The main thesis of this article is that related concepts and attitudes of „civil disobedience” and „civil courage” are comprehensible only through the idea of public sphere. To illustrate this rule, we describe two utterly different views of the public sphere: as a space of Agon and rivalry (Arendt), where disobedience and courage regenerates a motionless political process, as well as an environment of hygiene and correctness, where acquiescence to these attitudes is at least limited (Plessner). This rule applies to all interpretations of this issue, as illustrated by an example of John Rawls. In other words, whenever the aforementioned issues appear, the problem of the public sphere occurs as well. Secondly, the idea of what it is sends us back to the sources of the Self. What might seem to be a problem of social ethics turns out to be more a subject of political philosophy and anthropology. Finally, we believe that this rule might be applied as well to social movements that frequently initiate activities of a civil disobedience. Their functions and role is closely linked to the idea of the public sphere.