and her conceptualisation of research and analysis of the interviews aptly shows the mechanisms by which all kinds of social norms are created, not solely gender ones.

Leszczyńska managed to collect a significant amount of research material and to submit it to multidimensional, appropriate interpretation, even though the subject is difficult and hard to research. During analysis it is possible to assign people meanings they did not intend, to overinterpret answers in the context of theory, to let one's own experience deform the analysis, or to meet with silence on the part of the respondents and not obtain the minimal confidence necessary to discuss topics that might be sensitive for them. Thus all the more homage is due to Leszczyńska for having undertaken such research and for publishing it in the form of a very accessible book.

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RIGHTS IN CRISIS

KRZYSZTOF JASKUŁOWSKI, *THE EVERYDAY POLITICS OF MIGRATION CRISIS IN POLAND: BETWEEN NATIONALISM, FEAR AND EMPATHY*

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Krzysztof Jaskulowski's *The Everyday Politics of Migration Crisis in Poland: Between Nationalism, Fear and Empathy*, published by Palgrave Macmillan, appeared at the beginning of 2019. The book is the first extensive qualitative study of Poles' attitudes towards the so-called migration crisis. As the work addresses one of the greatest political questions of recent years, it will likely have a wide impact on the scholarly debate on prejudices and Polish identity.

Jaskułowski writes of a "so-called" migration crisis because he does not agree with the label of crisis for the political events and decisions that have shaped the European Union's (EU) and Poland's current migration policies. He is interested in the years 2015–2016, when a record number of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa arrived in the EU to seek shelter from persecution, war, or poverty. In the European public debate, the term "crisis" began to be used. According to Jaskułowski, the term was not neutral as it came to define the extent of Europe's obligations towards the migrants, including the group most dependent on the EU's sense of solidarity, the refugees. Violation of the migrants' rights and limition of the aid afforded them was justified in a discourse framed in terms of a crisis. Supporters of the idea that the situation was extraordinary seemed to

be saying that "Normally we would not tolerate such an approach but the conditions are truly exceptional." In the case of Poland, as Jaskułowski reminds us, solidarity towards migrants appearing on the EU's southern borders was defined very narrowly. In the end, Poland did not admit a single refugee under the relocation agreements, obscurely justifying its decision on security grounds (Jaskułowski 2019: 38).

Jaskułowski's precise opinion on EU or Polish policy towards the migrants during the period analysed is not entirely clear as this is not what the book is about. It is certain, however, that he considers solidarity with the migrants, and especially with the refugees, to be an ethical imperative as well as an obligation under EU law. When he proposes, in the third chapter, that the "migration crisis" should be considered first of all in terms of a crisis of refugees' rights, it becomes quite clear that we are dealing with a socially engaged work, though it lacks the least hint of anarchism (47–48). The author does not protest the existence of national boundaries or the procedure for granting international protection, but simply points to the discrepancy between the values enshrined in the law and their practical implementation. The traditional liberal belief in the individual is also reflected in the book's criticism of prejudice, in which Jaskułowski includes both the security discourse and Islamophobia. Both contribute to the curtailment of individual rights in the name of imagined threats and to treating refugees as victims, which encourages overprotective solidarity with them and deprives them of subjectivity (105–110, 132). *The Everyday Politics of Migration Crisis in Poland* can therefore be read as a story about how we think and speak of members of our European political community – people who are not EU citizens, but are certainly participants in our collective life, with certain rights and political subjectivity.

Jaskułowski devotes most attention to the years 2015–2016. This period, when the greatest number of migrants seeking international protection reached the EU and the public debate on the subject became particularly high-pitched, provides an ideal opportunity for studying the attitudes of Europeans. The topic was especially new for Poles, among whom different camps began to form in order to produce positions and rhetorical tools. By defining their obligations towards migrants coming to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa, they mobilised knowledge and imaginings shaped over decades in which emigration prevailed over immigration and the rhetoric of cultural unity among Polish citizens was dominant in the public discourse. Thus, Jaskułowski's main question, concerning the relation between national identity and attitudes to migrants, is apt.

Attitudes can be examined in many ways. A survey is most often used for this purpose. Jaskułowski relies on qualitative methods, however, and looks at two axes around which public opinion is shaped: the more influential participants in the debate (i.e., politicians and selected figures of popular culture) and ordinary people, the addressees of the public message, who not being devoid of their own opinions and polemic enthusiasms, place that message in the context of their proper experience and emotional tendencies. In the book we find an analysis of selected public pronouncements and a report on a qualitative study composed of 191 structured individual interviews and 2 focus group interviews. While the empirical material is enormous, it does not ensure the study's representativeness for all of Poland.

The issue here is not one of representativeness in the statistical sense – which is not expected of qualitative research and to which Jaskułowski himself makes not the smallest claim – but about capturing the greatest possible variety of attitudes with their socio-cultural sources. Jaskułowski conducted his research in Lower Silesia and the Opole region, both in the largest towns and in smaller localities. He included areas that have experienced economic degradation in recent times and those where the situation was clearly better. Among the respondents were poor and well-to-do people, people with and without higher education. Although the range of social diversification among the interviewees was significant and shows Jaskułowski's sensitivity to possible structural factors influencing attitudes towards migrants, it does not take into account possible differences between the three partition areas or between the centre and borderlands. The book will not tell us much about the attitudes towards migrants of Polish citizens who feel Silesian or Kashubian first and foremost, and only then – if at all – Polish. Jaskułowski leaves reflection about the historical and cultural determinants of attitudes to migrants to other scholars and focuses instead on Polishness as a hegemonic identity.

The Everyday Politics of Migration Crisis in Poland has a very clear structure. Its short chapters, containing clearly formulated topics, can be read separately. The first two chapters are an introduction to the study; they explain its aims, methods, and theoretical perspective. A reader who has considered in some depth the questions about the relation between national identity and current political discourse appearing in the book's first pages will not be surprised when Jaskułowski presents himself as a constructivist. He does not support the notion of a nation as a real community with a relatively unchanging identity, and he calls for the study of those practices and discourses that cause the leading category of political thinking to be the

nation, with the recreation of old boundaries or the establishment of new ones between "us" and "them" (16). His aim is not to improve upon the constructivist paradigm but rather to make use of it in his empirical analysis, which appears in the succeeding chapters and is the most interesting part of the book.

The book's target audience is probably English-speaking, non-Polish scholars, and thus some explanations may seem unnecessary from a Polish point of view, while others may seem insufficiently developed. This is especially true of Chapter 3, where apart from discussing the EU's migration policy and the decisions of various Polish governments in this sphere (decisions well known to the Polish reader), there are several observations on the connection between Islamophobia and nationalist rhetoric in the right-wing political discourse and popular culture (and here the Polish reader will likely find the choice of cultural texts too narrow). Nevertheless, it is worthwhile for researchers familiar with the subject to read this chapter carefully, given the above-mentioned redefinition of the "European migration crisis" as a period of consent for the violation of migrants' rights.

As I was reading the third chapter, I also stopped to consider the notion of the "pathological Europeanisation" of the Polish discourse. "In other words," Jaskułowski writes,

> in Western European countries, migration has become a central element of public discourse in Poland. Yet PiS have adopted the rhetoric typical of far-right nationalist parties in Western Europe. Thus, the party not only drew public attention to migration and linked migration issues to national security but also identified migrants and refugees with Muslims who had become the target of racial othering. The party mainstreamed and normalized both cultural and biological racism in the public sphere (38).

Yet the term proposed by Jaskułowski suggests that it was not parochialism but participation in the international discourse that made it easier for many Poles to link belief in their own superiority, fear of migrants, racism, and prejudice against Muslims, into an inseparable whole.

Various "-isations" usually entail some form of judgment about power, and thus also of responsibility for the effects of the processes they describe. "Colonisation," for example, signifies imposed power and assigns appropriate political responsibility to the colonisers. "Modernisation," on the other hand, is – at least in the social sciences – an example of fatalism describ-

ing the domination of social and market processes over political authority. I wonder what vision of subjectivity lies behind the concept proposed by Jaskułowski. From an empirical perspective, "pathological Europeanisation" describes the fact that we emulated the European debate, although we did not have to face the challenge of rising migration in practice. At the same time – let the more neutral readers forgive this overt assessment – we were most fervent in welcoming the most loathsome elements of the debate. I am not entirely certain, however, how Jaskułowski understands the agency of the participants in the Polish discourse – whether they were Europeanised, whether they Europeanised themselves on their own, or whether Europeanisation describes some form of inertia in the social process. This is a difficult question because it concerns power and responsibility. It cannot be avoided, though, in studying prejudices, those peculiar structures of the common mindset in which automatic judgment meets political cruelty. Another question that arises in confrontation with "pathological Europeanisation" is what form correct Europeanisation should take.

From the perspective of the Polish reader, perhaps the most interesting element of the book is the report on the results of field research. In short, focused chapters, Jaskułowski discusses how the respondents understand their Polishness, and three different attitudes – hostile, solidary, or ambivalent – they displayed towards refugees from North Africa and the Middle East. There is no point in dwelling on Jaskułowski's observations of a very general nature, namely, that the sense of Polishness of the majority of the respondents was strong, that they had an unquestioning view of history, and that their mostly hostile attitude towards refugees was supported by Islamophobia. The author notes these facts with regret, but – in the understanding tradition of the social sciences – he analyses statements with which he does not agree and those with which, as ordinary human beliefs, he finds it easier to identify. More importantly, he senses a real tension in the shaping of opinions: if in the thicket of discursive practice an individual has some form of agency (and thus power and responsibility), it will find expression in this situation.

In Jaskułowski's analysis, the public discourse neither thinks nor speaks for the individual. It is rather material from which we derive opinions and meandering argumentation. Like any material, it also has its limitations. Thoughts can be expressed within the discourse, but this is done using what has already been said and in response to questions that have already been raised. Jaskułowski's respondents were in exactly this situation – irrespective of whether they were asked about Polishness or about

the relocation of refugees, they stepped on the shaky ground of subjects that are constantly being discussed. It was not so much that they might draw on clichés as that they could not avoid drawing on them and still have something to say. In the respondents' emotionally charged responses, in their doubts or unwillingness to take a position, or in their attempts to question or renegociate the main categories of the public discourse, it was clear that the domination of those categories was uncomfortable. The respondents whose attitude Jaskułowski described as ambivalent – those who fluctuated between fear and the solidarity impulse – were especially uncomfortable with the categories. Respondents from this group spoke of their ignorance and fear of taking a stand. Some were suspicious of media reports. Others said they needed more time to arrive at a sensible opinion. Still others formulated conditional opinions, trying to position themselves on both sides of the argument at the same time. They did not want either to speak in clichés or firmly to oppose them. When reading the statements of respondents from this group, it is difficult not to get the impression that instead of going beyond the hegemonic language their dialectic quietly replicates it, because more abdication is involved than opposition (113–126).

Jaskułowski emphasises that people are not just passive recipients of the hegemonic discourse (129). His analysis certainly serves to consolidate this view, though it might have been even more interesting if he had considered the critical potential of the recipients' "activeness." A careful reader of his book will probably reflect on this question – because what good is it that people form their opinions autonomously, when in the end the opinions of the majority are not at variance with those that resound the loudest in the public sphere? Is the individualisation of their voices an aesthetic effect or an expression of ethical exploration? If I could commission one more chapter from the author, it would deal with this very issue, which incidentally is just another version of the question about power and responsibility.

Jaskułowski can be praised for many other things. Both the constructivist perspective and his assumption about the relation between attitudes towards migrants and national identity are corroborated in his analysis. Neither allows for the disregard of discussion in the media as a form of exercising power or of everyday thinking as a counter to statements in public circulation. The clarity of Jaskułowski's analyses, which are usually conducted separately at the level of identity, views, and the logic behind their justification, makes the book useful even for researchers who do not fully agree with his approach. Last but not least, the critical perspective adopted

at the beginning of the work – which assumes the subjectivity of migrants as members of the European political community who are entitled to specific rights – is consistent with the further argumentation and also opens the way for reflection upon the "migration crisis" as a manifestation of a deeper crisis in the normative power of legal regulations (Legendre 2011).

The Everyday Politics of Migration Crisis in Poland also has some weak points. Personally, I consider one such drawback to be the lack of reference to the situation of refugees in Poland. Jaskułowski writes of them only that

> [a]s we have seen, Poland was neither a destination for refugees [Jaskułowski writes "refugees," and not "refugees from the MENA countries" or "the refugees"] nor a transit country. In 2015, for instance, 12,325 applications for refugee status were submitted in Poland. Refugee status was granted to 348 persons, including 203 Syrians and 24 Iraqis (39).[1]

I suppose the author is simply trying to say in this fragment that in the period covered in the study Poland did not experience a rise in forced migration, and refugees from North Africa and the Middle East (i.e., the group in which Jaskułowski is most interested) rarely arrived here. Jaskułowski states, however, that no refugee route led through Poland, and such a statement can be countered by the very statistics he quotes. These figures indicate that in 2015, 12,000 people sought haven in Poland. Admittedly, some were returned to Poland from other countries under the Dublin Regulation; thus their escape route, mostly against their will, did indeed lead through Poland.

Statistics from the last decade show that every year a few thousand to a dozen thousand people apply for international protection in Poland. They mostly come from the former Soviet republics. They apply for protection despite the fact that Poland grants it to very few applicants and does not offer any real institutional support to asylum-seekers.[2] Sociological suspi-

[1] The manner of presenting the data in this portion of the book could easily lead to a misunderstanding, namely, it might be assumed that in 2016 the status was given to those people who applied for it in the same year. This is not the case: the status was received also by those who had applied for it in previous years. Considering the long-term and often multi-stage nature of the proceedings connected with granting international protection or other forms of legalising a stay, a proper presentation of the data should contain information as to whether decisions on applications were made in the same year.

[2] Polish refugee policy includes elements such as the prohibition to perform gainful employment for at least half a year after submitting an application, with very low benefits for persons subject to the procedure and possible detention of the entire family. Researchers also point to poor conditions

ciousness leads one to wonder whether the Polish authorities are truly implementing the idea of international protection and putting the welfare of people seeking protection first, or whether they are pursuing some bureaucratic interest (such as the number of places available in refugee centres, the budget connected with material assistance for refugees, or the integration programme). Suspicion is also justified by the corroborated reports of violations of refugee rights at Polish border crossings. The first such signs surfaced at the end of 2016. The Border Guard at the Terespol border crossing began to make it impossible for migrants to apply for refugee status. This practice, which is not only illegal but also endangers human life, has persisted despite complaints, petitions, and court proceedings. It has been thoroughly documented by the press and NGOs. The European Court of Justice and the the Polish Ombudsman (Bodnar 2018) have also examined complaints in the matter. These Border Guard practices have most likely contributed to a threefold decrease in the number of applications for refugee status in the last three years.[3] The Polish escape route from persecution, which was narrow but of long standing, may disappear from the European map (Klaus 2017).

Perhaps I expose myself to the charge of being over-meticulous in observing that a scholar who deals with migration on a many times greater scale has ignored the probable rights violations of, say, several thousand forced migrants. After all, the omission does not affect the main theses or results of the study. It does not undermine the value of the book and, in the context of the entire argument, looks more like an oversight than a profoundly considered element. There are three sentences, though, that allow the abuse of forced migrants in Poland, and on Poland's eastern border, to be downplayed. These three sentences do a great disservice to a cause for which Jaskułowski is the spokesman, namely, the respect of refugees' rights in Europe, including in Poland. After all, if there are no refugees in our country, then in principle no one is violating their rights.

Transl. Michelle Granas

in refugee centres, protracted bureaucratic procedures, and insignificant assistance in the integration process (Gracz & Chrzanowska 2007; Górny 2017; Mikulska & Patzer 2012).

[3] From 12,300 in 2015 and 2016 to 4,100 in 2018 (source: UDSC; yearly statistical reports concerning the international protection procedure in Poland are published by the Foreigners' Office (UDSC) and available online at: https://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/raport-roczny--ochrona-miedzynarodowa/).

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FOR THE ART OF DISTANCE

TOMASZ RAKOWSKI, *PRZEPŁYWY, WSPÓŁDZIAŁANIA, KRĘGI MOŻLIWEGO. ANTROPOLOGIA POWODZENIA*

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Przepływy, współdziałania, kręgi możliwego [Inflows, cooperation, the realm of the possible] is Tomasz Rakowski's research record of his stay in the northern-Mongolian town and territorial unit, or *sum*, of Bulgan, which is inhabited by people belonging to the Torghut group or tribe. The Torghuts are a branch of the larger Oirat group, a minority in a country dominated by the Khalkha group. The small town of Bulgan, with around 11,000 inhabitants, turns out to be a business and cultural centre, pulsing with life and linked by strong ties with other cities, including the capital of Mongolia, Ulan Bator, as well as with centres for Mongolian business activities in China, especially Sinciang.

The book introduces us to a society in the process of intense transformation from a traditional pastoral economy – requiring a nomadic way of life with moves between summer and winter pastures – to a capitalist economy, in which traditional herding has begun to play a lesser role. This rapid change is happening amidst the rubble of the communist system, which altered the traditional economy based on nomadic animal husbandry but also in some ways preserved it. Rakowski's work is part of the stream of research conducted in this region by Polish ethnologists. His visit, in the company of Lech Mróz and Oungerel Tangad, is a new exploration of an area that Polish researchers (Sławoj Szynkiewicz, Lech Mróz, and Jerzy Wasilewski) visited forty years ago.

Rakowski's book is an attempt to portray a society in movement and developing rapidly – with variable success – in a manner characterised by the fact that its expanding business activities are deeply rooted in local kinship structures while being simultaneously and variously intertwined with the state. Development in Bulgan is happening largely thanks to actions in the informal sphere. Rakowski attempts to grasp what is informal and transitory in the situation by drawing on the idea of "instant history," or history that is "still happening" (2018: 92) and thus can be grasped through the observations of participants and through oral reports. Rakowski's tale of the contemporary inhabitants of Bulgan reads like a kind of "live transmission." As he shows, grasping the informal dimension has great importance in a situation where the official documents created by the Mongol authorities are written in a propaganda manner and do not have much in common with what is really pursued. It would also seem that such a manner of researching and presenting materials is connected with the author's more general view of the nature of what is social and what takes place in action, in the process of "humanifying" (Rakowski refers to Tim Ingold's idea; 2018: 157). Thus there is a dimension that is in continual movement and that cannot, in his opinion, be sufficiently described in terms of closed, lasting, or reproducing structures.

Rakowski uses various terms to describe the essence of the process of endogenous growth; he speaks of an "art of the informal," of collective business, of "brothering" and "sistering," of sharing success. He refers also to a metaphor which was repeatedly used by his research subjects and which is rooted in the Mongol tradition. The metaphor concerns individual success that can spread its rays to others. Thus there is talk of a life force (*süld*), or of the force of the "wind steed" (*chijmor*). The nature of this specific force is perhaps best described in Rakowski's story of a crowd of men who surround the winner of a traditional horse race in order to bathe their hands in the animal's sweat and take to themselves a part of its life-giving force. The new generation of Torghut businessmen are said to be in possession of this force, and their vigorous, fluent, and variable activities – which are characterised by continual movement between Bulgan, Ulan Bator, and often border territories in China – are changing the region. The businessmen invest part of their earnings in the region's development and social life. They have co-financed, for instance, the equipment for a local preschool, the construction of roads, and religious and sports celebrations. Thus they also contribute to strengthening and celebrating the local identity. Both the purely economic activities and the activities that are focused

on the integration of local society occur thanks to the close ties of the Torghut community. On the one hand, these are family ties (a large expanded family supporting its members, e.g., by sending members to study in the city), and on the other hand, they are the ties of a peer group. Rakowski stresses the large role of lasting friendship and cooperation between people from one school class. It is school colleagues who have founded a club to care for *nutag* – the place of origin, the fatherland. In Rakowski's opinion, the existence of these strong informal ties is characteristic of the "art of the informal" and of the Bulgan/Mongol model of development.

Przepływy… is an interesting record of intense ongoing social changes. It is a compelling reading, especially for reviewers like me who were not previously acquainted with the economic and cultural context of Mongolia. However, the reader who, like me, is new to the Mongolian context, will be left with a certain sense of insatiety and with the feeling of having more questions than answers. This record of the author's repeated visits to Bulgan is a blink in the life of young Mongol businessmen; it concentrates on what is happening at the moment. This perspective means that the present being studied is not grounded enough in the historical context, especially in regard to specific figures and families.

The book contains a chapter on the history of the Mongol transformation. We learn a fair amount on the subject of the most recent history of Bulgan itself and of the economic transformations in the region. Yet the description of the activities of Torghut businessmen could have been undoubtedly enriched by use of the biographic method. Taking into account, to a larger degree, the life history of the persons studied would have allowed for a better understanding of their present situation as creators of the new economic system and of the basis for the present "art of the informal." To what degree, for instance, are ties from communist times still in use? The text suggests that the official authorities are personally connected with the former system, which after all is not surprising.

Interviewing members of various generations would also have been extremely valuable, as it would have allowed for analysis of both family ties and of how the new methods of doing business were formed: probably partly in opposition and partly in symbiosis with elements of the former system, combined with ancient local tradition. At the same time, the majority of the research material presented in the book describes celebrations, either in public institutions or those connected with rites, professions, the meetings of a school class or a local club, and even family celebrations or joint travels between cities.

Rakowski shows that the activeness of the Bulgan businessmen is deeply grounded in social networks, chiefly those connected with the expanded family but also those involving strong ties between peers who attended the same school class. At certain places in the book the links between contemporary business, social activity, the Lamaist (Tibetan Buddhism) religion, and traditional customs are mentioned. The latter are chiefly customs connected with herding and the life cycle. The book's passages on these traditions appear almost incidentally, though. The author consciously seems to abandon a deeper analysis of this topic, perhaps on account of the fact that the traditional kin and custom structure connected with herding has already been described in considerable detail by other, earlier scholars, including Polish ones. However, leaving this body of knowledge aside means that the picture presented seems incomplete. One of the few rituals of a religious nature to have been noted is the custom of paying homage to the local mountain, which is considered to be the mother of the Torghut tribe – a custom Rakowski seems to suggest was somehow "invented" by the leaders of Torghut society. It is, as Rakowski writes, a method of strengthening ties with the local fatherland (caring for *nutag*) for a society functioning in increasingly more globalised conditions and being still "on the road." It is hard to believe, however, that these rituals, which we learn are supported by the clergy, are entirely new and unconnected to tradition (perhaps they were discouraged or repressed during communist times).

The topic of the rites in honour of the mountain, with its ritual feeding, is unusually interesting. Lack of familiarity with the cultural context of Mongolia does not allow me to speculate in greater detail, but it appears that the interpretation could be taken further – that the rite could be an expression of grief connected with the loss of closeness and permanent presence in the native land (feeding the mountain as a fulfilment or symbolic maintenance of ties). In the 1970s, Mróz quoted one of his interlocutors, who said that "herders don't like to move" (1977: 162). The passage to a new means of life, which was partially imposed by the state policy of "de-animaling," must have been a disrupting or perhaps even a traumatic change, with which the herders-students-businessmen attempt to deal in various ways. An intriguing passage on the cyclical returns to family pastures of people not directly involved in herding would seem to encourage further study in this direction. During these cyclical returns, women who study or work as teachers or saleswomen wear traditional clothing and make dairy products, as if transforming themselves briefly into traditional shepherds. In the same context, one of Rakowski's interlocutors

weeps when looking at photos from her homeland, saying that "Bulgan is always the same; always wonderful Bulgan." It would seem that the events described and statements quoted allow us to see here a deep need for communication with a certain unchanging "core" of the Torghut way of life.

This motif also raises the question of whether in reality we are dealing, as Rakowski writes, with a post-pastoral society, or whether the structure of this seemly changeable and continually moving society is still that of a pastoral society, although a weaker and less economically significant one than previously. Perhaps, to a certain degree, its "post-pastoralness" is expressed in the fact that the cyclical society's departures and returns to Bulgan, with the long and arduous journeys described by Rakowski, are analogous to the society's pendulum movement between winter and summer pastures?

These questions incline the reader to the conclusion that the book lacks a view of the structure of Torghut society and its place in the state organism of Mongolia. A "view from afar" – not entirely in the sense that Claude Lévi-Strauss meant it, but in the sense of paying attention to objectively existing dependences between specific elements of the social structure – would be useful. Such a view, which would be at least temporarily disconnected from "present history," would allow Rakowski to give a fuller answer to questions about the relation between the state and informal elements, that is, the ties created by the new Bulgan business sector. Rakowski devotes considerable space to these relations. As he writes, informal organisations sometimes cooperate, sometimes "replace," and sometimes "duplicate" the state institutions. He interestingly shows the interpenetration of these structures, for instance, in the case of a preschool, which functions thanks to the generous subsidies of businessmen (who are honoured during a special ceremony), or in the case of building a road. On the other hand, it is also noticeable that in many respects businessmen's associations play a role comparable to that of the state in such matters as, for instance, founding parks or organising important ceremonies. The author also mentions a certain element of rivalry between the state authorities and the informal authority formed by businessmen and social activists, although this motif is not developed. Perhaps Rakowski's unusually thought-provoking point that state positions are "traditionally" held by members of one of the Torghut groups, the Wangijn, which is considered rather lower in the hierarchy, while most of the businessmen he describes belong to the Bejlijn group, would be worth pursuing.

It would seem that the traditional division of tasks among specific branches of the Torghut group means that the group of "informal businessmen" and social activists engage in a sort of game with the public sector, which is basically represented by another group, and one considered to be lower in the group hierarchy. The game can take the form of cooperation, exchange, or rivalry, or it can have an ambivalent nature, as Rakowski describes. However, Rakowski seems solely to touch on the theme of the objective social structure of the society he is studying, and he does not write much about internal and inter-ethnic relations either (e.g., about the sizeable Kazakh minority, which is traditionally agricultural). Rakowski uses various theoretical concepts which seem interesting but do not appear to be fully operationalised or consistently applied (for instance, the social-technical system).

The book *Przepływy…* is part of the stream of criticism on the imposition of Western models of development and top-down modernisation, which often determine how the social worlds of non-European countries are understood (as in the anthropology of development or postcolonial studies). Rakowski correctly condemns the mechanisms of transferring such categories as civil society onto completely different social conditions, with the result that completely unsuitable development programmes are created. He mentions examples where the strong, informal ties of Mongolia have been described as corruption, nepotism, or even ties of a mafia nature. (He admits, however, that within the framework of the kin and acquaintanceship networks it sometimes happens that there are unreciprocated services, delays in payment, or even violence, and thus there are certain risks.) Such a mechanical application of Western categories is also visible in the sociological literature concerning Poland, for instance, in the context of Europeanisation and the complex "immaturity" of Polish democracy. In the last decade, a number of works have appeared which are critical of these concepts and condemn imitative thinking about progress and the necessity of a passive adaptation to the Western system. The works of Tomasz Zarycki on centre–periphery relations are especially pertinent (compare, e.g., Zarycki 2009, 2013; see also Sztandar-Sztanderska 2016; Zielieńska 2015).

We come then to the last question, which is especially important and concerns the axiological side of the book. There is no doubt that Rakowski's evaluation of the phenomenon he studies – economic development based on an informal social network – is very positive, although he is also aware of the potential dangers. The motif of praise for informal ways of cooper-

ating and managing on one's own links *Przepływy…* with the author's earlier book *Łowcy, zbieracze, praktycy niemocy. Etnografia człowieka zdegradowanego* (Hunters, gatherers, practitioners of powerlessness: An ethnography of the degraded human), which concerns ways of dealing with a situation of poverty and exclusion in Poland after the transformation.

However, while the previous work primarily described those who found themselves on the bottom rung of the social ladder after the economic "shock therapy" in post-transition Poland, the book on the Torghuts describes above all those who have come out on top: those who have assumed the role of economic and social leaders in the said town and region. We do not know the perspective of those inhabitants of the Bulgan *sum* who did not manage to grasp that "wind steed" of success which is repeatedly mentioned in descriptions of the society (e.g., they are still engaged in herding as their main occupation). This does not mean, though, that Rakowski's positive opinion is not apt (it is hard for me to say). Perhaps in the Torghut system, thanks to the solidarity of family and peer groups, there are no groups condemned to degradation, exclusion, and extreme poverty – in contrast to the countries where the neoliberal version of capitalism has made itself at home. Nevertheless, we are undoubtedly not dealing with an egalitarian system, as one of the quotes placed at the beginning of the book – Marcin Król's statement on the need to "reclaim the idea of equality in some sensible form" in liberal democracies – would seem to suggest. What emerges from the ethnographical description in the book is rather a picture of a highly hierarchical arrangement which is perhaps not at all as dynamic and fluid as it would appear. Furthermore, the opposition between the Mongol "art of the informal" and the formalised societies of the West, which emerges as if between the lines, is not as sharp as Rakowski seems to indicate. The contributions of numerous scholars, from Pierre Bourdieu on, as well as anthropologists such as Janine Wedel, have shown the large role played by informal hidden relations in Western social systems. The anthropology of the success of Torghut businessmen is undoubtedly an interesting case of a non-schematic road to capitalist development. But if we were somehow to model our way of development on societies such as the Mongol one, it would be worthwhile first to look at them not only from the inside but also from a certain distance.

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THE REASONS OF THE HEART

KAROLINA WIGURA, *WYNALAZEK NOWOCZESNEGO SERCA. FILOZOFICZNE ŹRÓDŁA WSPÓŁCZESNEGO MYŚLENIA O EMOCJACH*

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We live in emotional times. Go to any news site, open a newspaper, turn on your TV, and you will see story after story about hate, fear, envy and contempt – but also enthusiasm and hope – bringing people to the streets in mass protests, toppling goverments, fuelling populist policies, creating fertile ground for fake news and driving fanatics to commit violent acts. How we got here is hardly a mystery. The profound geopolitical, social and cultural changes in the world of the last decades, accelerated by the rise of the Internet and in particular of social media, have resulted in a perceived, if not real, erosion not only of great narratives, but of rational communication as such, with its central notions of truth and objective facts. Emotions are taking over, which many observe with alarm. Others, however, point out that it need not be bad news. Authors like Bethany Albertson and Shana Kushner Gadarian (*Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening World*, 2015), Ted Brader (*Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work*, 2006) or William Davies (*Nervous States: How Feeling Took Over the World*, 2018) are cautiously optimistic. Emotions, they suggest, are the raw material of social life, and as such they are a source of conflict – but they can also be our way out of it. Exactly because they are primordial, they are universal and easily communicable. Our political de-

bate always appealed to emotions – now that it's breaking down, shouldn't we simply go with our feelings?

There was a moment in the history of moral philosophy when emotions became, similarily, the focus of all attention. They had always been present in the background, of interest to ethicists as regular but rarely reliable (in fact, frequently cumbersome) companions of moral reasoning. But the arrival of logical positivism saw them take centre stage. In 1936 Alfred Ayer, the young disciple of the thinkers of the Vienna Circle, published his first book *Language, Truth, and Logic*, which introduced the English-speaking world to the Viennese positivist programme – and spelled out its consequences for all the areas of inquiry the positivists deem unscientific. Since logical positivism defines facts as what can be verified by the senses, there are, from its point of view, no religious, esthetic or moral facts, so there can be no scientific thinking in these matters, and in fact, no rational argument about them. In the case of morality, that leaves us with emotions as the only point of reference for our judgments; according to Ayer and other emotivists, moral utterances have no truth-value – they can be neither right nor wrong. They are nothing more than expressions of our feelings.

There is a price to pay for such elegance. Even at the peak of its popularity, emotivism had to continue to fend off the charge of promoting relativism or even moral nihilism. But subjectivism does not, of course, equal relativism, and the work of later emotivists spelled out how moral views, even if they are reducible to simple emotions, can be effectively discussed and reflected upon, how they can come to be questioned and reformed. For a moment emotivism seemed to have all the answers. However, in 1964 Peter Geach published his version of the "embedding problem," and the stakes rose astronomically. The so-called Frege-Geach problem focused not on the disturbing implications of the linguistic thesis of emotivism, but on its coherence. Briefly, it pointed out that moral utterances don't always stand alone – they can appear in context, and in particular, they can be parts of statements of fact, capable of being true or false. Do they continue in these contexts to be nothing more that expressions of feelings? If so, how can they influence the logical value of such statements of facts? If not, on the other hand, how is moral reasoning possible – to use Geach's example, why should claiming that lying is wrong commit us to believing that it is also wrong to get your brother to lie? There were only two ways out of this dilemma – either to bite the bullet and say that all of what we see as statements of facts are in reality expressions of attitudes (roughly the position espoused by expressionists) or to drop the claim that moral utter-

ances are expressions of naked emotions, which is what most ethicists did. The project of emotivism was dead.

Is there a larger lesson to be learned from this story? It's worth asking this question because emotions have arguably never been more present in the public discourse. Impressed by their power, we are tempted to see them as distinct, autonomous forces either for bad or for good, and a growing chorus of voices seems to ask not only if we can, but if we should maintain the regime of rationality – maybe it's time we stopped justifying ourselves, and started trusting our feelings?

Karolina Wigura's book *Wynalazek nowoczesnego serca* [Discovery of a modern heart] can be read as giving a sceptical answer to this question. Following the good tradition of histories of ideas, it cools the enthusiasm of "political emotivists" by reminding them that just like any other notion, our idea of raw, immediate, biologically grounded emotions has its history. Tracing its genealogy is necessary if emotions are to be taken seriously, but it is also potentially destructive – the end result may very well be not so much the purification of the concept, but its deconstruction. On the other hand, by choosing to focus on early modernity as the period in which to search for the philosophical sources of our present understanding of emotions, Wigura lays the ground for a constructive genealogy of feelings. By pointing out the similarities between our present situation and the mental circumstances of our philosophical forefathers, she sketches a guideline for fruitful reflection on and around emotions as we experience and understand them now.

The main thesis of the book is that the roots of what is particular about our present approach to emotions can be traced back to the philosophical work of a handful of exceptional individuals living in the seventeenth century, who proved capable of giving a distinctive and extremely influential voice to the spirit of their times. René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza, the principal characters in the book, were of course not the only eminent thinkers of the era who were interested in human psychology, but, according to Wigura, they were the ones whose original critique of the classical and scholastic traditions resulted in forging new psychological terminology which we immediately recognise as familiar, even if we have forgotten its original connotations. Wigura's goal is to help us to rediscover its full meaning.

Her strategy is to analyse the writing of the three philosophers in order to reconstruct their respective theories of human emotions. The task is difficult, as none of them made emotions explicitly their point of interest, but

also because their attitude towards the existing tradition was ambiguous. On the one hand, the philosophers of the seventeenth century acknowledged the unprecedented character of the challenges of their times and were actively seeking a new opening in thinking about human nature and faculties – on the other, they were aware of the hidden potential of the deeper layers of the ideological ground they were standing on, and much of what they proposed came under the guise of reviving ideas silenced or distorted by scholastic philosophy. That's why assessing their particular contribution is impossible unless we first take account of the earlier traditions of thinking about emotions.

Wigura identifies three of these: the classical, the Hellenistic, and the scholastic. Each of them constitutes a step forward in the process of building the language used later by Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, but they were in fact far from compatible with each other. The ancient Greeks, who are represented in the book by Plato and Aristotle, talked mostly about passions, phenomena which, whatever their nature, we experience passively, as forces coming from the outside – or from our own bodies, but equally independently of our will. However subtle their actual position on the matter, it is to the classics that we owe the lasting idea of feelings as a problem, a challenge for human beings striving to maintain rational control over their lives. The more optimistic of the two thinkers, Aristotle, believed that passions can be put to work and become essential tools in the quest for a good life, but even he doubted they could be completely domesticated. Hellenistic philosophers, pragmatists that they were, could not accept this vision of a permanently looming conflict and made a distinction between untamed passions, always erroneous and leading reason astray, and calm affects, engendered by reason. The stoic attitude of *apatheia* was not, therefore, about not experiencing emotions, but about replacing their noxious kind with another, beneficial one, by way of gaining true knowledge about the laws of nature. Since these laws are divine, and since getting to know them is our highest vocation, the affects which come from reason are not just beneficial but moral. This last idea found a continuation in the scholastic theory of emotions. Thomas Aquinas, whose thought Wigura considers to be the highest expression of this tradition, drew on the Aristotelian conception of passions as morally neutral, capable of leading us astray, but also of becoming an important element of virtue – depending on the effort we make to control and educate them. But he also took over from the stoics the idea of affects as something which is not passively experienced, but actively willed; love of God is one example. In this way, Aquinas man-

aged to propose a complex theory of emotions which at the same time put human beings firmly in the natural order of reality and ascribed to them a transcendental vocation, pointing clearly to their fixed place in the supernatural one.

But it is exactly clarity, suggests Wigura, that the experience of living in the seventeenth century lacked. Describing the extremely complex array of influences and tendencies which decided the character of Early Modernity, she writes that the condition which defined the era was that of self-reliance, which was all too often experienced as solitude. To quote just one of Wigura's examples of this alienating dynamics: the end of the medieval social order gave birth to the courtly culture with its special insistence on the sublimation of emotions – social pressure in this sphere had never been higher. At the same time, religious feelings changed their character to become more personal, but also more private, which made them less and less suited for the role of life anchor. Emotional life got real in a way which made the Aquinian approach obsolete. It required a new kind of guidance to make it work for, and not against, safety, fulfilment and happiness.

As Wigura explains, the most influential thinkers of the seventeenth century turned for this guidance to science, whose tremendous successes at the time could inspire not only trust, but devotion. Descartes is by far the best example. In his late treaty *Passions of the Soul* he developed a theory of emotions (Wigura credits him with introducing the term in its present meaning; it was next picked up by David Hume) which he himself construed as breaking with tradition, but which largely continued the scholastic ideas, referencing also those of the classical and Hellenistic eras, to make up a heterogeneous whole which few found compelling. The important innovations, apart from the terminological one, were, according to Wigura, Descartes's decision to abandon the distinction between higher and lower emotions, as well as his insistence on treating his inquiries as part of the physiology of the human body. The resulting anthropocentrism had a truly revolutionary potential – even if Descartes followed his predecessors in considering thinking about emotions as a way of cultivating personal virtue. Not so Hobbes, for whom the primary reason for studying passions was the fear of falling pray to their social consequences. As an Epicurean materialist, he saw humans as not essentially different or separate from other beings and from society as a whole. For him, the science of emotions concerned primarily the trappings of the social machine, which he studied in order to make us, its cogs, more resilient. Finally, Spinoza, a follower of the stoics, went further than the other two thinkers in,

on the one hand, naturalising all aspects of human experience, including rationality, and on the other, spelling out the consequences of the social nature of emotions for the dynamic of their formation and management. Unlike Hobbes, he did not believe that our mutual dependency in society is enough to make emotions the basis of a shared morality – for him, working on your passions could achieve nothing more than personal virtue. But unlike Descartes, who would agree with him so far, he understood this virtue not as setting yourself apart from nature, but as finding your proper place in it.

These innovations may at the first glance seem too piecemeal to amount to a breakthrough in our thinking about emotions. But Wigura points to two profound changes they ushered in: the fading away of the hierarchical vision of the world in which human life found its explanation in its relation to God, and the dawn of scientific anthropocentrism. Together they prepared the ground for nineteenth-century thinkers like William James and Charles Darwin and ultimately paved the way to our present way of thinking about emotions as biologically grounded and morally neutral. Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza are largely responsible for our modern reductive, utilitarian interest in human emotions.

Would they be happy with it? That's unlikely, given that for all the research and all our easy familiarity with the subject, emotions continue to cause us trouble. Wigura does not, herself, propose a solution to the problem of the proper place of emotions in our personal and social lives. By turning our attention to the philosophical sources of our ideas about emotions, she does, however, suggest that as we walked the path set for us by Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza, we left something precious behind, most of all the idea of a good life as a point of reference for our attitudes towards our own feelings. For the thinkers of the seventeenth century emotions were not external forces or signals from God – but neither were they the raw phenomena that we now often take them to be. They existed and were meaningful in the moral context of a dialogue we conduct with the world and with each other, in search of a life worth living.

Historians of philosophy will appreciate Wigura's endeavour. While the works of each of the thinkers she focuses on have been subject to countless interpretations and reinterpretations, the problem of the seventeenth-century philosophy of emotions has rarely been systematically addressed. They might, however, question the author's decision not to include Blaise Pascal in her pantheon – his interest in emotions seems to have been even more pronounced than in the case of Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, and

his influence on posterity is hard to overstate. Historians of ideas should not have similar objections; the methodology of Wigura's analysis fully justifies the choice of examples and the story she ultimately tells is credible and compelling.

Can it be put to practical, and especially political use? In some of the interviews published just after the publication of her book, for instance, the one given to Piotr Witwicki (2019) from *Rzeczpospolita*, Wigura appears to deflect questions about the utility of emotions. On the other hand, in a recent opinion piece written with Jarosław Kuisz for the *Guardian*, she stresses the urgent need to rekindle "courage, hope and compassion" in our political life (Wigura & Kuisz 2019). Her point seems to be that we are above all wrong to think about emotions in utilitarian terms – instead, we should recognise both their insurmountable power and their importance for all meaningful acts in our life together. Emotions are hopelessly entangled in the way we perceive reality, understand it and act in it – the effort to separate them, that we've been engaged in at least for the last two hundred years, carries the risk of paralysing social communication and cooperation. But it doesn't mean we're at the mercy of blind forces. The forgotten proposition of the great thinkers of the seventeenth century, which Wigura unearths, is to treat emotions as neither plagues nor tools, but as guides in our difficult quest for living a good life. Perhaps if we approached the emotions rattling our present political life with the same humanistic attitude, we'd have better chances of understanding what we really care about, and how to get it.

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FORTHCOMING

NEXT ISSUE:

1/2019 /// Total Intellectuals

The spectre of the scholar as a "soulless specialist" of the Weberian kind, an expert for hire, reconciled with the vision of scholarship as a job like any other, hangs over contemporary debates on changes in scholarship. The opposite of such a figure is the scholar who goes beyond the narrow frames of specialisation and administrative disconnection – a figure increasingly seldom to be found either in academia or in discussions of the academic milieu. Total intellectuals combine fields of thinking and methods of describing the world that are often only seemingly distant from each other and yet are institutionally categorised as separate academic disciplines. They are often writers who move smoothly between the cultivation of theory and engagement in practical activity, either social or political. They experiment with various forms of academic and non-academic writing, searching for various media to express their specific comprehension of reality. Finally, they are scholars who go beyond a certain standard of academic activity and depart from the usual career paths of their environment. Possible theoretical contexts for analysing the topic include critical views of the total intellectual as a figure of domination in the field of intellectual production, and the problem of the specialisation and reification of scholarship as a certain historical process connected with more general changes in the sphere of work.

FURTHER ISSUES IN PREPARATION:

2/2019 /// A New Culture of Truth? On the Transformation of Political Epistemologies since the 1960s in Central and Eastern Europe

Recent years have seen the alleged rise of a "post-truth era," in close association with the destabilisation of familiar epistemologies and the dismissal of their classic gatekeepers. Though "fake news" and "alternative facts" have predominantly been discussed with reference to the United States and Western Europe, this issue of *State of Affairs* will mainly focus on the former Warsaw Pact countries, where the negotiation of truth has a specific

history. After 1989, Marxism lost its official monopoly on interpretation to other – often "Western" – truth regimes. Although dissidents and social movements had emphatically (re)claimed "truth" as a weapon against regimes before 1989, it afterwards lost its impact, perhaps as an effect of political pluralisation and/or the digital atomisation of perspectives. These shifts in epistemological landscapes cannot be observed and described easily along the well-known lines of propaganda, information, disinformation, and so forth. The idea of this issue is to systematically assess such changes. We will therefore examine the practical contexts in which truth claims are embedded, as well as the (trans-)formation or (de-)stabilisation of "truth scenes" (e.g., the trial) and "truth figures."

1/2020 /// Heresy

Heresy is a call to change; it is a questioning of the existing order. It seems to us an interesting reflection of the world in a time of engrossing – and often even disturbing – change. Historically, the idea of heresy (from the Greek "*hairesis*," "choice" or "chosen thing") is one of the source categories of Christian thought, as heresy is dialectically connected with the concept of orthodoxy. The term was used to define the internal tension and conflict in the early Christian community or simply erroneous teachings. However, the idea could also be used to describe social and cultural phenomena that are not connected with the Christian tradition. We want to test the dialectical potential of heresy in contemporary debate. How does the idea of heresy function not only in the theology of various religious faiths but above all in philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities? In what manner could the idea of heresy be used by anthropologists, economists, cultural anthropologists, philosophers, religious scholars, or sociologists? We are also interested in the category of heresy itself, as well as studies of particular instances (historical phenomena and the fates of heresiarchs).

2/2020 /// Monuments

Monuments are a phenomenon as ancient as historical communities. Created out of stone or other material, resistant to the passage of time, they were made to preserve a memory. Generally involving a pedestal or column, they were intended to ensure the visibility of those events, persons, or ideas that had obtained social recognition. The image of a triumphal military leader has an outstanding political aim: to communicate the legitimacy of

his rule. Beginning in the times of the French Revolution, a certain fundamental change has occurred in this area: monuments began to be raised to persons or events that previously had been less visible – the victims of wars and other conflicts, or of mass tragedies. These monuments form an element of a broader phenomenon, the "political cult of the victim" (Koselleck), which changes the fallen into a political tool. Reformative and revolutionary iconoclasm proved monuments are able to evoke extreme emotions and serious disputes or acts of vandalism. At the same time, the majority are increasingly overlooked as minor architectural elements. In this issue, we reflect on monuments in the context of shaping social identity, commemorating victories, developing the political cult of the victim, and violence towards monuments.